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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Critiques of regulatory government are as old as government 
regulation itself. They are also often compelling. Indeed, today confi-
dence in public regulatory institutions—in the modern administra-
tive state—risks dismissal as idealistic and uninformed. No doubt 
this is true in part because of the power of familiar critiques. Often, 
regulatory bodies appear to cater to the powerful, the well-funded, or 
the organized. This general dynamic is widely taken to be a conse-
quence of the basic “rules” of modern politics, and not without justifi-
cation. The combination of elected legislators who require economic 
resources to maintain their positions, on the one hand, and regula-
tory agencies that enjoy considerable regulatory power but depend on 
the legislature for political and budgetary resources, on the other, 
provides a recipe for a regulatory state that works to advantage well-
funded yet narrowly focused political interest groups (“special inter-
ests”), at least according to conventional wisdom. Such groups ex-
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change economic and political resources for what are essentially 
regulatory rents. Regulators deliver those rents as parties to an illicit 
exchange. 
 But sometimes they don’t. At times, regulatory institutions in-
stead appear to advance broad, diffuse interests, even at the expense 
of more powerful, concentrated interests. How is this possible? More 
specifically: Under what set of conditions, politically and especially 
legally, can regulatory bodies, federal administrative agencies in par-
ticular, deliver broad-based benefits—“public interest” or, better, 
“public interested” rather than “special interest” regulation?1 How, 
and perhaps more to the point, why do they at times seem to deliver 
broad-based benefits even over the strong opposition of well-
organized and well-funded interests? Are even these instances, upon 
close scrutiny, simply examples of certain powerful interests getting 
what they want, albeit under the guise of purportedly beneficial 
regulation, and thus confirmation of the conventional wisdom rather 
than exceptions to it? If not, what particular channels of agency au-
thority, what decisionmaking tools, are insulated from the conse-
quences of interest group politics? Perhaps more urgently, why would 
interests thwarted by those channels tolerate decisionmaking envi-
                                                                                                                  
 1. For treatments of the concept of “the public interest,” see generally VIRGINIA 
HELD, THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS 1-15 (1970), GLENDON SCHUBERT, 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST: A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF A POLITICAL CONCEPT 5-29 (1960), 
Clarke E. Cochran, Political Science and “The Public Interest”, 36 J. POL. 327 (1974), Nor-
ton Long, Conceptual Notes on the Public Interest for Public Administration and Policy 
Analysts, 22 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 170 (1990), and Barry M. Mitnick, A Typology of Conceptions 
of the Public Interest, 8 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 5 (1976). Some students of regulation associate 
“the public interest” with the amelioration of market failures. See, e.g., Michael E. Levine 
& Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: To-
ward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 168 (1990). For a classic distinction between 
public-interested and self-interested interest groups, see E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER,  THE 
SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE : A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 26 (1960). See also 
JEFFREY M. BERRY,  LOBBYING FOR THE PEOPLE :  THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF PUBLIC 
INTEREST GROUPS 7 (1977) (distinguishing “public interest groups” from other types of in-
terest groups); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 29 (1986) (same). Here and throughout, “public interested” regula-
tion is used in contradistinction to “special interest” regulation, where the former refers to 
regulation that promotes diffuse interests while the latter describes the delivery of rents to 
narrow groups. Interest group and public choice theorists of many stripes have long la-
mented the consequences of regulatory favoritism towards narrow, rent-seeking interest 
groups as antithetical to general, but not highly spe cified, notions of the general welfare. 
“Public interested” regulation represents the category of “benign” regulation that stands in 
opposition to the “bad” regulation interest group theorists usually fear. Public interested 
regulation needs no further spe cification than to say that it aims at vindicating the prefer-
ences of diffuse interests, and it delivers no regulatory rents. Thus, a publicly interested 
regulator is motivated to advance some conception of the general welfare. Whether publicly 
interested regulators in fact advance general interests effectively is a separate question 
touched upon in the conclusion of this Article but outside of its principal focus. The point 
for now is that public choice theorists are estopped from objecting to an argument that 
regulation sometimes advances public interests on the grounds that such an argument re-
quires a well-developed conception of the public interest. 
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ronments that allow agencies to deliver broad-based benefits at their 
expense? Or is there little they can do about it? 
 This Article will address these questions, though it does not pur-
port to answer them definitively. Part II articulates and evaluates 
certain claims about the “logic” of regulatory government commonly 
made by versions of “interest group,” “capture,” or “public choice” ac-
counts of regulation. Part III presents an alternative approach to un-
derstanding regulation that places greater explanatory weight on 
administrator ideology and especially administrative procedure as 
important determinants of regulatory outcomes. In so doing, Part III 
explores the relationship between Congress and agencies by 
considering the motivations for agency behavior, the role of the 
administrative process in constraining or liberating agencies, and 
extralegislative influences on agency behavior. Part IV attempts to 
ground the analyses of Parts II and III by exploring three recent 
major regulatory initiatives that appear inexplicable by conventional 
interest-group accounts of regulation. Part V draws conclusions 
about the limitations of interest group theory and the promise of an 
administrative process approach to regulation, based on the common 
features of the examined initiatives that made broad-based 
regulation possible, emphasizing the administrative decisionmaking 
processes the agencies employed and examining the larger legal and 
institutional environments in which those agencies operated. 
II.   INTEREST GROUP THEORY 
A.   Theme 
 You’ve heard all of this before: Elected politicians prefer to remain 
in office. They are able to remain in office only so long as they con-
tinue to win the favor of their constituencies. Winning the support of 
their constituencies requires substantial political resources, in par-
ticular, votes and money to attract votes through political campaign-
ing. Because very few politicians can finance their own political 
causes independently, they seek to attract resources from supporters 
and potential supporters. 
 Enter organized interest groups. Interest groups possess the very 
resources politicians require for their political survival. Sometimes 
such groups are large and well disciplined such that their member-
ship can deliver a significant number of votes to a member of Con-
gress. Much more often, interest groups do not themselves contribute 
significant numbers of votes directly to politicians, but instead con-
tribute financial support to political campaigns, which turn money 
into votes through television advertising and the like. In any event, 
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the important point is that interest groups can supply invaluable re-
sources to those politicians who garner their support.2 
 Naturally, interest groups have their own goals as well; they 
hardly exist simply to meet elected politicians’ needs. Rather, they 
seek to advance particular policies that further the interests of their 
members and, similarly, to defeat or dismantle policies that retard 
their members’ interests. Politicians, as policymakers and policy-
breakers, are well positioned to advance interest group goals. They 
can do so by providing the very policies that an organized interest 
group seeks or by defeating one that a group opposes, powers they 
exercise in exchange for the group’s support. Each side gains: Politi-
cians receive the political resources necessary for their continued po-
litical survival, and interest groups enjoy the benefits of the regula-
tory policies they favor. 
 Although this exchange relationship between elected politicians 
and organized interest groups constitutes the linchpin of most cri-
tiques of regulatory government,3 it tells only half of the story, or 
rather two-thirds of it. Administrative agencies figure into the ex-
change equation as well. After all, because so much of modern gov-
ernment is administrative government, agencies, not legislatures, 
typically hold the levers of state. While Congress occasionally legis-
lates with considerable specificity, it is federal regulatory agencies 
that implement legislative directives by filling in the innumerable 
gaps in virtually all legislation. For powerful pragmatic reasons, 
given the scarcity of congressional time, attention, and other re-
sources, Congress must delegate to administrative agencies the 
power to make countless regulatory decisions. Agencies in turn exer-
cise that power, within the often very broad parameters of their dele-
gated authority, by creating, defining, and enforcing the legal rules 
that govern much of modern society, a condition that students of ad-
                                                                                                                  
 2. See generally FRED S. MCCHESNEY,  MONEY FOR NOTHING:  POLITICIANS, RENT 
EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997); FRANK J. SORAUF,  INSIDE CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIES (1992); M. Margaret Conway & Joanne Connor Green, Po-
litical Action Committees and the Political Process in the 1990s, in INTEREST GROUP 
POLITICS 155 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 4th ed. 1995); Frank Sorauf, Adap-
tion and Innovation in Political Action Committees, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS, supra, at 
175. 
 3. This idea of an exchange relationship between suppliers and demanders of regula-
tion is the distinctive characteristic of the public choice account of regulation. See, e.g., Le-
vine & Forrence, supra note 1, at 169; Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of 
Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 212 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic 
Regulation, 5 BELL. J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 344 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory 
of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 11-12 (1971) [hereinafter Stigler, 
The Theory]. On the state’s special position as the sole supplier of regulation, see, for ex-
ample, id. at 4, noting, “The state has one basic resource which in pure principle is not 
shared with even the mightiest of its citizens: the power to coerce.” See also Posner, supra, 
at 346 n.27 (1974) (“The government has a monopoly on the sale of regulation . . . .”). 
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ministrative law often point out. 4 Thus, “regulation” is best under-
stood as the work product of agencies; “regulatory decisionmaking” 
almost always (though sometimes implicitly) references the adminis-
trative implementation of general and often dusty legislative direc-
tives, as the discussion later below will illustrate. 
 The implication here is crucial: Because regulation infrequently 
takes the form of highly specified legislation, interest groups seeking 
to advance their regulatory policy goals require much more than a 
cooperative legislator or legislature. They also require a cooperative 
bureaucrat or agency. This means either that interest groups must 
press their concerns directly before administrative agencies, or that 
legislators must be able to control agencies well enough to deliver the 
policies that interest group constituencies seek, or both. If agencies 
are not sympathetic to interest group goals, and if legislators cannot 
influence agencies enough to implement the regulatory policies 
sought by their interest group supporters, then all of the votes and 
campaign contributions in the world (resources of no use to agencies 
themselves) will not generate the regulatory outcome an interest 
group seeks. 
 Fortunately for groups demanding favorable regulation, as well as 
for legislators seeking to earn electoral-political support from appre-
ciative interest groups, Congress has at its disposal a set of carrots 
and sticks (mostly sticks) with which to influence agency behavior. 
That influence extends ultimately from Congress’ fundamental power 
of legislation, including the power to repeal legislation, and its corol-
lary power to spend, or refuse to spend, money. From an agency’s 
point of view, the possible consequences of these powers are straight-
forward. Congress can increase or decrease an agency’s budget, de-
pending in part on Congress’ assessment of the agency’s perform-
ance. Similarly, Congress can expand or contract the scope of an 
agency’s authority by amending or, in the extreme, by repealing the 
agency’s enabling act or other important pieces of legislation that 
give an agency its power. Agencies unresponsive to congressional 
cues about what regulation should look like may thus see their au-
thority curtailed. Finally, though cumbersome, Congress can also by 
legislation undo any agency decision, giving Congress a certain veto 
power over agencies. Conversely to all of these possibilities, Congress 
can provide cooperative agencies with more generous funding, 
greater statutory responsibility, legislative blessing of agency deci-
sions, and so on. 
                                                                                                                  
 4. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM  6 (1982); CORNELIUS M. 
KERWIN,  RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 85 
(1994); John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 1, 13 (1990); Levine & Forrence, supra note 1, at 185. 
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 Of course, exercising these powers requires Congress to keep 
abreast of what an agency does; punishment and reward presuppose 
information about which of them is deserved. Here too, Congress has 
several mechanisms in its repertoire.5 For example, it can order stud-
ies and reports of agency action. Congress can also hold oversight 
hearings to evaluate specific agency behavior or proposed behavior. 
In addition, Congress can and does monitor agencies through con-
gressional offices, informal staff contacts, and agency liaisons. And if 
all of that is not enough, Congress can also rely on information from 
interest groups themselves, who have their own incentives to keep 
abreast of agency behavior.6 
 Now for the punch line: These various methods of congressional 
control allow legislators to satisfy interest group regulatory demands 
by prompting agencies, the ground-level regulators, to make the 
regulatory decisions interest groups seek. Obtaining favorable budg-
etary and statutory treatment from legislators motivates agencies to 
supply desired regulatory treatment. 7 Interest groups are happy to 
provide electoral resources to legislators who can inspire desired 
regulatory treatment by agencies. Legislators, in order to secure 
needed electoral resources, are motivated to ensure that agencies 
supply the regulation that their interest group supporters seek. 
Hence the “iron triangle”8 or, less darkly, the “issue network”9 rela-
                                                                                                                  
 5. See generally Jeffrey S. Banks, Agency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing, 
33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 670 (1989); Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Learning from 
Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 96 (1994); 
Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, in CONGRESS:  STRUCTURE AND POLICY 426 (Mathew D. 
McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987); see also Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus 
Expertise: Congressional Choice About Administrative Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
62, 62 (1995); McNollgast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 248-51 (1987). 
 6. See, e.g., McNollgast, supra note 5, at 250. 
 7. For one classic statement, see WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971). See also THE BUDGET MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: 
APPRAISALS AND EVIDENCE  (Andrea Blais & Stephane Dion eds., 1991). 
 8. See, e.g., THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF 
THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979). For important earlier presentations, see generally 
DOUGLASS CATER, POWER IN WASHINGTON (1964); J. LEIPER FREEMAN, THE POLITICAL 
PROCESS: EXECUTIVE BUREAU-LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE RELATIONS (rev. ed. 1965); and 
ERNEST S. G RIFFITH, THE IMPASSE OF DEMOCRACY: A STUDY OF THE MODERN GOVERNMENT 
IN ACTION (1939). See also James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF 
REGULATION 357 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980). Contributors to the “information” species of 
capture theory include, for example, MARVER BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS THROUGH 
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1969), GABRIEL KOLKO,  RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-
1916 (1965) and, more recently, Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risks, Courts, and 
Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027 (1990). See also GEORGE J. STIGLER, Can Regulatory 
Agencies Protect the Consumer?, in THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE : ESSAYS ON REGULATION 
178, 181 (1975) [hereinafter STIGLER, The Consumer] (discussing the inevitability of indus-
try influence on the proverbial Washington commissioner). 
 9. See generally Jeffrey M. Berry, Subgovernments, Issue Networks, and Political 
Conflict, in REMAKING AMERICAN POLITICS 239 (Richard A. Harris & Sidney M. Milkis eds., 
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tionship among groups, legislators, and administrative agencies that 
typically characterizes the interest-group account of regulation. Ac-
cording to this account, agencies become “captured” by the very par-
ties whose behavior the agencies are supposed to shape; ironically, 
control runs in the direction from interest group to agency, opposite 
from what might be hoped for or supposed.10 
 But it’s a free country. Stated so far, nothing about the dynamic 
described indicates what is normatively undesirable about the legis-
lator/agency/interest group triad. Indeed, the image of legislators 
who are sensitive to the preferences of their constituencies, of inter-
est groups that mobilize to advance lawful goals by contributing to 
open elections, and of legislators who control (unelected) agencies 
that they themselves have (after all) created is hardly an undemo-
cratic one. The question thus becomes what makes the interest group 
theory of regulation so troubling. 
 The trouble is two-fold. First, it is by no means clear that interest 
group competition for the loyalties of elected legislators is balanced. 
To the contrary, most students of interest-group politics conclude 
that certain types of interest groups dominate the electoral system 
because they are unusually effective at mobilizing.11 Borrowing from 
Mancur Olson,12 the interest group theory holds that small groups 
                                                                                                                  
1989); William P. Browne, Organized Interests and Their Issue Niches: A Search for Plural-
ism in a Policy Domain, 52 J. POL. 477 (1990). 
 10. This is not to say, however, that satisfying powerful constituencies’ demands is it-
self what motivates Congress to delegate in the first place. According to conventional wis-
dom, Congress delegates lawmaking power to administrative agencies who have the time, 
attention, personnel and, critically, the scientific and technical resources to address regu-
latory problems in a way that Congress, given the scarcity of its own institutional re-
sources, cannot. Naturally, once Congress has delegated regulatory power to agencies, it 
runs the risk that agencies may pursue their own agendas at the possible expense of Con-
gress’ own preferences. In a recent set of interesting works, David Epstein and Sharyn 
O’Halloran have systematized this basic wisdom by presenting what they call a “transac-
tion costs” approach to delegation. According to their formulation, Congress will either 
delegate, or directly legislate, depending on the relative costs “of making policy internally,” 
given “the inefficiencies of the committee system,” and the costs of delegating, given “con-
gress’s principal-agent problems of oversight and control.” DAVID EPSTEIN &  SHARYN 
O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY 
MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 7-9 (1999). See generally David Epstein & Sharyn 
O’Halloran, Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 697 (1994); David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Divided Government and the Design 
of Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical Test, 58 J. POL. 373 (1996); 
David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists, 
and the Bureaucracy, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 227 (1995); see also Morris P. Fiorina, Legisla-
tive Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 
33 (1982). 
 11. See, e.g., SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 1, at 200-20; see also William C. 
Mitchell & Michael C. Munger, Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Sur-
vey, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 512 (1991); Peltzman, supra note 3; Posner, supra note 3; Stigler, 
The Theory, supra note 3. 
 12. The classic work is MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). A clearer exposition is found in RUSSEL 
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are better situated, relative to groups with many would-be members, 
to overcome the collective-action problems that generally impede 
group mobilization.13 Similarly, groups whose individual members 
have a large absolute stake in the matter are also better able to mo-
bilize; from their members’ points of view, more depends on their 
successful mobilization.14 Often these two characteristics—few mem-
bers and large member stakes—coincide, which makes mobilization 
easier still. The flip side is that groups whose members are numer-
ous, and groups whose members have a small individual stake in a 
given matter, will tend not to organize, which is to say that they will 
not exist in a group structure at all. 15 
 Interest group participation in regulatory politics will tend to be 
lopsided, the story continues, given that many regulatory decisions 
either generate diffuse benefits but impose concentrated costs—
consider many workplace safety or pollution-reduction proposals, for 
example—or provide concentrated benefits while imposing diffuse 
costs—as is true for regulation that restricts market entry. Either 
way, parties on one side of a regulatory program will be spread much 
more thinly than those on the other. That distribution translates into 
pitting a mobilized group against an unorganized one, with the pre-
dictable result that regulators will feel pressure from, and will re-
spond to, only one side of the regulatory transaction. Far from the 
balanced interest group competition contemplated by pluralist theo-
ries of politics, 16 which the Olson-inspired interest group theory ex-
                                                                                                                  
HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982). For recent treatments and applications, see DENNIS 
CHONG,  COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1991); MARK IRVING 
LICHBACH, THE COOPERATOR’S DILEMMA (1996); GERALD MARWELL & PAMELA OLIVER, THE 
CRITICAL MASS IN COLLECTIVE ACTION: A MICRO-SOCIAL THEORY (1993); ELINOR OSTROM, 
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 
(1990); TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS  (1992); and JOE 
B. STEVENS , THE ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE CHOICE  (1993). 
 13. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 12, at 28, 35; Posner, supra note 3, at 345; George J. 
Stigler, Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation, 
5 BELL. J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 359, 360-62 (1974). 
 14. See OLSON, supra note 12, at 28-29. 
 15. See id. at 28. 
 16. Important contributions to the development of interest group pluralism include, 
for example, ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SOCIAL 
PRESSURES (1908), ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956), ROBERT 
A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE (3d ed. 1976), 
ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961), 
EARL LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS: A STUDY IN BASING-POINT LEGISLATION 
(1952), and DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND 
PUBLIC OPINION (1951). For important critiques outside of the public choice tradition, see 
LOWI, supra note 8, and Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 AM. 
POL.  SCI. REV. 947 (1962). Useful secondary sources include JEFFREY M. BERRY,  THE 
INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY (2d ed. 1989); RONALD J. HREBENAR & RUTH K.  SCOTT, 
INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1990); GRAHAM K. WILSON,  INTEREST 
GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES (1981); and J. David Greenstone, Group Theories, in 2 
HANDBOOK OFPOLITICAL SCIENCE :  MICROPOLITICAL THEORY 243 (Fred I. Greenstein & 
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plicitly rejects, interest group activity in this light essentially means 
that the organized few accomplish their regulatory aims over the un-
organized many.17 
 That’s not the worst of it. More disturbing, self-serving interest 
groups are able to advance their policy goals even where their gains 
are outweighed by greater losses borne by the unorganized.18 Pre-
cisely because the many are no competition for the few, there are 
many occasions for those able to mobilize to achieve regulatory suc-
cesses that harm the unorganized substantially.19 Although the 
losses to any individual among the unorganized may be impercepti-
ble, their total magnitude may far outweigh the gains enjoyed by 
members of the special interest group. And even where those losses 
are perceptible to the regulatory losers, by hypothesis there is little 
regulatory losers can do about it. 20 
 The consequences of lopsided interest group influences on regula-
tory policy, in other words, are not merely distributional. Instead, 
powerful and narrowly interested groups often realize their policy 
preferences to the much greater expense of those who, unorganized 
or poorly funded, are unable to advance their competing regulatory 
preferences very far. That regulatory policies generate net social 
losses is what gives the interest group theory its pejorative ring. In-
terest group rents are detrimental to society as a whole. 
B.   Complications 
 Now turn up the microscope. On close analysis, this familiar ac-
count, while compelling on one level of generality and appealing in 
its parsimoniousness, shows its holes. Seeing them clearly requires 
careful consideration of the main argument underlying the conven-
tional wisdom. Boiled down, its key propositions hold: 
                                                                                                                  
Nelson W. Polsby eds., 1975); see also ARTHUR MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD 
3, 5 (1983) (discussing the extent to which pluralists perceived the consequences of interest 
group competition as being benign); BERRY, supra, at 9-11 (same). 
 17. See Posner, supra note 3, at 344; Stigler, The Theory, supra note 3, at 3, 10; see 
also Mitchell & Munger, supra note 11, at 525-26 (noting that market privileges gained 
through rent seeking “[inform] consumers (and potential industry entrants) of the gains to 
collective action . . . .”); Peltzman, supra note 3, at 212-13. 
 18. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. 
POL.  ECON. 807 (1975) (arguing that the social costs of regulation are probably greater 
than the social costs of monopoly); Stigler, The Theory, supra note 3, at 10 (arguing that in-
terest group rents usually “fall short of the damage to the rest of the community”); see also 
JAMES M. BUCHANAN ET AL., TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (1980); 
GORDON TULLOCK, RENT SEEKING (1993). 
 19. See Stigler, The Theory, supra note 3, at 18; see also STIGLER, The Consumer, su-
pra note 8, at 181.  
 20. See STIGLER, The Consumer, supra note 8, at 181, 186-87 (citing OLSON, supra 
note 12); Peltzman, supra note 3, at 212-13 (citing Stigler, The Theory , supra note 3); Rich-
ard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 83 (1969). 
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(1) Interest groups seek regulatory decisions that advance the self-
ish interests of their members—the “interest group motivation 
claim.” 
(2) Small, narrowly focused interests groups, whose members indi-
vidually have much at stake, are unusually well able to overcome 
the collective action problem that generally impedes interest group 
mobilization. This ability creates a strong bias in the demand for 
regulation in favor of narrow interests—the “collective action 
claim.” 
(3) Legislators seek to trade favorable regulatory treatment for 
needed political resources from the interest groups best able to 
provide them—the “legislator motivation claim.” 
(4) Legislative control over administrative agencies is sufficient to 
allow legislators to deliver the regulatory treatment interest 
groups seek from agencies—the “legislative dominance claim.” 
 And each step is necessary. The coupling of the interest group mo-
tivation and the collective action claims is what raises concerns 
about interest group activity in the first place: Interest groups are 
out for only their own good, and only narrowly focused groups whose 
members have a lot at stake will be able to mobilize to press their re-
spective agendas. The collective action claim in particular is impor-
tant to the theory because it establishes the type of interest groups 
that make the most effective demands upon legislators in exchange 
for electoral support. If many equally powerful groups were able to 
mobilize to compete for legislative sympathies, then the pluralist 
theory might appear stronger. To the extent that legislators hear 
from many types of interest groups with different and opposing regu-
latory preferences, the implications of a legislator’s reelection-
minded calculus become more complicated: The legislator may be 
pushed and pulled in different directions, sometimes deciding that 
satisfying the regulatory preferences of broad-based groups is more 
politically rewarding than siding with business interests. By a simi-
lar token, if only a few groups were able to mobilize, but did so to ad-
vocate general interests rather than only their members’ interests, 
one would not worry so much about the consequences of interest 
group influence. However, because interest group activity is instead 
selfish and lopsided, legislators have more to gain from being solici-
tous of certain interests, and necessarily less solicitous of more gen-
eral interests. 
 The legislator motivation claim is similarly indispensable to the 
interest group theory’s capture vision. Were legislators by and large 
immune to interest groups’ regulatory preferences, it would not mat-
ter much how lopsided interest-group activity was. Because legisla-
tors are motivated to satisfy those preferences in order to preserve 
their own positions, however, lopsided interest group pressure trans-
2000]  PUBLIC INTERESTED REGULATION  17 
 
lates into lopsided regulatory consideration. Finally, the legislative 
influence claim is similarly crucial. Were legislators unable to control 
agencies enough to generate the regulatory outcomes favored by their 
interest-group constituencies, legislator motivation would mean very 
little. The problem is that legislators can prompt agencies to provide 
the regulatory benefits that powerful yet narrowly interested groups 
seek. The theory concludes, accordingly, that agencies, responsive to 
legislative signals, provide those benefits thereby consummating the 
exchange between legislators and interest groups, even at the greater 
expense to the rest of society. 
 While not all students of regulation see socially beneficial regula-
tion as an impossible proposition, this basic picture enjoys wide aca-
demic recognition. The interest group theory holds considerable sway 
over much scholarly discourse about public law institutions gener-
ally, and regulatory bodies in particular. Even those—perhaps, espe-
cially those—who approach public law regulation indirectly often 
seem osmotically influenced by the interest group theory’s conclu-
sions. 21 The theory accounts for much skepticism towards public law 
regulation.22 
 Yet all of its key claims are questionable. While an exhaustive 
treatment of the conceptual and empirical dimensions of each of 
these claims is beyond the scope of this analysis, several general ob-
servations are in order, after which the balance of this Article will fo-
cus on the interest group theory’s legislative dominance claim in par-
ticular. 
 First, the claim that interest groups seek to advance only the in-
terests of their members overstates matters, in at least two ways. 
For one, many interest groups, even those representing well-
financed, business-oriented interests, often at least purport to repre-
sent general interests. That is, they claim that the regulatory policies 
they support would benefit society generally, by boosting American 
competitiveness, benefiting consumers, promoting new technologies, 
and so on. Interest groups making such claims may be wrong about 
them, and they may often make them disingenuously, but at least 
part of the time even groups organized to promote a specific trade or 
industry appear to favor regulatory policies that plausibly do ad-
vance broad interests. It is often the case, for example, that compet-
ing business-oriented interest groups seeking diametrically opposed 
regulatory decisions both invoke the argument that their preferred 
                                                                                                                  
 21. For one recent example, see DANIEL N. SHAVIRO,  WHEN RULES CHANGE :  AN 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY (2000). 
 22. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,  LAW & PUBLIC CHOICE: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 24 (1991) ; LOWI, supra note 8, at 57-61; GLEN O. ROBINSON ET 
AL., THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 17 (3d ed. 1986); cf. Levine & Forrence, supra note 1, at 
171; Roger G. Noll, Government Regulatory Behavior: A Multidisciplinary Survey and Sy n-
thesis, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 9, 52 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985). 
18  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:7 
 
regulatory outcome would most benefit society as a whole. (The con-
troversy in recent years surrounding bank deregulation, which pitted 
banks against insurance companies and investment companies, pro-
vides a case in point, as discussed below.23) Opposing groups cannot 
both be right that the outcome they favor would most benefit society 
in general, but then neither can both be wrong about that. As regula-
tors will act or fail to act in a way that most promotes one side’s in-
terests or the other’s, regulators who deliver what one interest group 
wants may in fact advance broad public interests. Moreover, wher-
ever opposing groups can credibly claim that the regulation they fa-
vor will advance social interests, such claims seem likely to increase 
that group’s chance of success—by providing regulators with political 
cover, by giving regulators a means to resolve close cases, and so 
on—even if one assumes that agencies otherwise satisfy groups’ regu-
latory demands as a general matter.  
 Second, and more importantly, some organized interest groups 
appear primarily to promote interests extending beyond those of 
their own membership.24 In fact, the very purpose of environmental 
groups, consumer groups, and other public-interest groups is to pro-
mote the broad-based interests of large segments of society, not the 
selfish interests of their members. 25 Here again, such groups’ claims 
about whether the regulation they favor truly advances broad socie-
tal interests are certainly open to dispute,26 but the point remains 
that the existence of these groups complicates the theory’s interest 
group motivation claim; accommodating public interested groups re-
quires some adjustment to the theory. A proponent of interest group 
theory might respond that broad-based groups are outnumbered and 
                                                                                                                  
 23. See infra Part IV.C. 
 24. See BERRY, supra note 1, at 8-10; HARDIN, supra note 12, at 101-08; SCHLOZMAN & 
TIERNEY, supra note 1, at 30-34; CASS R. SUNSTEIN,  AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: 
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 3 (1990); Terry M. Moe, Toward a Broader View of 
Interest Groups, 43 J. POL. 531, 536 (1981); Cass R. Sunstein, Participation, Public Law, 
and Venue Reform, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 976, 987 (1982); see also Harold H. Bruff, Legislative 
Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207, 244 (1984) (arguing that the 
development of public-oriented interest groups is incompatible with interest group theory 
expectations); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 63, 99-100 (1990) (same); Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive 
Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1991) (same).  
 25. See, e.g., BERRY, supra note 1, at 8-10; HARDIN, supra note 12, at 101; STEPHEN 
MILLER, SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN POLITICS  113-33 (1983). 
 26. On the one hand, members of such groups might be considered to represent the 
ends of the political spectrum, rather than the median voter. On the other hand, however, 
some see such groups as representative of many citizens’ interests, see, e.g., BERRY, supra 
note 1, at 3; MILLER, supra note 25, at 118; Jeffrey M. Berry, Citizen Groups and the 
Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics, 528 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 30, 31 
(1993). This view enjoys some empirical support. See LAWRENCE S. ROTHENBERG, LINKING 
CITIZENS TO GOVERNMENT: INTEREST GROUP POLITICS AT COMMON CAUSE 36-37 (1992). 
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out-resourced by other groups, as indeed they are,27 but whether 
their lesser resources means that legislators are less attentive to 
their preferences raises empirical questions without obvious an-
swers. It is plausible, for example, that legislators’ reelection goals at 
times inspire careful attention to the preferences of broad-based 
groups, whose views may matter to a large number of voters, and 
less attention to the preferences of narrow groups whose campaign 
contributions may or may not yield large numbers of votes.28 It is also 
possible that administrators may be as attentive to broad-based in-
terest groups as they are to narrow groups.29 
 The observation that the existence of seemingly broad-based in-
terest groups is inconvenient for the interest group theory brings no 
news, but it helpfully exposes certain conceptual difficulties with the 
interest group theory’s collective action claim as well. Again, that 
claim holds that small, narrowly interested groups whose members 
have considerable individual stakes in some collective undertaking 
are peculiarly able to overcome the logic of the collective action prob-
lem, which ordinarily prevents the emergence of organized groups.30 
To refresh memories, Olson’s formulation of that logic, on which the 
interest group theory relies heavily,31 posits that individual members 
of a potential group will not contribute toward some group good—a 
public good for the group in question—whenever the costs of doing so 
outweigh the benefits of contributing. Because the benefits of group 
contributions are shared across the entire group, whereas the costs 
are borne by the individual contributor alone, the individual member 
will tend to reason that contributing toward a collective good is not 
worthwhile, and certainly will not contribute at what would be the 
                                                                                                                  
 27. See, e.g., HARDIN, supra note 12, at 11, 124; SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 1, 
at 34-36. 
 28. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 3, at 347. 
 29. See, e.g., DAVID VOGEL,  FLUCTUATING FORTUNES:  THE POLITICAL POWER OF 
BUSINESS IN AMERICA 112 (1980). For empirical evidence suggesting that administrators 
are at times quite attentive to public interest groups, see, for example, Scott Furlong, In-
terest Group Influence on Regulatory Policy (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with 
author), and Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act 
and Good Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451, 500-01 (1997). On the political significance 
of public interest groups in the legislative arena generally, see BERRY, supra note 1; 
MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS 
(1981); WILSON, supra note 16, at 138-39; Burdett A. Loomis & Allan J. Cigler, Introduc-
tion: The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS  1, 1-26 
(Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 2d ed. 1986); and Jack L. Walker, The Origins 
and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 390, 397-99 (1983). 
 30. See OLSON, supra note 12, at 143; see also sources cited supra note 13. 
 31. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 22, at 23 (noting that economic theory of 
interest groups can be traced to Olson); Jack Hirshleifer, Comment, 19 J.L. & ECON. 241, 
241 n.2 (1976) (describing Peltzman’s topic as closely related to OLSON, supra note 12); 
Moe, supra note 24, at 533-35 (characterizing “the Olson perspective” as the foundation of 
the main alternative to pluralist theory of interest groups). 
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optimal level (for the group).32 What is true for one potential member 
is true for all similarly situated, potential members. Group goods 
therefore are often not produced at all; at best, they are under-
produced.33 
 Only in unusual circumstances, the argument continues, will 
there be enough contributions to the collective enterprise to finance 
any organizational structure and political apparatus, and thus allow 
a group to emerge; most groups will remain, in Olson’s lexicon, “la-
tent.”34 First, some groups (“privileged groups”) will just happen to 
have one or more members who have so much individually at stake 
that they are willing to make significant contributions to the group 
enterprise themselves. 35 The other members of such groups are sim-
ply the lucky beneficiaries of the sponsoring members’ efforts; the 
group mobilizes thanks to the sponsoring members’ contributions. Al-
ternatively, and more importantly according to Olson’s framework, 
some groups (“intermediate groups”) may be small enough that their 
members can bargain their way to an agreement governing contribu-
tions to their collective endeavor.36  
 The difficulty for the theory concerns the exact mechanism by 
which intermediate groups mobilize. That is, the very same logic that 
concludes that large groups will tend not to organize, because each 
individual member reasons that it is not in her individual interest to 
contribute toward the collective enterprise, should predict the same 
for any group, no matter its size. After all, to devise and participate 
in some bargaining arrangement is to contribute toward a group 
good. Enforcing such an arrangement, once established, requires ad-
ditional contributions to a group good. If a group is not privileged, 
then, none of its members will expect to receive benefits from contri-
butions to the group enterprise that are commensurate with her own 
costs. Taken to its conclusion, the logic of collective action really im-
plies that groups as such, as opposed to individual group members 
whose behavior happens to provide a beneficial externality for other 
members, are not as central to understanding political behavior as is 
commonly supposed. 
 Of course there are answers. Group members contribute for rea-
sons having to do with their own sense of fairness, for political or 
ideological reasons, and to show solidarity, for example.37 In addition, 
some groups are founded and maintained through the efforts of po-
litical entrepreneurs.38 But the answers Olson and, following him, 
                                                                                                                  
 32. See OLSON, supra note 12, at 33-34. 
 33. See id. at 33-52. 
 34. Id. at 50. 
 35. Id. at 49-50. 
 36. Id. at 50. 
 37. See HARDIN, supra note 12, at 103-12. 
 38. See id. at 35-36. 
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George Stigler, who provides much of the theoretical foundation for 
the interest group theory, offer to explain why some interest groups 
mobilize and others do not are not compelling. For instance, Stigler 
attributes interest group mobilization to small group size and an 
asymmetry of preferences among a group’s members, 39 neither of 
which convincingly explains why some groups (representing narrow 
interests) but not others (broad-based interests) can overcome the 
collective-action barriers to mobilization.40 Taken on its own terms, 
the theory is fuzzy, incomplete.41 
 This conceptual indeterminacy notwithstanding, assume that leg-
islators are pressured exclusively by narrow, industry- or trade-
oriented business interest groups, and that those interest groups 
pursue only rent-seeking regulatory policies that would further their 
memberships’ interests at society’s expense. The next question be-
comes whether the interest group theory’s separate claim about legis-
lative motivations, according to which legislators respond to interest 
group pressures in exchange for needed political resources, is itself 
compelling. One fair criticism of the theory’s legislator motivation 
claim is that it seems to imply that reelection-minded legislators in-
evitably satisfy interest group demands. 
 But that implication is misplaced. Even legislators for whom re-
election is by far the single most important, overriding goal need not 
always supply resourceful interest groups with the regulatory poli-
cies they prefer. For one thing, not all legislators are electorally vul-
nerable.42 Legislators from “safe” districts, even those who would 
never jeopardize their reelection prospects, have no strong incentive 
to satisfy all interest group regulatory demands, since the benefits of 
doing so would not, for them, be substantial. Whether a reelection-
minded legislator would determine that satisfying a group’s regula-
tory preferences were necessary would depend on how close a legisla-
tor considered herself to be to some comfortable reelection threshold, 
as well as on her calculations about whether supporting or failing to 
                                                                                                                  
 39. See Stigler, supra note 13, at 359-60. 
 40. For a fuller treatment, see Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating 
the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM . L. REV. 1, 16-19, 45-49 (1998). 
 41. See Posner, supra note 3, at 349 (noting the conceptual limitations of the logic of 
collective action); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and 
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support some interest group’s cause would likely move her above or 
below that threshold.43 Moreover, while the interest group theory’s 
portrayal of legislative incentives usually seems to contemplate some 
electorally vulnerable member of the House of Representatives, the 
story becomes much more complicated remembering the Senate’s 
contribution to regulatory policy.44 To be sure, senators too need to be 
reelected, but longer terms, generally safer tenure, and the real pos-
sibility of conflicts between the two chambers on matters of regula-
tory policy make the interest group legislative motivation claim 
much more intricate than it first appears. 
 Legislator ideology complicates matters further still, as others 
have shown.45 Assuming that reelection is one very important goal 
for any given legislator, but one that may be traded off against other 
important goals, the question becomes how much weight reelection 
gets vis-à-vis other legislator goals. In fact, there is evidence that leg-
islators serve different roles over the course of their legislative ca-
reers—as ombudspersons, policy experts, senior statespersons—not 
all of which are consistent with meeting interest groups’ regulatory 
preferences, and during which legislators have more or less room to 
advance their own ideological commitments. 46 
                                                                                                                  
 43. See Steven P. Croley, Imperfect Information and the Electoral Connection, 47 POL. 
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 44. See, e.g., Terry Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of “Congressional 
Dominance”, 12 LEG. STUD. Q. 475 (1987); John T. Woolley, Conflict Among Regulators and 
the Hypothesis of Congressional Dominance, 55 J. POL. 92 (1993). 
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 46. The interest group theory might accommodate considerations of legislative ideol-
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regulation and interest group regulation line up rather neatly. According to this view, leg-
islators might as a psychological matter be driven by ideology, but their ideological beliefs 
about desirable regulatory policy happen to match interest groups’ preferences. Only legis-
lators whose convictions lead them to the same place interest groups would have them go 
will enjoy the political resources that interest groups have to offer, creating a selection bias 
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in elections are not bought out by interest groups; rather, they are the candidates who 
happen to attract the most interest group support. But see Kau & Rubin, supra note 45 
(presenting empirical findings that legislators’ votes cannot be reduced either to the eco-
nomic interests of their constituents or to logrolling and that ideology appears to be a sig-
nificant determinant of legislator voting decisions). To be sure, interest group support is 
still crucial, but in this light, that support is a consequence of a legislative behavior, not a 
cause of it. Thus, interest group support for certain regulatory policies should, as a norma-
tive matter, be somewhat less troubling. At the very least, the interest group theory’s legis-
lator motivation claim should now cause alarm only to the extent one can be confident that 
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 But this speaks only to the complications introduced by considera-
tions of legislative ideology. To the extent that administrators too are 
motivated by ideological commitments, the interest group theory is 
threatened again, for a separate set of reasons. As discussed below, 
administrators motivated by ideological considerations or their own 
sense of what constitutes the public good, rather than exclusively by 
calculations of how their decisions will affect their budgets and scope 
of authority, are less susceptible to legislative control. Here again, 
the link between interest group preferences and regulatory policy 
outcomes becomes more attenuated. 
 Administrative motivation is not all that raises questions about 
the legislative influence claim. Although the interest group theory 
implies that Congress can design and employ the administrative 
process to ensure that agencies (whatever their own motivations) de-
liver the regulation sought by legislative constituencies, 47 it is un-
clear whether administrative process rules really facilitate congres-
sional control of agencies more than they liberate agencies from the 
legislature—an issue to be explored in much more detail shortly. 
This leads to a related complicating factor: Agencies are not influ-
enced by Congress alone. Rather, they must answer to a president 
and to the courts. Nor is it clear that institutions like judicial review 
facilitate agency delivery of regulatory rents, as many scholars have 
pointed out. 48 Although on the one hand judicial review can be seen 
as furthering congressional influence of agencies (by holding agencies 
faithful to the language of regulatory statutes), on the other hand ju-
dicial review also makes it difficult for agencies to cater to the regu-
latory preferences of one group without due consideration of facts or 
arguments that may support the regulatory preferences of an oppos-
ing group. To the extent that judicial review promotes regulatory 
                                                                                                                  
a legislature full of ideologically committed persons is, though motivated by general inte r-
est intentions, consistently wrong about what makes good regulatory policy.  
 Another accommodation of legislative ideology allows trade -offs between principles and 
political expediency, but maintains that ideology, while complicating the analysis, does not 
often enough triumph over reelection goals. Once again the pressing question becomes how 
often regulation reflects ideologically driven motivations, and how often it instead reflects 
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then it is not clear that regulation will on balance harm society more than it will benefit 
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 47. See STIGLER, The Consumer, supra note 8, at 181; Posner, supra note 20, at 82-87; 
Posner, supra note 3, at 350, 351; Stigler, The Theory, supra note 3, at 17-18. 
 48. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE 
REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE  36-37 (1992); SUNSTEIN, supra note 24, at 
212-14; Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: 
An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures, 6 J.L. ECON. AND ORG. 307, 315-18 
(1990).  
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evenhandedness by agencies, Congress’ ability to direct agencies to 
satisfy interest group preferences becomes more precarious. 
 To summarize, the interest group theory of regulation is vulner-
able to the extent that interest groups advocate regulatory policies 
that benefit more than their own members; broad-based interest 
groups representing diffuse interests compete with more narrow 
groups for legislative favor; legislators are not motivated only by 
electoral considerations and therefore do not seek only to satisfy in-
terest groups’ regulatory preferences; and finally legislators cannot 
control agencies, whether due to agencies’ own motivations, the proc-
esses through which agencies make regulatory decisions, or the in-
fluences of other branches of government. Because it seems undeni-
able that interest groups represent more than their own members’ 
interests, that legislators have mixed motivations, and that legisla-
tive control over agencies is limited, one can credibly question 
whether the dominant theory of regulation today advances the un-
derstanding of regulation very far. The interest group theory’s con-
clusions notwithstanding, it could well be that regulation often 
serves public interests, even if it also sometimes caters to special in-
terests. All things considered, then, the regulatory state’s merits 
might well outweigh its demerits. 
 All of this sounds naïve, no doubt. The argument, however, is not 
that the administrative state regulates in a happy manner that al-
ways ensures due consideration of broad-based interests, or that self-
serving interest groups are uninfluential participants in regulatory 
decisionmaking. The point is more subtle and modest: The interest 
group theory’s parsimoniousness masks several complications that 
attenuate the theory. Once those complications are introduced, the 
theory’s usefulness ultimately turns on a number of empirical ques-
tions about which the theory itself provides little guidance. Once 
groups advocating broad-based interests enter the picture, in compe-
tition with special interest groups, for example, one must consider 
whether and how often they succeed in their regulatory goals. Simi-
larly, once legislative motivation encompasses not only reelection 
goals but also ideology, new questions arise concerning the trade-offs 
legislators are willing to make between electoral success, on the one 
hand, and the personal and professional satisfaction that comes with 
fidelity to one’s principles, on the other. Finally, and no less funda-
mentally, once legislative influence over administrative decision-
makers is understood to depend on issues such as administrators’ 
own motivations, on the extent to which the administrative process 
effectively disciplines rather than liberates administrators, and on 
whether external institutional constraints such as presidential con-
trol and judicial review reinforce (rather than undermine) legislative 
control, the interest group theory’s power is properly seen as resting 
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on contestable answers to such issues. In the end, the interest group 
theory of regulation might explain or predict regulatory outcomes 
successfully, but if so that is because each of its questionable condi-
tions holds. Part III will focus on the strength of the theory’s legisla-
tive dominance claim. First, however, the following section sketches 
an alternative perspective.  
C.   Alternatives 
 Counter-punching is easy. Providing an alternative to the interest 
group theory that is not vulnerable to similar types of criticisms is 
the hard part. And indeed, even some of the most thoughtful critics of 
the interest group theory have offered little by way of any alternative 
theory comparable in sophistication or scope. Rather, they have 
shown how the interest group theory is too sweeping, how it is con-
ceptually incomplete, and how it rests on shaky empirical ground, 
but all without supplying any compelling replacement. To date, there 
is no thoroughgoing alternative theoretical framework for under-
standing regulation or predicting regulatory outcomes. 49 
 Civic-republican-inspired accounts of regulation, for example, pro-
vide the greatest contrast to the interest group theory.50 They see 
regulatory decisionmaking, at least potentially, as a deliberative ex-
ercise aimed to identify policies which best advance shared regula-
tory values and goals. In the civic-republican view, private partici-
pants in regulatory decisionmaking processes, whether individuals or 
groups, do not come to those processes with fixed preferences about 
what desirable regulation looks like. Rather, their regulatory prefer-
ences are, at least potentially, shaped by the very process of delibera-
tion over the possibilities. 51 Accordingly, public decisionmakers do 
more than broker deals among competitors; they aid the discovery of 
regulatory policies most compatible with collective judgments about 
shared regulatory commitments. 52 Regulatory outcomes reflect those 
judgments. 
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See generally Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpre-
tive Essay , 94 YALE L.J. 1617 (1985); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for 
the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-
Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271 (1986) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Factions]; see also IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE , RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 54-100 (1992). 
 51. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE , supra note 50, at 91; Reich, supra note 50, at 1632; 
Seidenfeld, supra note 50, at 1514; Sunstein, Factions, supra note 50, at 282; Cass R. Sun-
stein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 63-68 (1985). 
 52. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 24, at 12; Reich, supra note 50, at 1625, 1637-39; 
Seidenfeld, supra note 50, at 1514-15; Sunstein, Factions, supra note 50, at 282-84. 
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 Unfortunately, however, the civic republican theory does not ex-
plain what motivates deliberating decisionmakers, how private deci-
sionmakers emerge, when and how their regulatory preferences are 
transformed by decisionmaking processes, or what decisionmakers do 
in the face of an impasse concerning preferred regulatory alterna-
tives. 53 Nor is the theory forthcoming about issues such as what ani-
mates legislators and administrators, or exactly how regulatory deci-
sionmaking procedures ensure or even promote collective delibera-
tion. In short, while civic-republican accounts seek to challenge the 
interest group theory—in fairness, in part by providing an alterna-
tive normative, not entirely descriptive, vision of regulation—the al-
ternative picture they provide is neither very clear nor, where clear, 
very convincing. 
 Another alternative approach, developed below, builds upon a po-
sition very different from what the interest group theory’s legislative 
influence claim implies about agency autonomy and the administra-
tive process. According to this alternative, the administrative process 
can be understood as a source of control of interest groups, not con-
trol of agencies. That is, by delegating substantial lawmaking au-
thority to agencies, the legislature insulates itself as well as adminis-
trative regulators from interest group pressures. It does so, specifi-
cally, by equipping agencies with legal authority and political auton-
omy sufficient to advance broad-based interests. This is not to say 
that agencies never respond to narrow interest group demands, 
whether applied directly on agencies or channeled through Congress. 
Rather, the thesis here is that agency authority exercised through 
administrative procedure provides important opportunities for ad-
vancing broad-based regulatory interests—opportunities that Con-
gress itself lacks. Whereas the interest group theory sees delegation 
as a vehicle for interest group capture of regulatory decisionmaking, 
the alternative administrative process “theory”54 of regulation sees 
delegation as an impediment to interest group capture. As a result, 
                                                                                                                  
 53. See Croley, supra note 40, at 81-82. 
 54. “Theory,” a term sometimes used casually in legal-academic literature, serves to 
explain empirical phenomena, to predict empirical phenomena, or to organize and sys-
tematize existing knowledge in a field. See, e.g., ALAN C. ISAAK, SCOPE AND METHODS OF 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 167-69 (4th ed. 1985); POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH METHODS 24-26 
(Janet Buttolph Johnson & Richard A. Joslyn eds., 3d ed. 1995). The theory presented in 
this Article attempts to do mainly the first and third of these. It does not make any broad 
predictions about regulatory outcomes. See infra Part V.B (discussing limits of the extent 
to which the framework provided here generates predictions about regulatory outcomes). 
This thesis does predict, however, that where administrative regulators happen to be mo-
tivated to advance general-interest regulation, certain rules of the administrative process, 
as well as the legal-institutional context in which they operate, will tend to equip them to 
realize their general-interest regulatory aims, and that regulatory outcomes may therefore 
reflect those aims, congressional objections to the contrary notwithstanding. See infra Part 
V.C (discussing conditions under which general-interest regulation is most likely). 
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where the interest group theory laments the growth of the adminis-
trative state on the grounds that it provides expanded opportunities 
for regulatory rent seeking, the administrative process theory sees 
administrative growth as benign on the grounds that it shifts regula-
tory power away from Congress to decisionmakers who are more in-
clined and better situated to advance broad-based interests. In this 
light, the bigger the administrative state, the more public interested 
its decisions might be. Given the nature of the administrative proc-
ess, particularly in contrast to the legislative process, administrators 
motivated by commitments to public interests can do what similarly 
motivated legislators may find difficult to do themselves. And, for 
their part, legislators might not mind that so much. 
 Of course, for this alternative account to be plausible several 
things must be true. First, administrators themselves must be in 
part committed to ideology or principle (that is, some vision of the 
public interest) when exercising their regulatory decisionmaking au-
thority. To the extent that administrators instead seek to cater to in-
terest group preferences, out of expectations of favorable future em-
ployment opportunities, for example, then one would not expect ad-
ministrative regulation to reflect considerations of broad-based inter-
ests, even if the interest group theory’s legislative influence claim is 
false. Second, administrative decisionmakers must truly enjoy some 
substantial degree of legal and political decisionmaking autonomy. 
That is, they must first occupy some legal terrain within which their 
regulatory decisions are controlling absent some trump, congres-
sional or otherwise. Legally powerless administrators can do nothing 
to advance general interests, no matter how motivated to do so they 
may be. In addition, agencies must also have sufficient political 
autonomy to exercise their legal authority with some measure of in-
dependence. If instead agencies do little more than exercise their le-
gal authority simply according to congressional fancy, then again the 
administrative process theory must be abandoned. 
 In sum, several conditions must be met if the administrative proc-
ess theory of regulation is to have any bite. For purposes of easy 
comparison with the interest group theory, the administrative proc-
ess theory holds that: 
(1) Administrative regulators are motivated by more than concerns 
about matters such as the impact of their decisions on their budg-
ets or on the scope of their authority, and in particular, they are of-
ten motivated by concerns for general, public-oriented interests. 
(2) Administrative process rules governing regulatory decision-
making by agencies, such as those embodied in the Administrative 
Procedure Act, promote agency autonomy more than they advance 
legislative control. 
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(3) By fostering procedural independence, extralegislative influ-
ences on agency decisionmaking, including presidential oversight 
and judicial review, further promote agency autonomy more than 
they advance legislative control of agencies. 
The theory concludes that, given the above, regulation may very well 
serve broad-based interests much more than conventional wisdom 
suggests. 
 Part III returns the focus to the interest group theory’s claim 
about legislative control of agencies, challenging that proposition by 
developing the administrative process theory’s competing picture. 
Later, Parts IV and V turn to the competing theories’ claims about 
the causes and consequences of regulation. 
III.   AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS APPROACH: THE LIMITS OF 
LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE 
 The analysis up to this point highlights the centrality of the rela-
tionship between Congress and agencies to any theory of regulation: 
Does Congress control agencies, as the “congressional dominance” 
school suggests, 55 in the specific sense that agencies regularly answer 
to powerful if narrow congressional constituencies (assuming that is 
what Congress wants)? But of course the question is not of the yes-
or-no variety; rather, the issue concerns the degree of congressional 
influence. Plainly Congress is not without influence over the agencies 
whose authority Congress defines and whose budgets Congress sets. 
Just as plainly, however, agencies are not legislative puppets. The 
question then becomes whether agencies are independent from Con-
gress to an extent sufficient to allow them to advance regulatory poli-
cies aimed to benefit society as a whole and, if so, whether the social 
benefits of those instances outweigh the social costs of successful 
regulatory rent seeking where that occurs. The prior question is 
whether agencies would have any motivation to advance broad-based 
interests in the first place. The discussion below takes up these ques-
tions, focusing on certain procedural and institutional limits on con-
gressional control of agencies. 
A.   Administrator Motivation 
 Just as legislators are undoubtedly motivated by more than secur-
ing interest group favor,56 however heavily that particular motivation 
may weigh in the mind of any given legislator in any given instance, 
so too agencies are certainly motivated by more than preserving their 
budgets and authority, however heavily those motivations may weigh 
                                                                                                                  
 55. See generally sources cited supra note 44. 
 56. See sources cited supra note 45. 
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against others. After all, administrators are not drafted into public 
service. Nor are they seduced by irresistible salaries. It hardly seems 
far-fetched, then, that administrators self-select into an employment 
pool consisting of individuals who share some kind of ideological 
commitment to a given agency’s mission or, more generally, who be-
lieve that regulation can ameliorate difficult social and economic 
problems. Put differently, those whose career paths take them to 
public service seem likely to be those most committed to serving the 
public.57  
 Granted, some regulatory policymakers may choose to work for an 
agency temporarily for career reasons, to enhance their future job 
prospects at a law firm or lobbying firm for example, as interest 
group theorists sometimes point out.58 But by hypothesis they leave. 
Over time, then, those who remain with an agency are those who 
tend to believe in its mission and who reap personal satisfaction from 
a sense that public service truly serves the public. Those who spend 
much of their careers working for an agency probably do so out of 
commitment to the environment, consumer safety, or fair competi-
tion, for example. Indeed, it seems quite possible that, whatever one’s 
original motivation for spending part of a career working for an 
agency, over time agency culture fosters a belief in the legitimacy of 
an agency’s regulatory mission and a certain confidence in its effi-
cacy, a possibility that finds some empirical support. 59 Those for 
whom such feeling does not develop will be among those most likely 
to leave. So, again, one might expect administrators to consist largely 
of those with some real level of ideological commitment to and confi-
dence in their agency’s stated purpose. 
 Of course, some administrators, and regulatory policymakers at 
the highest levels specifically, “earn” their jobs as a reward for their 
loyalty to a political party or presidential candidate. For them, a 
longstanding commitment to a particular agency’s mission cannot 
explain their employment. But for them, the claim that ideology is 
likely to be an important motivator seems especially strong. After all, 
                                                                                                                  
 57. See generally HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1960); ALFRED A. MARCUS,  PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE: 
CHOOSING AND IMPLEMENTING AN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1980). 
 58. See Posner, supra note 20, at 82-87 (suggesting that career motivations of admin-
istrators may compromise the integrity of their regulatory decisions). For background, see 
Edna Earle Vass Johnson, “Agency Capture”: The “Revolving Door” Between Regulated In-
dustries and Their Regulating Agencies, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 95 (1983), and Beth Nolan, 
Public Interest, Private Income: Conflicts and Control Limits on the Outside Income of Gov-
ernment Officials, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 57 (1992). 
 59. See Steven Kelman, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, in THE 
POLITICS OF REGULATION 236, 250 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) (finding that the best ex-
planation of the agency’s actions was the “pro-protection values of agency officials, derived 
from the ideology of the safety and health professional and the organizational mission of 
OSHA”). 
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those rewarded by political appointment tend to be those whose prior 
political loyalty demonstrates some kind of philosophical commit-
ment to a party’s or candidate’s platform; political principles seem 
especially likely to inform their understanding of their own roles and 
missions. In that light, such persons seem least likely to be moti-
vated entirely by concerns about their agency’s budget or authority. 
Such persons also seem least likely to be motivated by considerations 
about past or future employment,60 as their prospects in that latter 
regard are likely very bright in any event. Thus, there are reasons to 
suspect that the regulatory decisions of high-level appointees, as well 
as long-term agency lawyers and other professionals, are motivated 
in part by principle and ideology. 
 In fact, it seems especially unlikely that regulators would make 
decisions hoping to improve their future employment prospects, not-
withstanding the well-known “revolving door”61 metaphor, an image 
that reinforces the interest group theory. For one thing, it is not en-
tirely clear what incentive an industry group would have to hire for-
mer administrators who made decisions favorable to that group when 
in public service. Because the industry would have already gotten 
what it wanted, hiring a formerly favorable administrator would not 
do the group any good. Nor would any uncommunicated “deal” be-
tween a regulator and the industry be enforceable, informally much 
less legally, once the administrator left public service. And the idea 
that an interest group would hire a former administrator who had 
made favorable regulatory decisions simply as a signaling device to 
present administrators who may be looking for a job later seems far-
fetched indeed. 
 It seems more likely that the future employment prospects of ad-
ministrative regulators depend entirely on the regulators’ experi-
ences with regulatory issues, not on particular decisions that were 
friendly to an interest group or groups. If so, regulated interests 
might well seek to hire those administrators who were most aggres-
sive against them. These are the administrators whom the industry 
may most want to co-opt, whose minds it most wants to tap, or whose 
efforts it most wants to enlist. To that extent, future employment op-
portunities would make administrators less friendly towards groups 
who might hire them later—exactly the opposite of what the wisdom 
informed by “revolving door” imagines. 
                                                                                                                  
 60. Here too the argument finds empirical support. See William T. Gormley, A Test of 
the Revolving Door Hypothesis at the FCC, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 665, 676 (1979) (finding that 
political party affiliation is more predictive of agency decisionmaking than is previous e m-
ployment with a regulated firm). 
 61. According to the “revolving door” hypothesis, agency personnel move between gov-
ernment service and the private sector, thus behavior is consequently shaped by their ex-
pectations of changing employment. See generally sources cited supra notes 58, 60. 
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 The above discussion simply explains that regulatory decision-
makers at the agency level—which is to say those actually making 
most regulatory decisions—surely make decisions in part according 
to ideological commitments, political principles and platforms, con-
ceptions of the common good, and complicated combinations of the 
above. Put in negative terms, it seems implausible that administra-
tive regulators are motivated entirely by worries about legislative 
rewards and sanctions for their decisions or by efforts to secure pri-
vate sector employment in the future. This is not to say that the in-
terest group theory’s legislative dominance claim is necessarily false, 
but rather that the claim is a strong one. If Congress ultimately con-
trols agencies to the extent that the interest group theory requires, it 
seems likely that Congress must do so by swamping whatever ideo-
logical commitments motivate agency personnel in the first place. In-
terestingly, available empirical evidence on the subject suggests that 
budget controls—often emphasized by the legislative dominance 
school—are not sufficient for the task: A study of senior-level admin-
istrators intended to probe the effect that budget concerns and future 
private sector employment prospects have on agency personnel con-
cludes that such motivators do not result in agency bias favoring 
business-oriented interest groups, 62 and a study of the relationship 
between agencies’ growth and the size of agency salaries finds no 
positive relationship.63 
B.   Administrative Procedure 
 But perhaps administrators have no effective choice but to deliver 
regulatory benefits to important congressional constituencies. Ad-
ministrators might have—or might once have had—the best inten-
tions coupled with confidence in government’s ability to ameliorate 
complicated social and economic problems, but little occasion for put-
ting their ideological commitments into regulatory practice. The ex-
tent to which they do have such ability, and the extent to which they 
are instead constrained by Congress’ ability to monitor and control 
agencies, will depend very heavily on the legal process rules accord-
ing to which agencies make their regulatory decisions. Thus, one 
might examine agencies’ regulatory decisionmaking processes with 
an eye towards how those procedures might promote agency auton-
omy, on the one hand, and how amenable they are to congressional 
and interest group pressures, on the other. Proponents of the interest 
                                                                                                                  
 62. See PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 
176-77 (1981) (concluding that inconsistency in the effect of such motivators among agen-
cies “supports skepticism toward the assertion that regulatory agencies tend to favor regu-
lated industry interests”). 
 63. See Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, Agency Growth, Salaries and the Pro-
tected Bureaucrat, 27 ECON. INQUIRY 431, 434 (1989). 
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group theory imply or assert that administrative procedures facili-
tate regulatory rent seeking.64 The question becomes, then, whether 
that is so. 
 While surprisingly few students of regulation actually focus on the 
details of the administrative process directly, majority wisdom 
among those who do supports the interest group theory’s legislative 
influence claim. In other words, most scholars considering the ques-
tion argue that administrative procedure serves as a disciplining de-
vice that Congress uses to control agencies. The collaborative works 
of Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast (“McNoll-
gast”) provide the most thoroughgoing and intelligent treatment of 
this view.65 After persuasively arguing that the repertoire of congres-
sional tools most commonly mentioned as sources of legislative con-
trol—budget powers, committee oversight, and so on—do not go very 
far to solve Congress’ principal-agent problem, 66 McNollgast argue 
that most of administrative law “is written for the purpose of helping 
elected politicians retain control of policymaking.”67 Indeed, accord-
ing to McNollgast, administrative procedure is an indispensable solu-
                                                                                                                  
 64. See Stigler, The Theory, supra note 3, at 17-18 (stating that features of adminis-
trative decisionmaking lend themselves to rent seeking); Posner, supra note 20, at 82-89 
(same); Posner, supra note 3, at 337-39. 
 65. See generally McNollgast, supra note 5; McNollgast, Positive and Normative Mod-
els of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures, 6 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 307, 309 (1990) [hereinafter McNollgast, An Integrative Approach]; McNoll-
gast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Po-
litical Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 432 (1989) [hereinafter McNollgast, Struc-
ture and Process]; see also Jeffrey S. Banks & Barry Weingast, The Political Control of Bu-
reaucracies Under Asymmetric Information, 36 AM. J. POL.  SCI. 509, 510 (1992); Arthur 
Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Accountability, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Winter & Spring 1994, at 91, 96; McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180 (1999). Others emphasize, as McNollgast 
themselves also do, see infra note 75, agency structure or design. See, e.g., Jonathan R. 
Macey, Organization Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 93, 94 (1992); see also D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, 
THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 
(1991); Randall Calvert et al., A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 588, 589 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political 
Theory: The Tug of War over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 673 (1992); John 
T. Woolley, Conflict Among Regulators and the Hypothesis of Congressional Dominance, 55 
J. POL. 92, 93 (1993). 
 66. See generally McNollgast, supra note 5. 
 67. Id. at 246. Because McNollgast do not commit themselves to a position with re-
spect to legislative motivations, their argument does not imply that regulation serves 
mainly the interests of rent-seeking interest groups. (As far as McNollgast imply, Congress 
could be composed entirely of legislators motivated by the public interest.) However, the 
interest group theory under examination is only a small step away from McNollgast, and 
in any event it is compelling only if McNollgast’s control thesis is correct. And even 
McNollgast themselves at times contemplate that legislators are motivated by reelection 
goals rather than a “search for the ‘public interest.’” McNollgast, An Integrative Approach, 
supra note 65, at 310, 315. 
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tion to Congress’ otherwise insurmountable bureaucratic compliance 
problem. 68 
 Specifically, McNollgast argue that administrative procedure fa-
cilitates legislative control by reducing the costs of congressional 
monitoring and thereby ensuring that agency decisions reflect con-
gressional will. 69 They argue, for example, that by standardizing 
agency decisionmaking procedures in the federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA),70 Congress enabled itself to keep abreast of what 
agencies are doing.71 Because all agencies use the same basic proce-
dures, the costs to Congress of following agency action are lower. For 
another example, McNollgast suggest that by requiring agencies to 
provide notice of their proposed rulemaking and to solicit commen-
tary on proposed rules, Congress made it easier for affected constitu-
encies to register directly with Congress, as well as with agencies, 
their opposition to pending agency action.72 Thus, the notice-and-
comment rulemaking process specifically serves to give Congress ad-
vanced warning of agencies that may be attempting to thwart con-
gressional wishes. 73 Administrative procedure therefore makes it 
hard for agencies to surprise Congress with decisions Congress would 
not like.74 By simultaneously slowing agencies down and providing 
affected interests with opportunities to express opposition to agency 
action, Congress solves its monitoring problem by exerting ex ante 
control over agencies.75 
 But one could argue as forcefully in exactly the opposite direc-
tion—that administrative decisionmaking procedures actually foster 
agency autonomy and independence from the legislature.76 For ex-
                                                                                                                  
 68. See McNollgast, supra note 5, at 273-74. 
 69. See id. at 253-54, 273. 
 70. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 71. See McNollgast, supra note 5, at 255. 
 72. See id. at 259-60. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See McNollgast, supra note 5, at 255. It should be noted that McNollgast’s argu-
ment that Congress exercises ex ante control over agencies is not limited to their claims 
about administrative procedure as such. They also argue that Congress’ “structural” 
choices concerning the scope of agency power and the level of agency resources constitute 
independent constraints on agency regulators. See McNollgast, Structure and Process, su-
pra note 65, at 432, 440-44. While the argument in the text above challenges McNollgast’s 
procedural claims, their observations about structure seem wholly unobjectionable: Un-
doubtedly Congress enjoys ex ante control over agencies in the sense that Congress estab-
lishes the range of possible agency decisions. The more interesting and difficult question 
remains, however, how much Congress influences agency decisionmaking within that 
broad range, and whether administrative procedure promotes or undermines that influ-
ence. 
 76. In a very thoughtful set of recent articles, Professor David Spence takes issue 
with the McNollgast thesis and thus represents the alternative view that Congress can do 
fairly little to control agencies ex ante and must therefore rely on traditional tools of ex post 
control. See David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative 
State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97 (2000); David B. Spence, Administrative Law and Agency Policy-
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ample, while it is true that notice-and-comment rulemaking enables 
regulated interest groups and Congress to monitor agencies more 
easily, the rulemaking process also allows other types of groups—
public-interest law firms, the media, the public, government watch-
dog groups—to keep abreast of agency action more easily as well. 
Relative to these groups, Congress and regulated parties would cer-
tainly have a comparative advantage at monitoring agencies, if 
agency rulemaking processes were not standardized. Thus, the ques-
tion is really not, as McNollgast suggest, whether standardized proc-
esses make it easier for Congress and powerful congressional con-
stituencies to monitor agencies, but whether, all things considered, 
standardized processes make it easier for those constituencies to get 
the regulation they want. If standardized rulemaking processes are 
even more useful to broad-based interests, watchdog groups, and so 
on—if they do more to subject agencies to pressures and influences 
beyond the legislature and legislative constituencies—then their ex-
istence does not support the view that administrative procedure fa-
cilitates congressional control. 
 Another difficulty with the McNollgast view is its implicit sugges-
tion that agencies defy Congress—upset prior legislative coalitions—
only through action, not inaction.77 But most often implementing a 
legislative deal requires affirmative agency action. Thus, an agency 
can thwart congressional will by failure to regulate, just as it may do 
so by regulating. Yet existing administrative process rules do very 
little to allow interest groups, or Congress, to compel agency action 
that is not forthcoming. If Congress really intended the administra-
tive process to hold agencies faithful to congressional will, it should 
have provided mechanisms to overcome recalcitrant inaction as well 
                                                                                                                  
making: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407 (1997) 
[hereinafter Spence, Rethinking the Positive Theory]; David B. Spence, Agency Discretion 
and the Dynamics of Procedural Reform, 59 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 425 (1999); David B. Spence, 
Agency Policy Making and Political Control: Modeling Away the Delegation Problem, 7 J. 
PUB.  ADMIN. 199 (1997); David B. Spence, Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to 
Steer Administrative Agencies, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1999). In challenging the view rep-
resented by McNollgast, Spence makes several excellent poin ts that resonate with the 
propositions made in the text below. He argues, for example, that administrator motivation 
is more complicated than the McNollgast view implies, and that structural decisions about 
the scope of agency power are infrequent and thus not so important. See, e.g., Spence, Re-
thinking the Positive Theory, supra, at 422-25. But while Spence states that McNollgast’s 
procedural claims are “overstated,” he does not go very far to explain how so. Spence also 
concedes a lot to McNollgast concerning Congress’ ability to control agencies through 
rulemaking, arguing in response that agencies can “evade procedural control” by relying on 
informal decisionmaking processes as an alternative to notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
as well as on formal adjudication. Id. at 428-29. The argument in this Article that follows, 
in contrast, sees rulemaking (and other formal agency decisionmaking procedures) as pro-
moting agency autonomy, rather than congressional control. Having said that, it sides with 
Spence in the Spence-McNollgast debate and aims to provide further support for Spence’s 
side of the debate. 
 77. See Spence, Rethinking the Positive Theory, supra note 76, at 421-23. 
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as recalcitrant action. The fact that Congress did not provide such 
mechanisms further suggests that legislative control is not the major 
purpose or effect of administrative procedure. 
 Consider some specifics. According to section 553 of the APA, a 
crucial section governing agency rulemaking, an agency commencing 
the rulemaking process is required to provide a notice of its proposed 
rule which includes the rule’s basic scope, purpose, justification, and 
authority.78 Thereafter, the agency is obliged to solicit commentary 
on its proposed rule from any interested party.79 Following the com-
ment period, the rulemaking agency is to take into account all rele-
vant facts, arguments, and other information gathered during the 
rulemaking process—both by the agency itself and as generated from 
the comments the agency receives—and render a final rule that re-
flects all relevant considerations. 80 To ensure that interested parties 
have the benefit of whatever information the agency deems especially 
important to its rule, the agency is prohibited from withholding from 
the public any such information during the rulemaking process. 81 
Section 553 further requires the agency to promulgate, along with its 
final rule, an explanation for the final rule form, justifying the final 
rule and addressing arguments the agency heard along the way.82 
 It is a little hard to see how section 553 rulemaking, the dominant 
procedural form of agency regulation, is especially amenable to pow-
erful congressional constituencies or, therefore, especially well suited 
for congressional monitoring and control of agencies. Any party, 
weak or powerful, can petition the agency to begin the rulemaking 
process (though the decision to initiate a rule rests with the 
agency).83 An agency must provide public notice of any rule it intends 
to develop, and receive comments from any party, no matter how well 
or poorly funded, who undertakes to contact the agency. Of course, 
the rulemaking agency may choose simply to ignore some comments, 
but it may do so at its peril if a party supplies relevant data or argu-
ment that a subsequent court determines the agency’s rule unjusti-
fiably failed to consider.84 Comments received during the notice-and-
comment period become part of the rulemaking record, which is sub-
ject to public and judicial inspection. 
                                                                                                                  
 78. Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994). 
 79. See id. § 553(c). 
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252-53 
(2d. Cir. 1977). 
 81. See, e.g., Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1030-31 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Port-
land Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1973), superceded in not 
relevant part by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(i). 
 82. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)(i); see also Kooritzky v. Reich, 17 F.3d 1509, 1513-14 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994). 
 83. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e). 
 84. See, e.g., Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d at 251. 
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 Moreover, notice-and-comment rulemaking levels the interest 
group playing field to some extent in the sense that, unlike election 
campaign contributions for example, the value of comments is not 
closely proportional to their volume: A single, small interest group 
submitting important arguments during a rulemaking can poten-
tially have as much influence on an agency’s final rule as many 
groups that present the same argument duplicatively. Unlike cam-
paign dollars, the arguments and information that make up rulemak-
ing comments are not fungible, and redundant comments are virtu-
ally worthless. To be sure, participating in a rulemaking at all re-
quires some organizational and financial wherewithal, but the costs 
of participation are not so overwhelming that only very well-funded 
interests can participate.85 Interest groups with fewer resources than 
others certainly can have an effect on a rulemaking vastly dispropor-
tionate to the relative size of their budgets. Because section 553 
rulemaking is open to any party that wishes to participate, and be-
cause influence on rulemaking is not necessarily coextensive with a 
party’s size or wealth, the section 553 rulemaking process constitutes 
a poor mechanism for delivering regulatory rents to favored constitu-
encies. Relative to decisionmaking by congressional committees, for 
example, whose members are very likely to be more influenced by a 
greater volume of constituent letters and campaign support, agency 
rulemaking is likely less sensitive to interest group pressures. 
 Of course, section 553 does not exhaust the procedural require-
ments for agency rulemaking. Other statutes supplement the APA in 
that respect. One especially important example is the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA),86 which requires an “Environmental 
Impact Statement” for major federal actions that have a significant 
effect on the quality of the environment.87 But here too it is hard to 
see how such additional requirements constitute useful procedural 
constraints for ensuring that agencies serve important congressional 
constituencies. On the one hand, one might argue that a statute like 
NEPA may advance the interests of some polluters by creating a bar-
rier to entry. On the other hand, however, NEPA is clearly costly to 
polluters in that it forecloses certain regulatory outcomes available to 
polluters because those outcomes have an adverse impact on the en-
vironment. It is hard to say how these offsetting effects stack up. To 
                                                                                                                  
 85. See Croley, supra note 40, at 120-25 (outlining costs of participating in agency de-
cisionmaking); see also National Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 683 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973) (“[U]tilizing rule-making procedures opens up the process of agency policy inno-
vation to a broad range of criticism, advice and data . . . .”); Ernest Gellhorn, Public Par-
ticipation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 390 (1972) (noting that agen-
cies can waive requirements of multiple submissions of written materials for parties claim-
ing financial hardship). 
 86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4343-47 (1994). 
 87. See id. § 4332(2)(C). 
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be sure, NEPA may be easy to understand if attributed to Congress’ 
desire to achieve some level of environmental protection,88 but that 
assumption undermines the interest group premise that the legisla-
ture is motivated to promote the regulatory interests of narrow but 
powerful groups, not environmentalists. 89 
 Nor does the adjudication side of administrative procedure seem 
especially well designed as a congressional control device; in fact, it 
seems even less well suited for that purpose. According to sections 
554, 556, and 557 of the APA,90 which govern formal adjudication, 
agency adjudicators must enjoy some measure of independence from 
the rest of their agencies. Section 554 imposes an administrative 
“separation of powers” norm by forbidding administrative law judges 
(ALJs) from being supervised by others in the same agency who 
bring cases before the ALJs. 91 The APA’s adjudication provisions also 
prohibit ex parte communications between the adjudicator and par-
ties to the adjudication.92 Evidence forming the basis of the adjudica-
tion is instead introduced formally, and where fairness requires, op-
posing parties ordinarily enjoy the benefits of cross-examination of 
adverse witnesses. 93 Finally, ALJ decisions must include written rul-
ings on material factual questions and statements of applicable 
agency policy and law.94 
 Intra-agency appeals (appeals through the agency’s own “judici-
ary”) are similarly formalized. And, while agency heads can ulti-
mately overrule ALJs and appellate adjudicatory bodies, agency ad-
judications are subject to the “substantial evidence” test upon appeal 
to a federal court.95 A reviewing court will affirm the agency’s ulti-
mate decision only for reasons supported by the adjudication record.96 
Though higher levels in an agency may reverse an ALJ decision, re-
viewing courts require some explanation for why they have done so.97 
                                                                                                                  
 88. Which it did. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 91-765 (1969), reprinted in 1969 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2767. 
 89. See Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality: Or, Public Choice and the 
Perils of Occam’s Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 132-33 (2000) (explaining that some 
environmental statutes were passed in spite of powerful interest group opposition). 
 90. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-57 (1994). 
 91. See § 554(d). 
 92. See id. 
 93. See § 556(d); see also, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971); Deme-
nech v. Secretary of HHS, 913 F.2d 882, 884 (11th Cir. 1990); Cellular Mobile Sys. of Pa., 
Inc. v. FCC, 782 F.2d 182, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 94. See § 557(c). 
 95. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). 
 96. See, e.g., American Smelting and Refining Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 494 F.2d 
925, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Marco Sales Co. v. FTC, 453 F.2d 1, 7 (2d Cir. 1971); Greater 
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 97. See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1176, 1178, 
1181 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Alabama Ass’n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Re-
serve, 533 F.2d 224, 248 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated in part, 558 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1977); ITT 
Continental Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1976). See generally MORTON 
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 As in the case of rulemaking, then, it is a little hard to see how 
the formal adjudication process serves as a useful vehicle for ensur-
ing that agencies supply desired regulation to important congres-
sional constituencies. The formalized process does not lend itself to 
interest group manipulation, nor is it very susceptible to congres-
sional or lobbyist pressure. In fact, the prohibition against ex parte 
communications during an adjudication extends even to members of 
Congress.98 To be sure, the costs of participating in formal adjudica-
tion, which include the cost of counsel, are greater than those typi-
cally associated with rulemaking, and to that extent the process is 
less inviting to many interests. 99 More importantly, formal adjudica-
tion is not open to any interested party, as rulemaking is, but rather, 
like ordinary litigation, is limited to the parties to the hearing and to 
whoever can qualify as an intervenor. And indeed, some agencies 
that for a time supported “public intervenor” programs have since 
abandoned them.100 But while the exclusivity associated with formal 
adjudication may raise worries that those involved have special ac-
cess to the agency that translates into regulatory favoritism, in fact 
the very trappings that make this procedure expensive and quasi-
judicial—the semi-independence of ALJs, the submission of evidence, 
the opportunity to challenge contrary evidence, the promulgation of 
written decisions that explain the facts and the law underlying the 
agency’s decision—also make the process rather inconvenient for de-
livering regulatory favors. 
 Apart from rulemaking and formal adjudication, other procedural 
mechanisms also appear to further promote openness and agency in-
dependence. Perhaps most notably, the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act (FACA)101 insulates agencies politically by providing an external, 
                                                                                                                  
ROSENBERG & JACK H. MASKELL, CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCESS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  (Cong. Res. Serv. No. 90-440A, 1990). 
 98. See, e.g., Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 
Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th. Cir. 1956); see also HOUSE COMM. ON STANDARDS 
OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, 98TH CONG., ETHICS MANUAL FOR MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES OF 
THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 69 (1984) (explaining prohibitions on ex parte com-
munications in formal agency proceedings). For an example of judicial unease with respect 
to congressional pressures on specific agency decisions outside of the formal adjudication 
context, see Koniag, Inc. v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 601, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1978), which set aside the 
Secretary of Interior’s determination on the grounds that a letter from a Congress member 
“compromised the appearance of the Secretary’s impartiality.” Id. 
 99. See Croley, supra note 40, at 121-24. 
 100. See generally SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 1, at 351-53; Barry B. Boyer, 
Funding Public Participation in Agency Proceedings: The Federal Trade Commission Ex-
perience, 70 GEO. L.J. 51 (1981); Susan B. Flohr, Comment, Funding Public Participation 
in Agency Proceedings, 27 AM. U. L. REV. 981 (1978). The Magnuson-Moss Act specifically 
authorized the FTC to “provide compensation for reasonable attorneys fees, expert witness 
fees, and other costs of participating” in its adjudications, for a time. 15 U.S.C. § 557a(h)(1) 
(repealed 1994); see also WILLIAM F. WEST, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: POLITICS AND 
PROCESSES 122-40 (1985). 
 101. 5 U.S.C. app. (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
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neutral source of expert policy recommendations that can be difficult 
for legislators and interest groups to ignore or discredit. The FACA 
requires any agency seeking policy advice or recommendations from 
a group of persons outside of government, which agencies do fairly of-
ten in the development of regulatory policy, to charter that group as 
a federal advisory committee.102 The chartered advisory committee 
then must open its meetings to the public,103 announce them in ad-
vance,104 keep minutes of its meetings, 105 make available to the public 
any documents on which the committee relies in rendering advice to 
an agency,106 and similarly make available its own documents and 
reports. 107 And both the FACA and its implementing regulations, 
promulgated by the General Services Administration, require that 
the membership of an advisory committee represent diverse points of 
view concerning the issue at hand.108 
 Given the FACA’s many good-government requirements, advisory 
committees chartered under it are not easily captured by narrow in-
terests; advisory committees whose meetings and records are open 
and accessible make inconvenient vehicles for delivering biased ad-
vice to an agency. Of course, the transparency of advisory committees 
does not speak to the issue of who actually serves on them. If the 
FACA required openness while advisory committees’ memberships 
were nevertheless dominated by special interest groups, then the in-
stitution might provide an effective avenue for interest group domi-
nation of agencies. It appears, however, that the FACA procedures 
for establishing and running an advisory committee go far to ensure 
balanced representation among many different types of interests. An 
investigation of advisory committee membership reveals that mem-
berships are reasonably well balanced. Approximately twenty-five 
percent of sampled advisory committee members represent either 
broad-based interest groups or some scientific or other academic dis-
cipline, as compared with approximately thirty-five percent of mem-
bers representing businesses and trade groups. 109 Further, approxi-
mately two-thirds of sampled advisory committees have at least one 
member representing some broad-based interests, whereas about 
two-thirds of committees have one or more members representing a 
trade association, and three-fourths have one or more members rep-
resenting business interests. 110 Thus, by providing a source of expert 
                                                                                                                  
 102. See Federal Advisory Committee Act § 9. 
 103. See id. § 10(a)(1). 
 104. See § 10(a)(2). 
 105. See § 10(c). 
 106. See id. 
 107. See § 10(b)-(c). 
 108. See § 5(b)(2)-(3); see also 41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1007(b)(2)(iii) (1999). 
 109. See Croley, supra note 40, at 137 & tbl.2.  
 110. See Croley, supra note 40, at 139 & tbl.3. 
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advice that aids agency record-building and can form a strong scien-
tific or technical basis for agency action, through procedures that do 
not seem vulnerable to over-representation by special interests, the 
FACA seems to promote agency independence and evenhandedness 
more than it facilitates congressional or interest group control. 
 Much the same is therefore true of the Negotiated Rulemaking 
Act (NRA),111 which expressly triggers the FACA by requiring a 
FACA-chartered advisory committee for the development of any rule 
under the NRA;112 the same openness requirements apply. In fact, 
much like the FACA, the passage of the NRA reflected concerns 
about the dangers of agency communications with parties interested 
in the development of a rule prior to the publication of a proposed 
rule’s notice.113 Of course, agencies commonly communicate with par-
ties early in a rule’s development, even before the notice of a pro-
posed rule,114 but the NRA requires agencies that assemble private 
parties to write the text of a negotiated proposed rule to do so in an 
open, inclusive, evenhanded manner. The negotiation process then 
promotes discussion, argumentation, and compromise among those 
interested in a negotiated rule’s development. Negotiated rulemak-
ing, as a procedural institution, thus does not resonate very well with 
the interest group theory, although not much turns on that observa-
tion given that negotiated rulemakings are, unlike advisory commit-
tees, uncommon.115 
 Like the FACA and the NRA, other important appendages of the 
APA also passed in the “good-government” reform era of the 1970s 
similarly present serious obstacles to, and moreover deter, regulatory 
favoritism. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),116 for one, re-
quires agencies to publish in the Federal Register items such as their 
rules of procedure, contact information through which the public may 
obtain information or make requests for agency decisions, statements 
of general policy, and interpretations of general applicability formu-
                                                                                                                  
 111. 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (reauthorized by the Administrative 
Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 11, 110 Stat. 3870, 3873). 
 112. See id. § 582. 
 113. See generally Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Commit-
tee Act and Good Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451 (1997). 
 114. See, e.g., JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A G UIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 155 (3d 
ed. 1998). 
 115. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of 
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rative Governance and the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1997). On the 
other hand, the NRA might accomplish something by discouraging illicit and unofficial ne-
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rent-seeking interest groups on the ground they do not wish to trigger the NRA. 
 116. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994). 
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lated and adopted by an agency.117 The FOIA also requires agencies 
to provide any requesting party any information pertaining to any 
other agency records not falling within an exempted category of in-
formation such as information pertaining to trade secrets and na-
tional defense.118 (Other statutes, including the Federal Records Act 
and the Presidential Records Act, require agencies to maintain all of 
their records. 119) And the Sunshine Act120 requires multi-member 
agencies, which include independent agencies, to hold open, publi-
cized meetings, except in one of a number of exempted circumstances 
roughly similar to those of the FOIA.121 To the extent that making 
regulatory decisions benefiting favored congressional constituencies 
is facilitated by administrators who operate outside the awareness of 
the public, the media, and watchdog groups, here again the good-
government procedural ground rules stymie the kind of regulatory 
decisionmaking the interest group theory contemplates. 122 
 Of course, the APA does not prescribe a particular process for 
every agency decision. Agencies make interpretive rules, procedural 
rules, and sundry other informal decisions for which there is no pre-
scribed decisionmaking process, 123 although perhaps tellingly they 
sometimes design their own processes which then become routine. 
One could say, then, that agencies are best able to supply the regula-
tion sought by powerful congressional constituencies through infor-
mal decisionmaking. But on the other hand, this is just to say that 
administrative procedure as such does not facilitate regulatory rent 
seeking, but rather that the absence of procedure (coupled with dele-
gation of significant discretionary power) does so; procedure itself can 
no longer be a constraint on agencies if informal—that is, a-
procedural—decisionmaking is where all of the interest group action 
                                                                                                                  
 117. See § 552(a). 
 118. See id. 
 119. Federal Records Act, 44 U.S.C. § 1501 (1994); Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. 
§ 2204 (1994). 
 120. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994). 
 121. See § 552(b)-(c). 
 122. See SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 1, at 348 tbl.13.1 (finding that 82% of sur-
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is. Moreover, if delegation itself is the worry, it is worth emphasizing 
that now much turns on administrators’ motivations in predicting or 
explaining regulatory outcomes. If an agency has strong incentives to 
provide illicit benefits to some particular interest group, informal de-
cisionmaking would probably help it to do so. If, on the other hand, 
administrators are motivated to promote general interests, then in-
formal decisionmaking power would help them do so. Thus, wherever 
agencies regulate by exercising raw discretion rather than according 
to statutorily prescribed procedures, much turns on what adminis-
trators’ motivations really are. 
 Administrators’ motivations are also important in the context of 
agency record-building outside of notice and comment. That is, noth-
ing about section 553 rulemaking prohibits agencies from making in-
formal, ex parte contacts with any party at any point prior to, or for 
that matter following, a notice of a proposed rulemaking.124 And, of 
course, such contact is extremely common.125 Agency communications 
with those affected or potentially affected by a rule usually precede 
rather than follow the agency’s notice of a proposed rulemaking. 
Thus, an agency motivated to advance the cause of powerful interest 
groups might most effectively do so by defining the parameters of a 
rulemaking or even drafting the proposed rule in a way that advan-
tages some groups, before the rulemaking ever becomes public. But 
here again, much turns on administrator motivation. Agencies might 
be motivated to structure their prenotice rulemaking process in a 
way that favors powerful interest groups—wherever they can do so 
without triggering the NRA or the FACA—but then they might not 
be so motivated; the mere opportunity for informal prenotice com-
munications with affected parties does not mean that agencies will 
advance special interests. Again, to the extent agencies do use ex 
parte rulemaking communications to advance special interests, it is 
not procedure itself but rather the absence of procedure which allows 
agencies to do so. The section 553 procedure itself is not a source of 
agency discipline. 
 In sum, an examination of many of the specific provisions of the 
APA and related parts of Title 5 suggests that administrative proce-
dure is not so well suited for congressional or, by extension, interest 
group domination of agencies, nor is it inaccessible to groups repre-
senting broad-based interests. The only specific features of adminis-
trative decisionmaking procedures that provide some support for the 
interest group theory’s legislative dominance claim include the 
elimination of some agencies’ public intervenor programs for formal 
                                                                                                                  
 124. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).  
 125. See LUBBERS, supra note 114, at 225-33. 
2000]  PUBLIC INTERESTED REGULATION  43 
 
adjudication, the relative exclusivity of formal adjudication,126 and 
the existence of informal decisionmaking mechanisms entirely within 
agencies’ own discretion. The interest group theory ultimately finds 
rather modest support from formal adjudication, however, given that 
that process involves the quasi-formal submission of evidence, prohi-
bitions on ex parte communications, and the more searching “sub-
stantial evidence” standards of judicial review. And, similarly, the 
theory finds only modest support from informal, agency-prescribed 
decisionmaking mechanisms given that these do not make very good 
substitutes for rulemaking and other APA-prescribed procedures. 127 
 To consider this issue from another angle, it is certainly not diffi-
cult to imagine an administrative process regime better suited to 
congressional control than that set forth in the APA. For example, 
one can well imagine a world without an APA—such as the United 
States before 1946, most local governments to this day, and all but a 
few countries—in which each agency made decisions in various ways 
not easily discernable by those outside of the industry or population 
most directly affected by an agency’s work. Such a world would be 
harder for the public, the press, public interest groups, and even 
courts to navigate. Such a world would also be more costly for those 
seeking to participate in many agencies’ decisionmaking processes or 
to otherwise influence many different agencies’ decisions. In the ab-
sence of procedural consistency across agencies, such parties would 
have to learn each agency’s procedural practices anew. Those regu-
larly seeking rents from a single, familiar agency, on the other hand, 
would enjoy an informational advantage. Indeed, as discussed below, 
efforts to render agency decisionmaking processes more open and ac-
cessible by making them more consistent across agencies are part of 
what originally motivated the passage of the APA.128 
 But even with an administrative procedure statute, decisionmak-
ing processes more consonant with the interest group theory are easy 
to imagine. For one example, rulemaking provisions might allow 
agencies simply to announce a final rule following a comment period 
without any explanation about why the agency settled on the rule it 
did. On the adjudication side, allowing ex parte communications con-
cerning the merits of a pending decision, as the APA did until an 
                                                                                                                  
 126. This conclusion finds support from a Congressional Research Service review of the 
law governing congressional intervention in administrative processes. See ROSENBERG, su-
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amendment in 1976129—one of the very few substantive changes to 
the act in its fifty-year history,130 prompted by worries that some 
agencies were unduly influenced by powerful interests on one side of 
a case—would make it easier for agencies to understand and satisfy 
the regulatory preferences of powerful constituencies. More gener-
ally, the APA could require agencies to seek congressional approval 
before their decisions become final, as might be possible through 
some version of a “negative veto” (as opposed to the “affirmative veto” 
invalidated by the Supreme Court131). Better still, Congress could 
make it clear through the APA that members of Congress could 
communicate directly with agency personnel concerning any pending 
agency decision. Instead, various prohibitions on congressional influ-
ence on agency decisionmaking processes call into further question 
the idea that administrative procedure is largely a tool of congres-
sional control. 132 Finally, the APA might provide for judicial review 
that instructs courts to invalidate agency decisions only for blatantly 
ignoring APA-prescribed procedures, rather than for the more expan-
sive “without observance of procedure required by law” standard un-
der APA section 706.133 
 On that latter note, Congress could have provided for very limited, 
bare-rationality review, with no judicial inquiry into matters such as 
the adequacy of an agency’s factual record supporting its decision, 
which would have had procedural implications relating to agencies’ 
factual record-building practices. After all, while it is true that the 
federal courts have imposed many administrative process norms 
through the course of ruling on APA cases, to some extent Congress 
invited them to do so by supplying the terms of APA review and in-
cluding inflatable words like “capricious” among them. 134 Thus, the 
APA’s judicially articulated procedural requirements are not really 
entirely court-imposed. In any event, the important point is simply 
that different conceivable processes would promote legislative control 
more than existing APA procedures do. 
 For example, aspects of the Model State Administrative Proce-
dures Act135 seem better designed to promote legislative control than 
does the APA. For instance, the Model Act provides for the estab-
lishment of a legislative “Administrative Rules Review Committee,” 
which allows for legislative review of rules, including proposed or 
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possible future rules,136 and provides that the legislative committee 
may certify that an agency’s rules are in the legislature’s view con-
trary to the agency’s authority.137 Many states make approval by a 
legislative committee the final step in a rulemaking before a rule be-
comes final, although some state supreme courts have held that such 
requirements violated state constitutional separation of powers prin-
ciples by in effect giving the legislature a veto over executive deci-
sions. 138 The point remains, however, that relative to Congress, state 
legislatures typically enjoy more control over their agencies. Com-
pared with some state acts, the APA seems less suited for ensuring 
that agencies heed legislative will. If Congress intended the APA 
primarily to secure congressional dominance, its choice of provisions 
seems in many respects puzzling. 
 But wait. If federal administrative process rules really liberate 
agencies from the legislature and from powerful legislative constitu-
encies, one must wonder why Congress, or for that matter those in-
terest groups which would benefit from tight legislative control over 
agencies, would ever allow such a state of affairs to develop. If Con-
gress prefers to control agencies, which it presumably does, and if 
Congress creates administrators’ decisionmaking processes in the 
first place, which it certainly does, why wouldn’t Congress devise 
administrative process rules that make certain agencies do what 
Congress and its powerful constituencies want? 
 This compelling question has several compelling answers. First, 
as discussed further below,139 Congress is not the sole source of the 
basic ground rules of administrative procedure. Rather, the Presi-
dent and especially the courts have supplemented or refined the text 
of the APA in ways that give the act its bite. Thus, to some extent, 
Congress itself has limited authority in the matter. 
 Second, it is less clear than many apparently believe that Con-
gress would be able to adopt administrative procedures that give it 
tight control over agencies’ regulatory decisions. For one thing, doing 
so would require legislators to overcome their own public-goods prob-
lem, and an intergenerational one at that.140 Devising rules that will 
preserve a future legislature’s dominance over agencies may not be 
something very many legislators in the present care much about. In 
the abstract, legislators presumably care about the extent to which 
they will be able to influence agencies in the future, but determining 
which administrative process rules would most accomplish that re-
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quires substantial legislator investment in the future, at the oppor-
tunity costs of focusing on immediate interest group demands—and 
various other demands on legislators’ time—in the present. Structur-
ing such rules would also require difficult ex ante calculations about 
whether and how different kinds of interest groups might participate 
in alternative processes, and how courts will interpret and apply 
statutory procedural rules. To the extent considerable uncertainty 
would surround those questions, the expected returns from legisla-
tive attention to administrative procedure will be small. An anthro-
pomorphized legislature might care very much about future agency 
control, but for a legislature composed of hundreds of individuals 
whose own time horizons are limited and who have many conflicting 
demands on their time, it is not clear that administrative process 
rules will command the attention that ensuring future legislative 
dominance would require. The same is true for regulated interest 
groups: In the abstract, interest groups that would benefit from close 
legislative control over agencies would have an incentive to lobby for 
administrative process rules that promoted legislative control, but 
any given interest group’s incentive to invest in securing a set of such 
rules for the benefit of all other similarly situated groups, especially 
given the uncertainty that would inevitably surround such an under-
taking, is less clear. Powerful interest groups too might prefer to fo-
cus instead on more immediate and self-serving gains. 
 That’s not all. Perhaps more importantly, Congress might well 
prefer to use administrative procedure to insulate itself from interest 
groups, rather than to control agencies to thereby deliver demanded 
regulation. That is, by prescribing generally open and accessible 
rules of administrative procedure, such as those embodied in section 
553—and devising open and accessible rules is a much simpler task 
than determining which rules would best exclude certain interests 
but not others—Congress might use administrative procedure to re-
sist interest group demands for favorable regulation. After all, why 
would legislators be motivated simply to act as interest group agents 
if they could avoid doing so without sacrificing whatever interest 
group political support they require? It is one thing to hold, as the in-
terest group theory does, that legislators are solicitous of special in-
terest groups’ demands, but quite another to hold that they enjoy it. 
By delegating substantial regulatory powers to agencies, which do 
not require the same type of political support from interest groups 
that members of Congress themselves do, and then by creating a set 
of rules that raise the costs of regulatory rent seeking, Congress may 
employ the administrative process as a defense against interest 
group demands even while it can appear to champion its interest 
group supporters. Congress can always later deflect blame toward 
agencies, and the courts which back them up, for regulatory decisions 
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its interest group supporters do not like. Congress can growl at agen-
cies too, under the eye of powerful constituencies. But individual leg-
islators who are motivated at least in part to advance general inter-
ests might not regret much that agencies enjoy sufficient autonomy 
to do what Congress itself can do directly only at great political cost. 
 Overlooking this possibility, the interest group theory too quickly 
assumes instead that a Congress dependent on the support of inter-
est groups which have only their narrow and self-regarding regula-
tory interests in mind can do nothing to limit the malignant conse-
quences of that dependence. But if Congress can properly be anthro-
pomorphized at all, maybe Congress is more resourceful than the 
theory gives it credit for.141 To be sure, interest groups might prefer 
that Congress not use administrative procedure to liberate agencies, 
and therefore to some extent liberate itself, but again it would take 
an unusually focused and far-sighted set of interest groups to do 
much about it. In sum, serious questions about Congress’ institu-
tional incentives to devise administrative procedures that success-
fully control agencies, as well as about its ability to do so, lend sup-
port to the arguments above that existing administrative process 
rules seem ill-designed to promote congressional control and regula-
tory rent seeking. 
 But there is a relevant history here, which casts still further 
doubts on the interest group theory’s legislative dominance claim. At 
the time leading up to the Administrative Procedure Act’s passage in 
1946, efforts to standardize and codify agency decisionmaking proc-
esses were born largely out of a concern that, in the wake of the New 
Deal, federal agencies enjoyed too much power and discretion vis-à-
vis regulated industries. 142 In response, those subject to agency power 
sought decisionmaking procedures that were open, accessible, and 
fair.143 Today, concerns about agency power are very different; the 
modern worry—one certainly embodied by the interest group the-
ory—is that agencies and regulated industries will cooperate in ways 
that sacrifice public interests. The difficulty for the theory, however, 
is that the very same procedural rules that were adopted to protect 
industry in the 1940s make it harder—because they are generally 
open, accessible, and fair—for industry to capture agencies today. 
Historical circumstances, in other words, produced a procedural tem-
plate which makes regulatory rent seeking difficult. 
                                                                                                                  
 141. See Farina, supra note 89, at 132-33 (identifying examples of Congress’ institu-
tional response to the particularism of its individual members). 
 142. See generally Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 
72 VA. L. REV. 219 (1986); George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative 
Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1560-61 (1996).  
 143. See Shepherd, supra note 142, at 1569-75. 
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 In fact, in the late 1930s industry lost in its effort to secure alter-
native legislation that would have limited agency power (and thus 
the potency of New Deal reforms) considerably,144 an historical fact 
inconvenient for the interest group theory. It got, instead, an act 
which preserved agency power over industry—specifically, one that 
legislatively sanctioned agency rulemaking—but conditioned the use 
of that power on conformity with certain good-government decision-
making procedures. 145 Those procedures, helpful to regulated parties 
in an era that pitted industry against the government, undermined 
regulated parties’ attempts to secure favorable regulation to the det-
riment of broad-based interests in a later era.146 
 A final point remains. In recent years, Congress has perceived a 
need to exercise greater control over agencies, suggesting that Con-
gress itself doubts its own capacity to influence agencies on regula-
tory matters. For example, the 104th Congress passed legislation, 
part of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 
1996147 (in turn a piece of the Contract with America Advancement 
Act of 1996148), that amended Title 5 of the U.S. Code to require 
agencies to submit all of their new rules to Congress and to the Gen-
eral Accounting Office for review.149 This new procedure stays the ef-
fective date of major rules under congressional review for sixty 
days,150 and further provides for Congress to enact a joint resolution 
disapproving rules it considers to be undesirable.151 The same Con-
gress also established a legislative “Corrections Day” in the House,152 
a mechanism for fast-track consideration of bills that would “correct” 
agencies’ decisions that Congress deemed misguided, which required 
a change in the House’s rules rather than legislation. That these de-
                                                                                                                  
 144. See id. at 1598-1618. 
 145. See id. at 1675-78. 
 146. Thus President Franklin D. Roosevelt, upon his veto of the Walter-Logan Bill, 
H.R. 6324, 76th Cong. (1939), the main alternative to the Administrative Procedure Act 
which he supported, stated: 
Wherever a continuing series of controversies exist between a powerful and 
concentrated interest on one side and a diversified mass of individuals, each of 
whose separate interests may be small, on the other side, the only means of o b-
taining equality before the law has been to place the controversy in an adminis-
trative tribunal. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Veto Message, reprinted in 86 CONG.  REC. 13,942-43 
(1940). 
 147. Pub. L. No. 104-121, tit. II, 110 Stat. 847, 857-74 (currently codified at 5 U.S.C. § 
601 note (Small Business Regulatory Fairness) and other scattered sections of Titles 5 & 
15 U.S.C.). 
 148. Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847. 
 149. See id. sec. 251, § 801, 110 Stat. at 868 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. V 1999)). 
 150. See sec. 251, § 801(a)(3)(A), 110 Stat. at 869. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See H.R. Res. 168, 104th Cong. (1995). See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Legal 
Scholarship in the Age of Legislation, 34 TULSA L.J. 679, 690 (1999); John Copeland Nagle, 
Corrections D ay, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1267 (1996).  
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velopments, which some observers attribute to political chest-
beating,153 will change the legislature-agency relationship in a sig-
nificant way seems unlikely. Certainly they do not change the essen-
tial fact that Congress must pass legislation to undo what an agency 
has legally done. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
such efforts reflect some amount of congressional frustration about 
Congress’ ability to influence agencies. For this reason as well as 
those already mentioned, existing administrative process rules do not 
seem to square with the interest group theory’s legislative dominance 
claim, not without a lot of pushing and grease. 
 
C.   Agencies’ Legal-Institutional Environment 
 
 Of course, agencies do not regulate in an APA-vacuum. Rather, 
their decisionmaking processes are guided or otherwise influenced by 
powerful legal and political forces besides Congress. Once again, 
then, one might ask whether those influences make the legislative 
influence claim more or less plausible. However motivated legislators 
may be to direct agencies to deliver regulatory benefits to legislative 
constituencies, other political institutions might complicate or even 
undermine congressional control. 
 Presidential oversight is one important example, perhaps espe-
cially lately. Though created, empowered, and funded by Congress, 
agencies answer to the President as well. While agencies’ institu-
tional position relative to the President is more subtle than the for-
mal-constitutional model of a government composed of three 
branches suggests, still agencies are in many important ways di-
rectly answerable to the White House. This is certainly true of execu-
tive branch agencies, whose heads serve at the President’s pleasure. 
 In recent administrations, the President has exercised his consti-
tutional power over the executive branch to assert greater and 
greater control over agencies, as many have observed.154 Several im-
portant executive orders have centralized agency decisionmaking, 
both by directing agencies to submit major rules to the White House 
for review and by articulating principles to guide regulatory deci-
                                                                                                                  
 153. See, e.g., Daniel Cohen, S. 981, The Regulatory Improvement Act of 1998: The Most 
Recent Attempt to Develop a Solution in Search of a Problem, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 699 (1998). 
 154. See, e.g., Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget 
Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 
12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1 (1984); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Rein-
venting the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995). See generally Steven G. Calabresi 
& Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 
(1994); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 
COLUM . L. REV. 1 (1994); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separa-
tion of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 587 (1984). 
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sionmakers. 155 Recent vice presidents also have taken a much greater 
interest in regulatory policymaking and agency decisionmaking spe-
cifically.156 As a result, agencies are often in close contact with the 
White House during the development of important regulatory policy 
initiatives. 157 Agency decisionmakers are not answerable to the White 
House only as a formal-constitutional matter, in other words, but 
rather as a practical, day-to-day matter—a relationship that seri-
ously challenges any easy control of agencies by Congress.158 
 This is not to deny that the chief executive may seek to use agen-
cies to deliver regulatory goods to important presidential constituen-
cies, much as Congress may attempt the same for its own constituen-
cies. 159 But for obvious geographical reasons, those two constituencies 
are not neatly overlapping. The President’s “district” composes the 
entire country, and reelection-minded administrations will have to 
reconcile competing interests spread out across the country, even 
while presidents may be especially solicitous of interests in elec-
torally important states. In short, the “electoral connection” between 
interest groups and the presidency, while perhaps as strong as that 
between groups and legislators, is longer and more twisted. Presi-
dential control therefore challenges rather than reinforces legislative 
control over agencies. 
 More importantly, given a very different electoral dynamic, presi-
dents have fewer incentives to be solicitous of interest group de-
mands than does the proverbial House member, whose next, difficult 
election is always just around the corner. For one thing, presidents 
are more responsive to, and have much greater capacities to shape, 
public opinion as compared with individual legislators, as issues like 
gun control illustrate. Presidents can also—in part therefore—better 
afford to advance general interests over the objections of powerful in-
terest groups than can individual legislators, as issues like free trade 
illustrate. Thus, presidential control over agencies is not simply in-
terest group control replanted in White House soil. To the extent 
agency decisionmakers are influenced by the President and not only 
by Congress, then, presidential influence may enable agencies to ad-
                                                                                                                  
 155. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 
C.F.R. 323 (1986); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). 
 156. See, e.g., VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE , FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS:  CREATING A 
GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE REVIEW (1993). Subsequent “status reports” on the reinvention initiative 
can be found at http://www.npr.gov/. 
 157. See, e.g., LUBBERS, supra note 114, at 160-64. 
 158. For an early argument along these lines, see Terry Moe, Regulatory Performance 
and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. 197 (1982). 
 159. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules 
for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987 (1997). 
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vance diffuse interests, legislative pressures to the contrary notwith-
standing. 
 That leaves the least dangerous branch, which may further em-
power agencies to advance broad-based interests. On the one hand, 
judicial review promotes congressional control of agencies by ensur-
ing that agency decisions are faithful to the text of the legislation an 
agency is implementing. An agency that strays from the will of Con-
gress as expressed in that legislation is likely to see its decision in-
validated by a reviewing court as outside of the agency’s authority. In 
this formal sense at least, judicial review promotes congressional 
monitoring and thus control of agencies, or serves as a proxy for it. 
 But of course the real question is whether judicial review makes it 
easier or harder for agencies, when acting within the broad parame-
ters of their statutory authority, to exercise that authority in ways 
that effectively deliver regulatory rents, in other words, that advance 
narrow congressional constituencies over greater, broad-based inter-
ests. There are several reasons to suspect that judicial review makes 
regulatory rent seeking more difficult. For one, judicial review pro-
motes a certain political neutrality in agency decisionmaking, by re-
quiring such things as consideration of all relevant facts, advance no-
tice of the facts upon which an agency intends to rely, openness with 
respect to access to the relevant agency decisionmakers, and so on. 
By vindicating principles embodied in the APA and thereby helping 
to ensure that agency decisions to some extent reflect all implicated 
interests, judicial review deters illicit delivery of regulatory rents. In 
addition, reviewing courts subject agency decisions, unlike legislative 
decisions, to certain substantive standards that discourage agencies 
from rendering arbitrary, inexplicable, or unreasonable decisions. 160 
Although courts show considerable deference towards the merits of 
agency decisions, still judicial standards of review make it difficult 
for agencies to ignore the relevant consequences of their decisions, 161 
to change course abruptly in response to political pressures for ex-
ample, where the underlying facts do not so warrant, 162 or to under-
value certain interests in order to advance others. 163 Both the “proce-
dural” and “substantive” facets of judicial review, in other words, im-
pede easy agency delivery of regulatory rents. 
 Judicial reinforcement of administrative process norms, like the 
rulemaking process itself, also to some extent equalizes the interest 
group playing field. First, subject to standing and similar require-
                                                                                                                  
 160. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D) (1994) (describing judicial review standards 
for courts reviewing agency action, findings, and conclusions). 
 161. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
 162. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
 163. See, e.g., International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795 
(D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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ments, in principle any group or person aggrieved by agency action 
can seek judicial relief.164 That is, it does not matter whether ten 
groups or one perceive that their interests were not adequately con-
sidered by an agency; judicial review can be triggered by any party 
that can afford to file a brief—a significant but not insurmountable 
hurdle. Second, again subject to the costs of participation, in princi-
ple any person or group can participate in agency decisionmaking by, 
for example, submitting facts or arguments during a rulemaking, 
thereby getting its view into the regulatory record. All of this is sim-
ply to say that, given the nature of judicial review, background dis-
parities in interest group resources or political clout are not neatly 
translatable into equal disparities in regulatory influence in the way 
they may be in the legislative arena.165 
 Moreover, while none of these observations alters the central fact 
that courts will hold agencies faithful to legislative text, thereby se-
curing some measure of legislative dominance over agencies, it is also 
true that statutory text itself often espouses general-interest regula-
tory principles. That is, it is not everyday that Congress passes legis-
lation that unambiguously grants socially undesirable benefits to fa-
vored interest groups. The political consequences of blatant favorit-
ism can be too costly. Legislative favoritism, where present, is thus 
often more subtle, requiring complicit agencies to interpret text sus-
ceptible to general-interest interpretation in some other way. Be-
cause courts show considerable deference to agencies in the context 
of statutory interpretation too, again judicial review can empower 
agencies to vindicate broad-based interests by interpreting legisla-
tion in ways most consonant with public interests. In fact, adminis-
trative law scholars have often called on courts to insist that agencies 
interpret legislation in such a way, where possible, believing judicial 
review to be an institution particularly suitable for combating spe-
cial-interest regulation.166 
                                                                                                                  
 164. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994). 
 165. The EPA's "Project XL" is just one illuminating example of the importance of the 
ability to challenge agency action in court. According to some, the EPA's requirement that 
companies seeking approval of Project XL proposals first obtain the support of environ-
mental groups—who might otherwise sue the agency for granting exemptions from exist-
ing environmental regulations in exchange for a company's own site-specific plan for 
achieving comparable environmental benefits—has seriously weakened Project XL's suc-
cess, and certainly empowers such groups. See Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environ-
mental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 147-49 (1998). 
 166. See, e.g., ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 48, at 36; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics 
Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. 
L. REV. 275, 309-14 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation 
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM . L. REV. 223, 227 
(1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 
54 TUL. L. REV. 849, 874-75 (1980); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public 
Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 74 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regula-
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 So grant this much: However uneven interest group pressures on 
Congress may be, and however inclined legislators may therefore be 
to use their powers over agencies to generate regulatory policies that 
favor narrow, organized interests, it is still at least plausible that 
regulatory decisionmakers at the agency level nevertheless often 
pursue regulatory policies designed to serve broad-based, even unor-
ganized interests. It is plausible that agency regulators are moti-
vated to do so as a result of their own commitments to certain con-
ceptions of the common good, which might account for why they be-
came regulators in the first place. It is similarly plausible that ad-
ministrative process rules promote agency independence by condi-
tioning the exercise of agency power on the use of procedures that, 
because they require some level of openness, notice, and accountabil-
ity in agency decisionmaking, are not well designed for interest 
group favoritism. It is also plausible that presidential oversight and 
judicial review further promote agency autonomy by providing sepa-
rate sets of incentives for agencies to consider all relevant facts, ar-
guments, and policy consequences in the course of their decisionmak-
ing processes. 167 At a minimum, whether the administrative process 
broadly understood promotes agency independence rather than legis-
lative influence seems, in the abstract, up for grabs,168 McNollgast’s 
arguments to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 But then what is plausible in theory may prove false in fact. 
Whether regulatory decisions ever advance broad-based interests 
over narrow interests is of course an empirical question. Whether 
regulatory decisions advance broad-based interests over narrow in-
terests regularly enough, especially when the regulatory stakes are 
high, to offset whatever regulatory rents agencies otherwise pro-
vide—and thus whether regulation on the whole promotes rather 
than imperils public interests—is a separate empirical question. By 
investigating three recent and highly significant regulatory initia-
tives, Part IV below goes far to answer that first question and pro-
vides some hints about the answer to the second. 
                                                                                                                  
tory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 462-502 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences 
and the Constitution, 84 COLUM . L. REV. 1689, 1695-97 (1984); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A 
Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 739-88 (1986); see also Em-
erson H. Tiller, Controlling Policy by Controlling Process: Judicial Influence on Regulatory 
Decision Making, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 114 (1998). But see Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest 
Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 48-66 (1991). 
 167. Cf. John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 
J.L. ECON. & ORG., Special Issue 1990, at 1, 9-17. 
 168. For a refreshingly textured treatment of this issue, which highlights some of the 
complexities of legislative control of agencies, see Thomas H. Hammond & Jack H. Knott, 
Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Con-
straints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making, 12 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119 (1996). 
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IV.   THREE REGULATORY CASE STUDIES 
 Questions concerning issues such as what motivates administra-
tive decisionmakers, how the administrative process limits congres-
sional control over agencies, and the extent to which judicial review 
reinforces congressional control or instead liberates agencies are dif-
ficult to tackle in the abstract. As there is no measuring stick by 
which to resolve such issues, it is often hard to know just what to 
conclude. One can develop a theoretical argument in most any direc-
tion, which is not to say all arguments are equally compelling, only 
that it is never clear what form a decisive test of any given argument 
is supposed to take. 
 Consideration of actual examples of regulatory decisionmaking 
cannot solve that problem. But it sure helps. Accordingly, the follow-
ing discussion explores three sets of regulatory decisions that may 
assist both to reveal the limitations of the interest group theory of 
regulation and to illustrate the promise of an administrative process 
approach. These include the EPA’s decision to develop stricter regu-
lations governing ozone and particulate matter, the Food and Drug 
Administration’s decision to regulate tobacco products, and the 
Comptroller of the Currency’s decision to take steps to liberalize the 
activities of national banks. These regulatory initiatives are interest-
ing because each appears to be an instance where regulators sought 
to advance diffuse interests over organized opposition representing 
powerful, concentrated interests. To that extent, these cases may 
shed light on whether and under what circumstances administrators 
regulate in the public interest. 
 To risk stating the obvious, these three vignettes are not offered 
as a random selection of regulatory cases with which to adjudicate 
decisively between competing accounts of regulation, or for that mat-
ter to evaluate once and for all the legislative dominance claim. In-
deed, the examples in question were chosen in part precisely because 
they appear to be instances of administrative regulators advancing 
broad-based interests at the expense of concentrated, mobilized in-
terests (and in part because of their regulatory significance). On the 
other hand, while these regulatory case studies were not selected 
randomly, neither are they inconsequential regulatory developments 
whose discovery required long search—minor exceptions in a sea of 
special-interest regulation—nor do they exhaust recent examples of 
regulatory action that appears to advance broad-based interests. 169 
                                                                                                                  
 169. See generally  OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, 2000 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (2000) (outlining agencies’ cost-
benefit approaches to regulation and providing several examples of regulatory programs 
with clear net social benefits, as well as some examples of programs questionable on cost-
benefit grounds); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, 1998 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (1999) (same). 
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To the contrary, each involves enormously important regulatory deci-
sions that sparked intense national debates and implicated billions of 
dollars. Indeed, the EPA’s regulatory action concerning ozone and 
particulate matter, the FDA’s with respect to tobacco, and the Comp-
troller’s liberalization of activities permissible by national banks 
would all clearly make a short list of some of the most significant 
regulatory activity in recent years, unquestionably so in the envi-
ronmental, consumer protection, and financial services arenas. Thus, 
while the case studies considered here cannot provide grounds for re-
jecting any theory of regulation, except one that admits no varia-
tion,170 they are nevertheless suggestive about whether, and how, the 
administrative state is capable of advancing broad-based interests. 
 These regulatory initiatives will be analyzed with the following 
questions in mind: First, are these examples instances of public-
interested regulation, or are they something else in disguise? Second, 
what made the initiatives possible? In particular, what motivations 
did the relevant administrators appear to have? What legal deci-
sionmaking processes did they employ, and which interests partici-
pated in those administrative processes? And what role did the agen-
cies’ institutional relationships with the President and the courts 
play? Third, how did important congressional constituencies line up 
in favor of or against the regulatory actions in question, how did 
Congress react, and what monitoring and sanctioning techniques did 
Congress use in response to agency action? Later, Part V will identify 
the common denominators linking these cases, and consider what 
conclusions they might therefore support about the interest group 
and administrative process theories. 
A.   The EPA and Ozone and Particulate Matter 
 In what was widely considered to be one of the most significant 
environmental policy decisions in recent years, 171 the EPA in July of 
                                                                                                                  
 170. Stigler, who again provides much of the foundation of the interest group theory, 
sets the stakes high on this issue. The great virtue of his approach is that it provides falsi-
fiable predictions. The great danger is that it provides falsifiable predictions. He writes: 
It is of course true that the theory would be contradicted if, for a given regula-
tory policy, we found the group with larger benefits and lower costs of political 
action being dominated by another group with lesser benefits and higher cost of 
political action. Temporary accidents aside, such cases simply will not arise: 
our extensive experience with the general theory in economics gives us the con-
fidence that this is so. 
GEORGE J. STIGLER, Old and New Theories of Economic Regulation, in THE CITIZEN AND 
THE STATE : ESSAYS ON REGULATION 137, 140 (1975). The examples of such regulatory poli-
cies in the text below contradict at least Stigler’s influential presentation of the interest 
group theory. 
 171. See, e.g., Dan Balz & Joby Warrick, President May Endorse Tougher Clean Air 
Rules; Backing EPA Would Upset Some Political Allies, WASH. POST, June 25, 1997, at A1 
[hereinafter Balz & Warrick, Tougher Clean Air Rules] (EPA’s proposals constitute the 
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1997 issued final rules under the Clean Air Act tightening restric-
tions on ozone and particulate matter.172 The EPA’s rules (one rule 
for ozone, one for particulate matter) constituted a revision to the 
agency’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), which 
set maximum levels for listed pollutants. 173 Sections 108 and 109 of 
the Clean Air Act require the EPA to identify and list maximum lev-
els of air pollutants that threaten human health and welfare,174 and 
to update those levels periodically, and at least once every five years, 
to reflect changes in science and technology concerning the effects of 
listed pollutants and their prevention.175 Ozone and particulate mat-
ter are two of six NAAQS-listed pollutants. 176 
 The EPA had last reviewed its restrictions relating to ozone in 
1993, and to particulate matter in 1987.177 Since then, the EPA initi-
ated rulemakings under section 553 of the APA by issuing notices of 
proposed rulemaking in December of 1996.178 The agency had come to 
believe, on the basis of intervening scientific research, that its exist-
ing standards were inadequate to protect human health and wel-
fare.179 At that time, the agency explained the grounds on which it 
found existing standards inadequate, and made available to the pub-
lic scientific studies the agency considered in reaching that conclu-
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sion.180 It also presented proposed rules to replace existing standards 
and invited comments on its proposals and on the issue of the ade-
quacy of existing standards more generally,181 all as required by sec-
tion 553.182 While the EPA’s decision took the procedural form of or-
dinary rulemaking, the decisionmaking process in this case was far 
from ordinary. To understand why, a bit more background is neces-
sary. 
 Ozone and particulate matter are not themselves emissions, not 
usually (particulate matter can be).183 Rather, they are the byprod-
ucts of emissions from a wide range of sources,184 which begins to ex-
plain why the EPA’s action here was so significant. Ozone (O3), spe-
cifically tropospheric (“ground level”) ozone—not to be confused with 
stratospheric ozone, which protects the earth from harmful ultravio-
let rays and differs from tropospheric ozone only in its location—
results from atmospheric transformations of volatile organic com-
pounds, nitrogen oxides, and oxygen in the presence of heat and sun-
light.185 Particulate matter is a generic term for tiny liquid and solid 
particles of varying size and composition that lodge in the lungs and 
other parts of the body (for example, the head) after inhalation.186 
Much like ozone, particulate matter results from transformations of 
gaseous emissions such as sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and volatile 
organic compounds.187 
 Both ozone and particulate matter are indisputably harmful to 
human health and welfare, though debatable questions remain about 
what the tolerable level of each is.188 And both are particularly 
threatening to young children, older persons, and asthmatics, as well 
as to a subset of the otherwise “normal” population that just happens 
to be particularly susceptible to health problems from these pollut-
ants.189 Particulate matter is also particularly threatening to indi-
viduals with heart or lung disease, as is ozone to completely healthy 
persons who perform moderate physical work out of doors, and to 
those who exercise out of doors. 190 
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 Reacting to research findings by a number of medical researchers 
about the health effects of ozone and particulate matter at levels be-
low those allowed by existing NAAQS,191 and prompted by a judicial 
order following a lawsuit in which the agency was sued for not updat-
ing its NAAQS in a timely manner,192 the EPA undertook to revise its 
standards. The revision process actually had in a sense begun in 
1992 for ozone and in 1994 for particulate matter, at which times the 
EPA began reviewing the latest scientific research on the health and 
welfare effects of the pollutants. 193 Following its review, the agency 
decided in 1996 to propose a rule reducing ambient ozone levels to 
0.08 part per million (ppm), calculated using a specific eight-hour av-
erage standard.194 It similarly proposed a rule to reduce levels of par-
ticulate matter first by distinguishing between “fine” particulate 
matter (up to 2.5 microns in diameter, “PM2.5”) and “coarse” particu-
late matter (from 2.5 to 10 microns, “PM10,” 10 microns being about 
1/7th the diameter of a human hair),195 and then by limiting newly 
defined PM2.5 to certain annual-mean and twenty-four-hour concen-
tration maximums, and PM10 to a revised twenty-four-hour standard 
(fifty micrograms per cubic meter).196 The agency also invited com-
ment on several specified alternative standards. 197 The EPA esti-
mated that its proposed new limitations would yield a number of 
benefits in various forms: fifteen thousand lives saved annually; one 
million fewer annual incidences of significant decreases in children’s 
lung functions requiring medical treatment, medication, or reduced 
activity; hundreds of thousands fewer annual incidences of aggra-
vated asthma; hundreds of thousands fewer annual cases of aggra-
vated coughing and difficult or painful breathing by children; tens of 
thousands fewer annual cases of symptoms associated with chronic 
bronchitis; thousands fewer hospital and emergency-room visits and 
admissions by individuals with asthma; reduced risks of illnesses 
such as inflammation of the lung, impairment of the lung’s defense 
mechanisms, respiratory infection, and irreversible changes in lung 
structure leading to emphysema and chronic bronchitis or premature 
aging of the lungs; reduced risks of susceptibility to childhood dis-
eases; between $50 and $120 billion annual savings in reduced medi-
cal expenditures and lower absenteeism from work; $500 million 
worth of avoided yield losses of major agricultural crops; reduced 
damage to other vegetation; and improved visibility over large re-
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gions of the eastern United States and over urban areas.198 The EPA 
estimated that compliance costs would range from $6 to $9 billion 
annually for ten years.199 
 While the EPA is charged under the Clean Air Act with setting 
the NAAQS standards, the agency does not implement them itself. 
Rather, the Act requires states to develop their own “State Imple-
mentation Plans” (SIPs),200 to be submitted to the EPA for the 
agency’s approval.201 The EPA’s role is one of assistance to states in 
developing SIPs that will achieve compliance with the NAAQS. By 
the time of the EPA’s proposed new rules in 1996, some parts of the 
country had achieved compliance with the existing limits, while other 
regions were not in compliance. 
 Because ozone and particulate matter are not typically discharged 
themselves, the important consequence of the new limitations was 
that states developing SIPs would have to restrict levels of pollutants 
by sources whose emissions contributed to their formation. This is 
where the case gets interesting, for those sources include chemical 
plants, construction operations, factories, incinerators, oil refineries, 
motor vehicles, power plants, and various other industrial and fuel-
combustion sources. 202 In short, numerous large industries were im-
plicated. The new NAAQS limits would require many industries to 
make significant new investments in emission-reduction technolo-
gies. Not surprisingly, those forces mobilized aggressively against the 
proposed new standards. 
 But this gets slightly ahead of the story. Appreciating the signifi-
cance of its proposed decision, and anticipating that its proposal 
would generate considerable political resistance, the EPA went to 
great lengths to solicit public input concerning its proposals. For one 
thing, it established a national toll-free telephone hotline to facilitate 
public commentary on the proposed rules. 203 It also solicited elec-
tronic comments via the Internet. 204 In addition, the EPA held sev-
eral public hearings at major cities across the country, where hun-
dreds of organizations and individuals responded to the proposed 
rules, 205 and several of the EPA’s regional offices held their own pub-
lic meetings and workshops as well.206 The agency also participated 
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in numerous meetings on the proposed rules organized by the Air 
and Waste Management Association.207 Finally, the EPA also held 
two national satellite telecasts to answer questions on the proposed 
standards. 208 
 The agency also made available two important documents that in-
formed the public about each proposed rule, a “Staff Paper” and a 
“Criteria Document,”209 both of which were developed, made available 
for public comment (via the Internet and otherwise), and revised 
prior to the EPA’s notices of proposed rulemaking.210 The Criteria 
Documents were the work-product of the EPA’s Clean Air Scientific 
Advisory Committee (CASAC), an independent advisory committee 
required by the Clean Air Act, chartered under the FACA, and com-
posed of scientific and technical experts. 211 The CASAC played a cru-
cial role in the agency’s decision to revise the NAAQS by reviewing 
and commenting upon the latest scientific data and studies on ozone 
and particulate matter.212 The EPA’s Office of Air Quality Planning 
and Standards also provided a review and assessment of relevant 
scientific and technical information in the form of a Staff Paper for 
each pollutant.213 Like the Criteria Documents, the Staff Papers were 
also made available for public comment and in addition were re-
viewed by the CASAC.214 Relying on the Staff Papers and Criteria 
Documents, as well as on public commentary and CASAC advice, the 
EPA determined to tighten the ozone and particulate matter stan-
dards.215 
 Interest group opposition to the proposed rules was intense. A 
large coalition composed of automakers, coal producers, electric com-
panies, oil companies, and other major industries, and led by the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers and the Air Quality Standards 
Coalition (another industry group), spent millions of dollars opposing 
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the standards through lobbying and publicity.216 Those opposed to the 
stricter limitations voiced their opposition in two main ways. First, 
they contested the soundness of the agency’s proposals, including 
their scientific bases and the agency’s assessments of their economic 
consequences, before the EPA during the notice-and-comment rule-
making process. 217 The EPA received 14,000 phone calls pertaining to 
the rules, 4000 e-mail messages, and 50,000 sets of oral and written 
comments. 218 Second, interest groups opposed to the proposed new 
rules simultaneously took their complaints to Congress, which ex-
erted heavy pressures on the agency to abandon, soften, or delay its 
new standards. And, following promulgation of the final rules, those 
opponents sought relief from the courts as well. 219 
 Not that opposition to the new rules was universal. Numerous 
academic researchers and medical research groups, including the 
American Lung Association, supported the proposed new stan-
dards,220 though they argued that the rules did not go far enough to 
protect human health adequately,221 as did the Association of State 
and Territorial Health Officials, representing state health agen-
cies. 222 The government of Canada took the same line, also arguing 
that the state of the scientific research counseled in favor of stricter 
standards than those the agency proposed.223 Environmental groups 
like the Natural Resources Defense Council and private citizens such 
as Olympic marathon winner Joan Benoit Samuelson also supported 
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the proposed regulation, though they too argued that the proposed 
standards did not go far enough. Notwithstanding such support, the 
proposed rules’ mobilized opponents vastly outnumbered and out-
spent their organized supporters. 
 Because these pollutants travel well, small particulate matter es-
pecially, states and local governments also entered the fray. On one 
side, northeastern states—that is, downwind states—supported the 
EPA’s proposals, 224 while Midwestern states—upwind states—many 
local governments, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors joined the 
rules’ opponents. 225 Curiously enough, Midwestern states reached the 
conclusion that the science underlying the proposed rules did not un-
ambiguously support what the EPA contemplated226 and relatedly 
concluded that the resulting costs imposed on industry would out-
weigh the rules’ uncertain health and welfare benefits, while north-
eastern states found the evidence concerning the proposed rules and 
their expected benefits overwhelming. And interestingly, this geo-
graphic division transcended partisan alignments: Republican gover-
nors from New York and New Jersey rushed to the EPA’s defense,227 
long before the President decided whether to support the agency, 
while many Democratic governors and mayors (as well as members 
of Congress) from the Midwest, including Administration loyalists 
like Detroit’s mayor, sharply criticized the agency and urged the 
White House to slow the EPA down.228 
 Given the strength of interest group opposition to the proposed 
new standards, it was very unclear during the months between the 
EPA’s commencement of its rulemakings and the announcement of 
the final ozone and particulate matter rules whether the agency 
would adopt the standards it contemplated. This was true in part be-
cause for a time the White House equivocated about whether to sup-
                                                                                                                  
 224. See, e.g., Cushman, Top EPA Official , supra note 216 (stating that Republican 
Governor William Weld of Massachusetts supported the EPA); Edward Epstein, Mayors 
Want Role in Welfare Reform, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., June 25, 1997, at A7 (noting that 
U.S. Conference of Mayors voted 319 to 1 in favor of a resolution against the EPA rules). 
 225. See, e.g., Peter Kendall, Tougher Air Rules Still Have Some Breathing Room, 
CHICAGO TRIB., June 26, 1997, at 1. 
 226. See sources cited supra note 224. 
 227. See id.; see also John H. Cushman, Jr., D’Amato Vows to Fight for EPA’s Tight-
ened Air Standards, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1997, at A13 [hereinafter Cushman, D’Amato 
Vows] (noting support for the EPA by Republican governors of New Jersey and Massachu-
setts, as well as by two Republican senators from Maine); George E. Pataki, Editorial, 
Holding Our Breath , N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1997, at A25 (supporting the EPA proposals).  
 228. See, e.g., Balz & Warrick, Tougher Clean Air Rules, supra note 171 (quoting De-
troit’s Democratic Mayor Dennis Archer, who led the U.S. Conference of Mayors in opposi-
tion to EPA, as saying the proposed rules go “too far, too fast”); Cushman, Top EPA Offi-
cial, supra note 216 (explaining that Congressman John Dingell, Democrat of Michigan, 
ranking member of the Commerce Committee, which oversees the Clean Air Act, led the e f-
fort among House Democrats against the rules); Warrick, Hands-On Role, supra note 171 
(noting that many Democratic governors and mayors opposed the EPA proposals).  
2000]  PUBLIC INTERESTED REGULATION  63 
 
port the agency. Some within the White House supported stricter 
limits, while others questioned whether the benefits of new limits 
would justify the costs. 229 According to several reports, the proposed 
rules were particularly controversial within the National Economic 
Council and to some extent the Office of Management and Budget.230 
At any rate, for a period of several months, the EPA’s Administrator, 
Carol M. Browner, found herself defending her agency’s proposed 
rules before many enemies, with the help of few allies, and under the 
awkward cloud of a conspicuously silent White House.231 
 Congress was not so ambivalent. Congressional opponents of the 
proposed new rules voiced their views far more often and more loudly 
than did congressional supporters. 232 Led largely by legislators from 
states housing industries with potentially high compliance costs, and 
Democrats at least as much as Republicans,233 Congress held several 
oversight hearings, on both the House and Senate sides.234 The House 
Science Committee’s Subcommittee on Energy and Environment also 
issued a report criticizing the proposed rules on the grounds that, as 
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one member put it, the agency had put “the regulatory cart before 
the scientific horse.”235 
 The congressional hearings were no picnic, for Browner especially. 
Some within Congress went so far as to charge that Browner from 
the very beginning took a results-oriented approach to the rulemak-
ings and refused to consider seriously the uncertainties surrounding 
the rules’ benefits or the great burdens the rules would create. 236 
That charge was echoed by certain interest groups which vilified the 
Administrator,237 as well as by the Washington Legal Foundation, 
which took the unusual step of formally petitioning the EPA seeking 
Browner’s recusal from the rulemakings on the ground that she could 
not give meaningful, open-minded consideration to the proposed 
rules because she had already determined to tighten the ozone and 
particulate matter standards.238 Others within Congress accused the 
EPA (and the White House) of withholding all relevant factual in-
formation.239 Still others threatened to utilize the new “Corrections 
Day” or other congressional review procedures to invalidate the new 
standards legislatively.240 Moderate congressional voices urged the 
EPA to loosen rather than abandon its proposed standards. 241 All of 
                                                                                                                  
 235. SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY AND ENV’T OF HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE, 105TH CONG., 
REPORT ON SCIENCE BEHIND THE U.S. EPA’S PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE PRIMARY 
NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR OZONE AND PARTICULATE MATTER: 
HEARING SUMMARIES,  FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Comm. Print 1997) (quoting 
Science Comm. Chairman F. James Sesenbrenner, Jr.). 
 236. See, e.g., Batra & Sugrue, supra note 232, at 626-38 (explaining congressional op-
position to rules and contemplated congressional responses, including freestanding legisla-
tion to undo the rules). 
 237. See, e.g., Kyle Niederpruem, EPA Chief Takes Naysayers in Stride, INDIANAPOLIS 
STAR, Nov. 14, 1997, at C1 (referring to a Forbes magazine cover story on Browner charac-
terizing her as a “‘mission creep’”). 
 238. See PM NAAQS, supra note 172, at 38,708-09 (responding to a request for re-
cusal). 
 239. See, e.g., Proposed NAAQS Hearings, supra note 212, at 3-4 (providing statements 
of Chairmen Thomas Bliley, Jr., criticizing the EPA on the grounds that the agency with-
held information concerning the scientific evidence underlying its standards as well as in-
formation about its benefits in the “EPA’s repeated attempts to shield the proposals from 
legitimate Congressional scrutiny”). 
 240. See, e.g., Cushman, D’Amato Vows, supra note 227 (noting that congressional op-
ponents threatened to use the new regulatory review procedure enacted by the 104th Con-
gress); Skrzycki, supra note 233 (explaining that legislative reactions included proposals to 
kill the rules through legislation, to use the new “resolution of disapproval,” and to pass a 
bill stalling the rules’ implementation); Vicki Torres, Firms Push for Some Breathing 
Room, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1997, at D9 (stating that House and Senate bills would impose 
moratoria on new rules); Congress May Override EPA’s Rules, Gramm Warns, PESTICIDE & 
TOXIC CHEMICAL NEWS, Sept. 17, 1997, at 9 (discussing how proposed legislation in both 
houses would postpone standards for five years pending further study, and quoting Sena-
tor Gramm: “I have no doubt that we have the votes [to stop the EPA’s rules].”). 
 241. See, e.g., Warrick, Hands-On Role, supra note 171 (stating that Senator John 
Chaffee, Chair of the Environment Committee, urged the White House to seek a middle 
ground between the EPA and the proposed rules’ opponents, to avoid a showdown with 
Congress). 
2000]  PUBLIC INTERESTED REGULATION  65 
 
these congressional reactions were bolstered by testimony from the 
rules’ opponents, including industry representatives, Midwestern 
governors, and interestingly, several former chairs of the EPA’s 
CASAC.242 
 But the Administrator defended the agency’s proposals and its de-
cisionmaking processes steadfastly, both in testimony before a mostly 
unsympathetic Congress and more generally before the public.243 And 
in the end, the EPA, over intense objections from many powerful in-
terest groups, though with a last-minute boost from downwind Sena-
tor Alfonse D’Amato (four of whose seven grandchildren suffer from 
asthma),244 as well as support from a White House that ultimately 
decided to support the proposed rules rather than advocate softening 
modifications245 as some had predicted,246 issued final rules that re-
sembled its proposed rules quite closely. For example, the final ozone 
rule limits ozone to .08 ppm, as proposed, calculated using a three-
year average of the annual fourth-highest (rather than third-highest, 
as originally proposed) daily maximum eight-hour concentration.247 
The final particulate matter rule limits PM2.5 to fifteen micrograms 
per cubic meter calculated on an annual basis, and sixty-five micro-
grams per cubic meter calculated on a twenty-four hour basis (rather 
than the stricter standard of 50 micrograms per cubic meter on a 
twenty-four hour basis, as originally proposed), and PM10 to fifty mi-
crograms per cubic meter annually and 150 micrograms per cubic 
meter on a twenty-four hour basis.248 Following the agency’s an-
nouncement of its final rules on July 17, 1997, bills were introduced 
in both the House and Senate to impose moratoria on the new stan-
dards.249 The implementation of the new standards was first put on 
hold judicially, however, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit ruled in a case brought by the American Truckers Association 
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that the portion of the Clean Air Act on which the EPA based its 
rules constituted, in light of the agency’s interpretation of it, an un-
constitutional delegation of legislative power,250 a decision reversed 
by the Supreme Court.251 
B.   The FDA and Tobacco 
 In August of 1996, the federal Food and Drug Administration took 
a bold step. It issued its much-discussed rule regulating the advertis-
ing, sale, and distribution of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, and 
explained the statutory basis for its decision to do so.252 The decision 
culminated a year-long rulemaking which began with the agency’s 
proposed rule in August of 1995.253 Following publication of the pro-
posed rule, the FDA accepted comments from August until Novem-
ber, at which time it extended the public comment period until Janu-
ary, 1996, after which it reopened the comment period for one month 
during the spring of 1996.254 
 Comment on the proposed tobacco rule was voluminous, to say the 
least. The rulemaking generated 700,000 pieces of written commen-
tary (though 300,000 of such pieces came from one particular mail 
campaign), the most in the history of FDA rulemaking.255 Ninety-five 
thousand people mailed the agency their individual views.256 The 
FDA also received 500 different form letters. 257 One comment on the 
proposed rule, submitted by the cigarette industry, consisted of some 
2000 pages of commentary with 45,000 pages of supporting docu-
ments. 258 For its part, the FDA assembled 200,000 pages of factual 
materials concerning the medical, scientific, and social-scientific ba-
sis for its rule.259 
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 The stakes were that high. Among other things, the proposed rule 
restricted access to cigarettes sales by minors, 260 limited tobacco ad-
vertising in the media,261 prohibited the distribution of free tobacco 
samples and non-tobacco promotional items such as clothing,262 con-
ditioned corporate sponsorship of sporting and other events by to-
bacco companies, 263 and required tobacco manufacturers to finance a 
national public education program aimed to reduce smoking by mi-
nors.264 The FDA estimated that its rule would impose an initial cost 
on the tobacco industry of between $174 and $187 million, and there-
after annual costs of between $149 and $185 million.265 (The industry 
estimated annual costs of $1 billion, excluding the losses from re-
duced sales.266) The agency also estimated that the rule would gener-
ate between $28 and $43 billion in annual benefits, mostly due to 
savings in health-related expenditures.267 
 As in the case of the EPA’s ozone and particulate matter rules, the 
FDA’s tobacco rulemaking process began before the agency’s formal 
promulgation of its notice of proposed rulemaking in 1995. In early 
1994, prompted by petitions submitted by the Coalition on Smoking 
or Health—a public interest group representing the American Can-
cer Society, the American Heart Association, and the American Lung 
Association—and others, 268 the FDA began to consider whether it had 
statutory jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products containing nico-
tine.269 At the same time, the agency began investigating whether 
cigarette manufacturers controlled the levels of nicotine in their 
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products in ways that create and sustain addiction.270 And in August 
of 1994, the FDA’s Drug Abuse Advisory Committee, an advisory 
committee established under the FACA, held a public hearing on the 
addictiveness of cigarettes and produced a report concluding that to-
bacco products contain nicotine at levels that create and sustain ad-
diction.271 The FDA’s proposed rule then followed the agency’s inves-
tigations of the medical and social-scientific evidence concerning pat-
terns of smoking among children and adults, the addictive qualities 
of nicotine, and the marketing, sales, and distribution techniques of 
tobacco companies. 272 
 The sheer magnitude of the FDA’s rulemaking was not its only 
distinguishing feature. Somewhat unusually, the agency issued as an 
“Annex” to its final rule, a “Determination of Jurisdiction” over ciga-
rettes and smokeless tobacco as nicotine delivery devices under the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).273 In fact, in its pro-
posed rule the FDA solicited comments specifically relating to its 
statutory authority over tobacco products. 274 Under the APA, the 
FDA was under no legal obligation to do what was tantamount to a 
sibling notice-and-comment rulemaking on the question of its statu-
tory authority to regulate tobacco products.275 Instead, it might have 
promulgated an interpretive rule before issuing its rule regulating 
tobacco sales, marketing, and distribution, which need not follow no-
tice and comment. 276 Or, the agency might have issued its proposed 
rule and included a short statement identifying the statutory author-
ity under which the agency was operating and explaining why the 
agency determined that its authority supported its rule, as the APA 
does require and as agencies do as a matter of course.277 But, antici-
pating the significance of what it proposed to do, and expecting force-
ful opposition by tobacco companies in particular, the FDA essen-
tially invited briefs on the question of its statutory authority, and it 
committed considerable space to that issue in its over two-hundred 
page final rule.278 
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 The FDA also sought White House support for its proposed rule 
prior to its promulgation. Here again, the agency was under no for-
mal obligation to do so; it could have initiated the rulemaking on its 
own. While informal communication and coordination between agen-
cies and the White House are not at all unusual prior to notice of a 
proposed rule, in this instance the significance of the proposed rule 
and the agency’s expectations of strong opposition by tobacco compa-
nies and a Republican Congress resistant to new restraints on smok-
ing led the FDA not only to “clear” the proposal with the White 
House, but also to get the White House’s official imprimatur before 
the agency initiated notice and comment. 279 Thus, FDA Commis-
sioner David Kessler went so far as to solicit an executive order from 
the President to begin the process of regulating tobacco sales. 280 Fol-
lowing communications between the FDA and the White House con-
cerning possible regulatory strategies proposed by the FDA (disclosed 
only to the White House),281 during which time Democratic governors 
and legislators from tobacco states urged the White House not to en-
courage FDA regulation,282 the President announced that he was “di-
recting” the FDA to adopt regulations aimed to limit children’s access 
to tobacco.283 Without White House support, the agency certainly 
would not have gone forward. 
 The FDA did go forward, concluding that it had the authority to 
regulate tobacco on the grounds that tobacco products met the statu-
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tory definition of both a “drug” and a “device” under the FDCA be-
cause they are “intended to affect the structure or any function of the 
body.”284 The FDA concluded that tobacco products “affect the struc-
ture or function of the body” in that they create and sustain addic-
tion, produce psychoactive effects, and control weight; the agency 
concluded that tobacco products are “intended” to do so given that 
the addictive and other pharmacological effects of nicotine are widely 
known and accepted, that consumers use tobacco predominantly for 
those purposes, and that manufacturers understand those same ef-
fects and design their products to provide consumers with pharmaco-
logically active doses of nicotine with the intended and inevitable 
consequence that consumers will continue to use tobacco to sustain 
their addiction.285 Finally, in support of its determination that it had 
the statutory authority to regulate cigarettes and other tobacco 
products, the FDA observed that although the agency had in the 
1970s concluded that it did not have authority to regulate tobacco, it 
reached that conclusion on the basis of scientific evidence about to-
bacco and tobacco manufacturers available at that time, now super-
ceded, and that moreover a court at that time deferred to the 
agency’s determination not to regulate but expressly left open the 
possibility that the agency might subsequently decide to regulate as 
new information developed.286 The FDA added that decades ago it as-
serted jurisdiction over a brand of cigarettes intended to reduce body 
weight, and that its decision to regulate tobacco more broadly now, 
with greater understanding of the effects of tobacco on the body and 
manufacturers’ intentions with respect to those effects, was consis-
tent with the approach the agency had always taken.287 
 The FDA’s position won the admiration of medical researchers 
and health professionals, public health organizations, consumer 
groups, and organizations such as the National Parent-Teachers As-
sociation,288 and the ire of tobacco producers, cigarette manufactur-
ers, advertisers, and groups like the National Smokers Alliance.289 
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Both sides mobilized, though tobacco companies committed the most 
resources to their cause.290 The rule’s opponents simultaneously filed 
law suits contesting the FDA’s authority to regulate in this area 291 
and called on Congress to hold the agency at bay. 
 Many in Congress, again from both political parties, were sympa-
thetic to those calls. Senior Democratic Senator Wendell Ford of Ken-
tucky, for one example, introduced a bill aimed to reduce minors’ ac-
cess to cigarettes and exposure to cigarette advertising which specifi-
cally prohibited the FDA from regulating tobacco.292 Senator Ford 
characterized the bill as a moderate alternative to the FDA’s pro-
posed rule, which he described as the work product of “zealots.”293 
Toward the close of the rule’s public comment period, thirty-three 
senators, including both the majority and minority leaders, signed a 
letter strenuously objecting to the FDA’s proposal. 294 
 On the House side, Speaker Newt Gingrich suggested that the 
“FDA had lost its mind,” explaining that “[i]f you want an example of 
big government interfering, it would be the FDA picking a brand new 
fight when we haven’t won the far more serious fights about crack 
and cocaine and heroin.”295 That sentiment was echoed by Represen-
tative Howard Coble of North Carolina, who complained that “the 
FDA continues to play its role as the officious intermeddler, inserting 
its nose into an area where it doesn’t belong,” notwithstanding that 
“tobacco is legally grown, legally produced, legally processed and le-
gally marketed.”296 Even House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt 
joined a coalition of lawmakers opposing FDA regulation.297 Still oth-
ers in Congress warned the FDA that there would be a congressional 
“response” if the agency went ahead with its proposed rule over con-
gressional objections. 298 Many in Congress as well as the tobacco in-
dustry targeted Kessler specifically, including Senate Majority 
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Leader turned presidential candidate Robert Dole, who made clear 
that he opposed FDA regulation of tobacco and that, if elected, he 
would fire Kessler.299 Following promulgation of the final tobacco 
rule, some in Congress resisted providing appropriations to the FDA 
for the purposes of enforcing the new rule.300 
 Congress’ involvement in potential tobacco regulation predated 
the FDA’s rulemaking, however, and in fact almost rendered the 
FDA rule irrelevant. In 1994, Kessler testified repeatedly before the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Health 
and the Environment (a subcommittee much more friendly to Kessler 
before the 1994 congressional elections than after) about evidence 
the FDA was gathering concerning cigarette companies’ control of 
nicotine levels in their product. 301 At that time, Congress was consid-
ering legislation concerning the FDA’s authority over cigarettes, 302 
and during Kessler’s congressional testimony the Commissioner ex-
pressly requested guidance from Congress about how the FDA should 
proceed given the evidence it had gathered about the composition of 
cigarettes, manufacturers’ practices, addiction, and the health effects 
of smoking.303 
 Later the same year, the Subcommittee also heard now-famous 
testimony from the CEOs of seven tobacco companies concerning the 
industry’s views on addiction and its practices with respect to alter-
ing nicotine levels in their products, 304 which led to a Justice De-
partment perjury investigation.305 Former tobacco company scientists 
and other employees testified about matters concerning company re-
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search establishing the addictive qualities of nicotine.306 As public 
opinion formed against the tobacco industry over 1995 and 1996, it 
appeared (as late as the summer of 1997) that Congress would pass 
legislation essentially ratifying the unprecedented $369 billion 
agreement reached between dozens of states and major tobacco com-
panies, according to which tobacco firms would contribute heavily to 
funds financing antismoking educational campaigns and past and 
present medical costs of treatment for smoking-caused illnesses, 
while getting in return the benefits of substantial restrictions on the 
types of lawsuits that could be brought against them to recover for 
injuries caused by their products. 307 That national settlement would 
have specifically provided for legislative codification of several as-
pects of the FDA’s rule, in particular its restrictions aimed to reduce 
smoking by minors,308 but on the other hand would have restricted 
the agency’s ability to regulate, and certainly to ban, nicotine di-
rectly.309 Because the proposed settlement was never “enacted,” how-
ever, tobacco companies opposed legislative revisions of the agree-
ment which increased the dollar amount they would have to pay,310 
while antismoking forces opposed the settlement on the grounds that 
it let tobacco companies off too easily.311 Ultimately, the FDA’s rule-
making was not preempted by legislation. 
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 And in the end, the FDA’s final rule, like the EPA’s ozone and 
particulate matter rules, resembled its proposed version closely.312 
Like the proposed rule, the final rule prohibited free samples of ciga-
rettes and distribution of cigarette “kiddie packs,”313 billboard adver-
tising within 1000 feet of school playgrounds,314 advertising in publi-
cations with significant youth readership,315 and the distribution of 
gym bags, hats, and other clothing items with tobacco brands or lo-
gos.316 The final rule also prohibited brand-name sponsorship of 
sporting events and, going further than the proposed version, auto-
mobile races and racing teams. 317 Whereas the proposed rule would 
have banned cigarette vending machines and colored billboard and 
in-store advertising altogether,318 the final rule permitted both in 
“adult only” facilities such as nightclubs.319 The final rule also re-
quired the six tobacco companies with the most significant shares of 
sales to minors to educate young people about the health risks of 
their products, 320 whereas the proposed rule would have established a 
$150 million annual fund, financed by tobacco manufacturers, to 
conduct a national education campaign.321 
 Shortly after the FDA initiated its rulemaking, numerous tobacco 
companies and advertising firms (joined by the National Association 
of Convenience Stores, and later by members of Congress and state 
officials from some tobacco states) filed lawsuits, subsequently con-
solidated, against the FDA seeking declaratory relief on the grounds 
that the FDA’s rule exceeded the agency’s regulatory authority under 
the FDCA.322 In 1997, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District 
of North Carolina ruled that the FDA had not exceeded its statutory 
authority, although it invalidated certain portions of the rule govern-
ing advertisements as contrary to the First Amendment. 323 On ap-
peal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed in 
part, holding that the FDA’s statutory authority did not extend to to-
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bacco,324 a decision recently affirmed in a five-four decision by the 
Supreme Court.325 
C.   The OCC and National Banks 
 Over the last several years, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) completed an ambitious effort to liberalize the ac-
tivities in which national banks may engage, causing great angst 
among banks’ competitors. The agency did so not with any single de-
cision, but rather with a series of closely related regulatory decisions 
with far-reaching economic and political consequences. Perhaps most 
significantly, the decisions have allowed banks and their subsidiaries 
to compete with insurance companies and insurance agents—both 
among banks’ arch rivals—by selling insurance and annuities and to 
some extent by underwriting insurance. In addition, the OCC has al-
lowed a national bank’s subsidiary to underwrite municipal revenue 
bonds, once an activity well within the domain of securities firms, by 
inviting national banks to apply to the OCC through their subsidiar-
ies for permission to conduct still other activities that their parent 
banks themselves could not conduct. 
 But the effects of the OCC’s liberalization extended even beyond 
dramatically altering the playing field on which providers of financial 
services compete. No less importantly, its action also helped to 
prompt equally significant liberalizing decisions by the Federal Re-
serve Board (the Fed) relating to permissible conduct by bank hold-
ing companies.326 The OCC’s liberalization of national banks simi-
larly helped prompt Congress to enact financial services reform legis-
lation last year, after many years of being unable to do so due to in-
terest group deadlock over legislative change. Indeed, the recent leg-
islative reform was considered by many commentators to be abso-
lutely necessary due to mammoth mergers in the financial services 
markets that were inspired by the OCC’s and the Fed’s regulatory re-
forms. 327 Yet, the OCC and the Fed had already largely upstaged 
Congress; at the very least, Congress recently followed as much as 
led the agencies by ratifying many administrative developments. To 
understand how so, and to appreciate the significance of the OCC’s 
recent actions, a very brief discussion of the regulatory background 
may be helpful. 
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 The OCC has primary regulatory authority over national banks 
(of which there are approximately 2800)—that is, banks that are 
chartered by the federal government rather than by one of the states, 
and banks as opposed to bank holding companies, over whom the Fed 
has primary regulatory authority.328 The OCC’s mission is to provide 
a safe, sound, and competitive national banking system. 329 To that 
end, its main functions include supervising national banks and en-
forcing federal banking laws, including approving new charters and 
merger applications by national banks. 330 The agency conducts rule-
makings relating to activities that are permissible for national 
banks, considers applications by banks to engage in certain activi-
ties, and conducts adjudications to enforce national banking laws and 
its own regulations. 331 
 As the primary national bank regulator, the OCC implements the 
National Bank Act of 1864,332 the predecessor of which (the National 
Currency Act of 1863333) created the OCC.334 A critical section of the 
National Bank Act outlines what national banks may and may not 
do, providing among other things that a national bank can “exercise . 
. . all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the 
business of banking . . . .”335 The identification of such powers rests 
with the OCC, giving the agency enormous power over the banking 
business and, therefore, its competitors. As a general matter, the 
Glass-Steagall Act and other federal banking laws have (until re-
cently) prohibited banks from engaging in nonbanking businesses, 
and likewise nonbanking businesses from engaging in banking.336 
The National Bank Act’s “incidental powers” clause was one of the 
two main possible escape hatches from that general prohibition, the 
other being a crucial section of the Bank Holding Company Act337 
providing that a bank holding company may engage in a nonbanking 
activity considered “to be so closely related to banking or managing 
or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto.”338 
 In recent years, the OCC used the National Bank Act’s escape 
hatch in an increasingly aggressive way. One of the first major ex-
amples occurred in 1990, when the OCC determined that sales of 
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fixed or variable annuities qualifies as “part of, or incidental to, the 
business of banking.”339 NationsBank and its brokerage subsidiary 
sought permission from the OCC for the subsidiary to act as an agent 
in the sale of annuities, which the Comptroller granted on the 
grounds that banks are empowered to broker a variety of comparable 
financial investment instruments when carrying out their traditional 
role of financial intermediaries. 340 The Variable Annuity Life Insur-
ance Company and other insurers challenged the agency’s authority 
to give NationsBank permission to sell annuities by bringing several 
law suits under the APA, arguing that the OCC misinterpreted the 
National Bank Act by allowing a bank subsidiary to engage in an ac-
tivity Congress intended to prohibit.341 The Supreme Court ulti-
mately deferred to the Comptroller’s reading of the statute, however, 
and thus national banks may now sell annuities.342 
 In December of 1997, the OCC took a similar approach, this time 
permitting a bank to sell crop insurance as “incidental” to its busi-
ness. In its response to an application to do so by the Iowa Bankers 
Association, the agency reasoned that selling crop insurance consti-
tutes an “incidental” power “necessary” to carry out the business of 
banking because selling the insurance helps a bank to secure its 
loans.343 While perhaps sensible enough, this reasoning too had dire 
consequences for insurance sellers, for it strongly suggests that any 
insurance sold in connection with a bank loan that helps the bank 
secure its loan may be permissible. But then numerous types of in-
surance may aid in securing a bank loan, and thus banks may be 
able to sell many types of insurance in addition to crop insurance. 
This implication was not missed by insurance groups; National Un-
derwriter, for example, characterized the OCC’s decision as having 
“staggering” potential. 344 
 As mentioned, the OCC also recently allowed a national bank’s 
operating subsidiary (op-sub) to underwrite municipal revenue 
bonds, as part of the agency’s so-called “Part 5 initiative”—a refer-
ence to the part of Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations govern-
ing the rules, policies, and procedures for banks’ corporate activities, 
one important provision of which concerns activities that are permis-
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sible for a national bank’s subsidiary.345 Permissible activities for an 
op-sub were long thought to piggyback on activities permissible for 
the parent bank itself,346 but in 1994 the OCC began a notice-and-
comment rulemaking proposing to change the rule to encourage 
banks in good regulatory standing to apply for permission for one of 
their op-subs to engage in an activity which its parent bank could 
not.347 The proposal’s critics, which included insurance and securities 
associations, opposed on several grounds, arguing that the OCC 
lacked authority to allow subsidiaries to do what banks could not, 
and furthermore that doing so would be inconsistent with OCC 
precedent, inconsistent with the Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank 
Holding Company Act, and would subject national banks to unac-
ceptable safety and soundness risks. 348 
 In the end, however, the OCC did much of what it proposed to 
do.349 Upon issuing its final Part 5 rule, the agency explained that 
while it has usually taken the position that banking laws applicable 
to a national bank should also apply in the same way to a bank’s op-
erating subsidiary,350 that rule of thumb never represented “a legal 
determination that an operating subsidiary may never permissibly 
conduct activities different from those allowed its parent bank.”351 In 
support of its case, the OCC traced the history of rather minor in-
stances where the OCC approved activities by subsidiaries different 
from those allowed banks.352 The agency also provided an analysis of 
the Glass-Steagall Act, the Bank Holding Company Act, and other 
banking laws, arguing that none foreclosed the possibility of op-subs 
performing activities not permissible for banks, and furthermore that 
its new rule did not authorize any new activities, but rather allowed 
for the possibility of them,353 adding that the agency would not ap-
prove any applications that ran counter to federal banking statutes 
or presented safety and soundness risks. 354 Finally, the OCC stressed 
that subsidiaries’ activities still must qualify as part of the business 
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of banking or be incidental thereto, or else be permissible for national 
banks or their subsidiaries under statutory authority besides the Na-
tional Bank Act. 355 
 According to the revised Part 5 subsidiary rule, then: “[A] national 
bank shall file an application and obtain prior approval before ac-
quiring or performing a new activity in an existing subsidiary . . . .”356 
In its commentary on the final rule, the agency explained: 
[A] national bank operating subsidiary remains limited in its ac-
tivities to those that are part of or incidental to the business of 
banking as determined by the OCC, or otherwise permissible for 
national banks or their subsidiaries under other statutory author-
ity. The final rule confirms, however, that this may include activi-
ties different from what the parent national bank may conduct di-
rectly, if, in the circumstances presented, the reason or rationale 
for restricting the parent bank’s ability to conduct the activity does 
not apply to the subsidiary . . . .357 
The agency’s Part 5 initiative thus made clear that it would entertain 
applications by banks or their subsidiaries to engage in activities not 
otherwise permissible for a bank, on the grounds that such activities 
were part of or incidental to and necessary to carry out the business 
of banking. In so doing, the OCC explained that its case-by-case 
evaluations of op-sub applications would focus on the form and speci-
ficity of the restriction applicable to the parent bank, the rationale 
underlying that restriction, and whether granting an application 
would frustrate the congressional purpose underlying the restric-
tion.358 
 The OCC’s recent temerity, on this issue and others, owes largely 
to former Comptroller Eugene Ludwig, aptly characterized as “one of 
the most aggressive comptrollers in modern times in expanding bank 
securities and insurance powers,”359 who pushed national bank liber-
alization about as far as one could within the OCC’s statutory 
framework. Though criticized by some, and strongly opposed by the 
insurance industry and often by the Fed as well,360 Ludwig defended 
the OCC’s Part 5 initiative on the grounds that technological and 
economic changes required changes in national bank practices allow-
ing banks to compete with other financial service providers if the 
stability of the national banking system was to be maintained. Ac-
cording to some reports, the OCC postponed the Part 5 rule pending 
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congressional action, but ultimately promulgated its final rule in 
1996 once it became clear that no legislative reform was forthcom-
ing.361 Defending his agency’s initiative, Ludwig argued that the 
safety and soundness of the banking system required decisive action, 
stating:  
We cannot wait, because a failure to move ahead prudently in the 
current dynamic environment is likely to create safety and sound-
ness problems for the banking industry . . . . [A] regulator who 
identifies a safety and soundness issue—whether an issue of im-
mediate concern or one off on the horizon with long-term implica-
tions—and does nothing is not doing his job or serving the public 
interest.362 
The OCC explained upon issuing its new Part 5 rule why the agency 
believed it always had, though seldom used, the legal authority to al-
low op-subs to engage in activities not permissible for banks; 363 
Ludwig believed exercising that authority made for good public pol-
icy. 
 Following promulgation of the final Part 5 rule in late 1996, then, 
the OCC in 1997 authorized Zion First National Bank to use one of 
its subsidiaries to underwrite municipal revenue bonds.364 Following 
Zion’s application to do so, the OCC published notice of and re-
quested public comment on Zion First National’s “application to 
commence new activities.”365 Interestingly, although the agency’s de-
cision with respect to an application concerning corporate activities is 
not itself a rule (but rather the application of one), the OCC’s own 
new Part 5 provisions established a notice-and-comment-type proce-
dure—a miniature rulemaking of sorts—for all applications submit-
ted to the agency for permission to conduct activities not previously 
approved. Following receipt of an application, the OCC provides no-
tice and invites comments, after which the agency explains the deci-
sion it reached with reference to supporting and opposing com-
ments. 366 The agency’s notice with respect to Zion First National’s 
application generated opposition from the Securities Industry Asso-
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ciation, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Fed, and Con-
sumers Union.367 These opponents argued, among other things, that a 
subsidiary of a national bank should not be permitted to engage in 
any activity that is not permissible for a national bank.368 The OCC 
rejected this argument, observing that underwriting and dealing in 
revenue bonds is “a functional equivalent or a logical outgrowth of” 
activities banks are already engaged in, and concluding for a variety 
of reasons that an activity not permissible for a bank may neverthe-
less, and under appropriate circumstances, be performed by a bank’s 
subsidiary.369 The agency has reaffirmed that general position several 
times since, as for example in 1998, when it approved an application 
by Fleet National Bank to allow one of its subsidiaries to underwrite 
credit life insurance as “part of” and “incidental to” Fleet’s credit card 
activities. 370 
 The OCC’s liberalization has not been limited to interpretations of 
the “incidental powers” language of the National Bank Act, however. 
The agency also recently approved a bank’s proposal to use a sub-
sidiary in a small town to facilitate insurance sales through any of 
the bank’s branches. While for decades banks have been prohibited 
from selling insurance, longstanding authority allowed banks in 
towns with fewer than 5000 residents to do so, although state insur-
ance laws sought to restrict them. In 1996, the Supreme Court made 
clear that state laws purporting to prohibit national banks from sell-
ing insurance had to yield to federal law, a ruling that opened the 
way for insurance sales by national banks.371 The OCC subsequently 
took the small-town exception and ran with it, allowing a national 
bank to use the exception to support insurance sales by the bank’s 
other units. What sounds like a technicality has enormous implica-
tions: Now a national bank can open a subsidiary in a small town 
and then market insurance sales anywhere throughout the country, 
so long as it processes all of its sales through its small-town subsidi-
ary, as for example the OCC recently allowed in connection with Mel-
lon Bank’s application to sell title insurance through a subsidiary’s 
joint venture. Here again, the agency was met with intense objec-
tions from insurance agents. 
 But insurers (and securities underwriters) have not been the 
OCC’s only critics. Many in Congress—where insurance companies 
and insurance agents have traditionally enjoyed considerable influ-
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ence372—have also loudly criticized the agency’s liberalizations, on 
the grounds that the OCC overreached and thwarted congressional 
will. For example, Senator Alfonse M. D’Amato, the Senate Banking 
Committee Chair, captured congressional frustration by stating:  
We should not sit idly by while the Comptroller of the Currency at-
tempts to unilaterally redesign the financial system and alter the 
state and federal regulatory framework established by Con-
gress. . . . The Comptroller is deliberately consolidating power 
within his agency by first approving new powers for national 
banks and then asserting the authority to regulate such activi-
ties.373 
For another example, Representative John Dingell, an influential 
member on the House Energy and Commerce Committee, repeatedly 
criticized Ludwig and the OCC during 1994 and 1995 over the 
agency’s approval of “retirement CDS”—an investment product com-
bining features of the traditional CD and an annuity—its treatment 
of op-subs, and its ability to regulate insurance products. 374 In 1994, 
Dingell, along with D’Amato and other House and Senate members 
sent a letter to the OCC promising to introduce legislation that 
would kill the retirement CD if the agency allowed its sale by 
banks,375 which the OCC nevertheless did.376 In 1996, Representative 
Gerald Solomon, Chairman of the House Rules Committee (and a 
former insurance agent), introduced a bill that would have blocked 
OCC funding if the agency authorized national banks to sell any new 
products or services. 377 Some versions of draft legislation modernizing 
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financial services included moratoria on the agency’s ability to ex-
pand banks’ insurance powers.378 
 But while many within Congress have been highly critical of the 
OCC, the federal courts have largely sanctioned agency-sponsored re-
form.379 In the face of repeated judicial challenges to the OCC’s deci-
sions by banks’ competitors, the agency’s decisions allowing national 
banks and their subsidiaries to do more and more has met with con-
sistent judicial favor.380 Indeed, in several recent opinions the Su-
preme Court has unanimously sanctioned OCC interpretations of the 
statute.381 Showing considerable deference to OCC interpretations of 
the National Bank Act, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts 
have emphasized the agency’s expertise concerning banking matters 
as one justification for deference.382 
 Ironically, judicial affirmation of the Comptroller’s liberalizations 
paved the way for Congress finally to enact reform legislation. This is 
true in large part because insurance groups, having “lost” at the 
agency level and in the courts, eventually came to support rather 
than oppose legislative reform. Figuring that bank-supplied insur-
ance products were an unavoidable reality, insurers sought reform 
legislation that would give broader financial services powers to them 
too, as well as preserve state regulation of insurance, considered 
more friendly to insurers. 383 As a result, banks, insurers, and securi-
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ties underwriters ultimately all came together in favor of reform, 
ending years of legislative deadlock. In truth, Congress had little 
choice, barring statutory invalidation of what the OCC had done by 
resurrecting the fire walls separating banking from insurance and 
securities—which was really out of the question given the breadth of 
expert and business support for reform384—but to codify much of 
what the OCC had done. Following skirmishes concerning matters 
such as the applicability of the Community Reinvestment Act385 to a 
reformed financial services world,386 Congress passed modernizing 
legislation in late 1999, following the path the OCC forged.387 
V.   RESULTS 
A.   The Limits of the Interest Group Theory 
 Now step back. To assess the reliability of the interest group the-
ory against the administrative process approach in the light of the 
above examples, it is helpful first to identify some of the common fea-
tures of the studied cases. First, and most notably, each involved ef-
forts to advance broad-based interests over concentrated and highly 
mobilized opposition—industrial polluters, tobacco companies and 
advertisers, and insurers. Nor do the facts of any of the cases plausi-
bly suggest that the agencies were in fact delivering regulatory 
rents—to small businesses, cigar producers, or banks—disguised as 
public-interest regulation. In the EPA case, the regulatory “winners” 
were citizens generally, most especially those who work or exercise 
outside, elderly persons, children, and asthmatics. Such interests 
were represented by some organized groups like the American Lung 
Association and celebrity athletes, but as a general matter they were 
not highly organized. In the FDA case, the main regulatory winners 
were children, future potential smokers, and taxpayers, again repre-
sented by public interest medical associations but not organized 
                                                                                                                  
tion to financial services integration” due to “recent regulations by the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency and a 1996 Supreme Court ruling.” Id. Furthermore, Paul Equale, 
Senior Vice President of Government Affairs, Independent Insurance Agents of America 
warns that “[t]he world is changing and as a practical issue we have to look at the next 50 
years rather than the last 50. . . . Anyone who is still fighting the old wars [to preserve the 
insurance-banking divide] is wasting time, effort, and money.” Id.; see also Key Insurance 
Groups, supra note 377, at 2 (“The longest running serial in Washington financial circles—
the feud between insurance interests and expansion-minded banking organizations—may 
be winding down somewhat.”). 
 384. See, e.g., MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT & JEAN TIROLE , THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION 
OF BANKS (1993); EMMANUEL N. ROUSSAKIS, COMMERCIAL BANKING IN AN ERA OF 
DEREGULATION (3d ed. 1997).  
 385. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (1994).  
 386. See, e.g., Senate & House Conferences Move Quickly on Financial Services Bill, 
FED. & ST. INS. WK., Oct. 18, 1999. 
 387. See Financial Services Modernization Act, 106 Pub. L. No. 102, 113 Stat. 1338 
(Nov. 12, 1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
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themselves. Indeed, the EPA and FDA cases are particularly note-
worthy in this respect given that the primary regulatory beneficiar-
ies—children and future generations—were not even voters at all, 
much less organized voters. 
 The OCC case is more complicated and in some sense therefore 
more interesting. On the one hand, a concentrated and mobilized 
special interest—the banking industry—clearly favored the OCC’s 
regulations, while other concentrated and mobilized interests—
insurers and securities firms—opposed. To that extent, the OCC’s 
initiative pitted the special interests of banks against those of their 
competitors. On the other hand, the OCC’s liberalization also was 
widely considered to benefit consumer interests more generally; 
economists and public policy experts overwhelmingly believed that 
preserving old distinctions among banks, insurance companies, in-
vestment companies, and so on would be contrary to public inter-
ests—it would stymie healthy competition and growth in the finan-
cial services sector and harm consumers’ interests. 388 Thus the OCC 
case cannot fairly be characterized merely as an instance of an 
agency delivering regulatory rents to the industry it is supposed to 
regulate. After all, if the OCC were motivated simply to promote the 
interests of banks over their competitors, and at the expense of con-
sumers, it could have done that long ago; the statutory authority on 
which the OCC relied was hardly new. Instead, the OCC responded 
to contemporaneous technological and economic changes that coun-
seled in favor of promoting competition and scale economies by liber-
alizing the activities national banks could engage in. For example, 
banks’ competitors had only recently started to market on a large 
scale products that competed with the savings and demand deposit 
services traditionally offered by banks, such as cash value life insur-
ance (by insurance companies) and money market mutual funds with 
unlimited check-writing privileges (by investment companies). Be-
cause the OCC further encouraged a benign competition that market 
forces had already generated, its efforts are best understood, like the 
EPA’s and FDA’s, as promoting public interests over the opposition of 
special interests, even though banking interests also benefited.389 
 The EPA’s ozone and particulate matter rules and the FDA’s to-
bacco rule share another common feature in that they both were 
originally prompted by public interest groups. Unlike the FDA, the 
EPA had a statutory obligation to revisit its NAAQS rules periodi-
cally. But a precipitating factor of the EPA’s rules was a successful 
lawsuit by a public interest group charging that the EPA had failed 
                                                                                                                  
 388. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 384. 
 389. Certainly consumer groups did not oppose the OCC’s liberalizations, objecting 
only to the privacy and community-development aspects of some of the financial services 
reform legislation. 
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to fulfill that obligation in a timely manner. The FDA was not sued 
by a public interest group, but its initial inquiry into its authority for 
regulating tobacco products was precipitated by a public interest 
group’s petitions to the FDA asking the agency to consider a tobacco 
rulemaking. 
 Speaking of rulemaking, all three cases involved the section 553 
rulemaking process. This comes as no great surprise given the nature 
of the decisions, but it warrants emphasis that the agencies did not 
attempt to affect significant regulatory change through off-record, in-
formal, or purely discretionary decisionmaking processes. That is 
somewhat less true with respect to the OCC, whose liberalizations 
also took, in addition to its Part 5 rulemaking, the informal forms of 
interpretations of the National Bank Act and the approval of applica-
tions to conduct certain activities following procedures the agency es-
tablished through a rulemaking. While all three agencies employed 
the rulemaking process, however, their decisionmaking procedures 
should be considered “rulemaking plus.” That is to say, all three 
rulemakings went well beyond the minimum requirements of section 
553: The EPA held public meetings, attended conferences, and held 
satellite telecasts. The FDA not only conducted a sibling rulemaking 
on the question of its statutory jurisdiction but provided exhaustive 
disclosure of the scientific and policy bases of its proposed rule;390 and 
the OCC’s rulemaking established a new mini-rulemaking procedure, 
not required by statute, through which the agency would consider fu-
ture applications concerning op-sub activities. 
 And in each case, the agencies’ decisionmaking process preceded 
its notice of a proposed rule. The EPA began studying the health and 
welfare effects of ozone and particula te matter a few years before it 
published its notices of proposed rulemaking. The FDA began inquir-
ies into the health effects of smoking, nicotine addiction, and the 
marketing and sales practices of tobacco companies over a year be-
fore its notice of proposed rulemaking. And the OCC articulated its 
interpretations of the federal banking laws before it undertook its 
Part 5 revision. Though all three agencies’ initiatives preceded initia-
tion of the 553 process, however, none of the agencies’ prenotice ac-
tivities were clandestine. In fact, both the EPA and the FDA char-
tered advisory committees under the FACA, which played important 
roles in the development of the data informing the agencies’ rules 
and by serving as a source of neutral, expert advice to which the 
                                                                                                                  
 390. As the FDA rightly explained about its notice obligations under the APA, at the 
time it issued its final rule, “No court . . . had required the degree of public disclosure at 
the notice stage of a rulemaking proceeding that FDA undertook here.” FDA Tobacco Rule, 
supra note 252, at 44,558 (1996) (citations omitted); see also id. at 44,563-64 (explaining 
that the FDA provided more than twice as much time for comment on its rule as the 
agency’s regulations require). 
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agencies would later appeal. Indeed, the EPA relied on the CASAC 
more than any other study or source. 
 During the rulemaking processes proper, participation in notice-
and-comment was enormous in the EPA and FDA cases, though not 
so in the OCC case. In the EPA and FDA cases, the political fault 
lines were drawn similarly: public interest groups, public health or-
ganizations, academic researchers, and some state and local govern-
ments supported the EPA’s and/or the FDA’s proposals, while nu-
merous industry groups and other states and localities opposed them. 
Those states and industries that would bear most of the costs ob-
jected the most, framing their objections both in terms of the eviden-
tiary basis for the agencies’ actions (in the EPA and FDA cases) and 
the statutory authority for what the agencies proposed to do (in all 
three cases). In all cases, the rules’ opponents sought relief from all 
branches of government. They simultaneously objected before the 
agencies directly, appealed to Congress to hold the agencies at bay, 
and filed lawsuits challenging the legality of the agencies’ actions. 
 One especially noteworthy aspect of the cases in question was 
Congress’ general hostility to the agencies’ regulatory initiatives: 
Congress was on the whole extremely critical of each agency’s efforts. 
In each case, Congress threatened to use or used various disciplining 
devices—hearings, reports, budget power, moratoria, or repeals—in 
response to the agencies’ actions or proposed actions. In each case, 
elements within Congress characterized the agencies as the enemy 
and accused the agencies of overstepping the bounds of their author-
ity. Congressional criticism transcended party lines and reflected leg-
islators’ attempts to protect important political constituencies (up-
wind pollution sources, tobacco farmers, and insurance companies) 
from what would be, for those constituencies, unfavorable regulation. 
 Yet in no case were the agencies deterred by adverse congres-
sional or interest group responses to their proposed regulations. For 
in each instance, the agencies’ efforts were led by particularly strong-
willed administrators who seemed motivated by their own concep-
tions of the public interest. Commentators consistently described 
Browner, Kessler, and Ludwig as highly committed and strongly in-
dependent regulators, whose behavior appeared unaffected by some-
times intense congressional and interest group criticism. These ad-
ministrators championed what they considered to be desirable regu-
latory policy at some political risk, and in the FDA and OCC cases 
only after Kessler and Ludwig first determined that Congress would 
not enact the desired policy. Each agencies’ final rule resembled its 
proposed rule rather closely in the end, notwithstanding the inter-
vening political turbulence. 
 Even so, in each case it was not always clear that the agencies’ 
regulatory efforts would be successful. The White House could have 
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stopped the EPA from issuing stricter ozone and particulate matter 
standards, and for a time it appeared that might happen. The White 
House fully supported the FDA, but for a time it appeared the FDA’s 
rule would be preempted by a legislated national tobacco settlement. 
And the OCC reportedly dragged its feet on its Part 5 revision pend-
ing liberalizing legislation that never came. As it turned out, how-
ever, the agencies were never derailed or preempted by the White 
House or Congress. 
 As for the courts, judicial treatment of the agencies’ regulatory 
initiatives varied. The courts largely inoculated the OCC from con-
gressional reprisals by vindicating the Comptroller’s interpretations 
of federal banking laws. On the other hand, an appeals court stopped 
the EPA’s rules where a hostile Congress was unable to do so, al-
though that court’s difficulty with the EPA’s rules was not at all the 
same as Congress’ (and although another court had earlier required 
the EPA to revisit its standards), but the EPA was subsequently vin-
dicated by the Supreme Court. In the case of the FDA, one court le-
gitimized the FDA’s position with respect to its statutory authority, 
but a higher court, and then the Supreme Court, ultimately rejected 
that position. 
 Given these general features of the regulatory examples in ques-
tion, and given the more particular facts summarized above, the 
question becomes how they can be reconciled with the interest group 
theory of regulation. Naturally, the theory would see the most sup-
port from findings that the agencies, responding to legislative sig-
nals, used their regulatory power to deliver benefits to organized and 
well-financed interest groups representing powerful congressional 
constituencies. Again, the interest group theory contemplates that 
interest groups will seek to advance the selfish interests of their 
members; that groups representing concentrated interests will domi-
nate the regulatory landscape; that legislators will be motivated to 
secure the regulatory benefits those groups seek in return for politi-
cal support; and finally that legislators will exercise sufficient control 
over agencies to secure the delivery of those benefits, even at the 
greater expense to the rest of society. 
 Unfortunately for the theory, however, most of the important facts 
of the studied cases do not line up very conveniently, for reasons al-
ready becoming clear. First, powerful, organized, and congressionally 
influential interest groups saw their regulatory goals defeated at the 
agency level. Instead, the EPA, FDA, and OCC promoted broad-
based, and less politically powerful, interests. And they did so over 
the objections of powerful industrial interests, tobacco interests, and 
insurance interests. They did so also notwithstanding repeated con-
gressional attempts to exercise greater influence over them. In each 
instance, the interest group theory’s defining conclusion—that regu-
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lation promotes the interests of the powerful few at the expense of 
the diffuse many—seems unsubstantiated. 
 One might object that the EPA and FDA examples should not 
count so much against the interest group theory based on the fact 
that those agencies are in the business of “social” rather than “eco-
nomic” regulation, the latter of which served as the typical focus of 
scholars developing the interest group theory. But this corrective ob-
jection—circumscribing the scope of the theory in the face of contrary 
evidence—is not compelling. First, the haziness of the so-
cial/economic distinction to one side, proponents of the interest group 
theory in fact never limited their logic to a particular subset of regu-
lation. Rather, they articulated in general terms political dynamics 
that, they argued, regularly if not inevitably produce regulatory out-
comes that are socially undesirable. Furthermore, when they ad-
dressed post-1970 consumer regulation specifically, they expressly 
applied the interest group theory to such regulation, arguing that 
there, too, regulation is contrary to public interests. 391 
 Third, there is no reason within the interest group theory’s con-
ceptual framework why environmental or consumer-protection regu-
lation should be any different from any other type of regulation, or in 
other words, why interest group theorists should have restricted the 
scope of their theory. As a general matter, all regulation is ultimately 
premised on the amelioration of market failures or their conse-
quences, and all regulation involves similar exercises of the state’s 
monopoly on political power to affect private behavior. In addition, 
the legal-procedural rules (such as the APA) and institutional rela-
tionships (between Congress and agencies) guiding the exercise of 
that power are the same over different regulatory fields, so if Con-
gress uses procedure to advance some interests over others, it should 
be able to do so no matter what the particular regulatory field might 
be. 
 Indeed, environmental and food- and drug-safety regulation are 
very well suited for the delivery of regulatory rents. 392 For example, 
                                                                                                                  
 391. See, e.g., STIGLER, The Consumer, supra note 8, at 187-88. According to Stigler:  
 We are now going through a new period of salvation by public reform, similar 
in scale . . . to the muckraking period preceding World War I. Then we had Up-
ton Sinclair . . . now we have Ralph Nader and his graduate and prep school 
students. . . . [Their reforms] will not amount to much because there is no du-
rable, effective political basis to support—or direct—the efforts of professional 
. . . reformers. Mr. Nader must flit from automobiles to drugs to local property 
assessment, cognizant that the public’s interests and sympathies are not for-
ever capturable by his vendetta against the Corvair . . . . It is of regulation that 
the consumer must beware. 
Id. at 187. 
 392. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1495, 1557 (1999) (describing the danger of special-interest manipulation of regu-
latory issues as, given the nature of environmental issues, “much more severe in the envi-
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environmental regulation could be used by powerful interests as a 
barrier to entry to new firms, thereby protecting those interests’ 
market power. This possibility seems especially strong to the extent 
that environmental standards can be applied, as in fact they often 
are, more strictly to new entrants in a market than to existing firms; 
old technology can be grandfathered in, while new pollution sources 
have to conform to stricter emission standards, for instance. Just as 
international environmental standards can be used to avoid competi-
tion for domestic standards, so too environmental law could be used 
to garner rents for existing firms by raising potential competitors’ 
costs. And in famous instances of environmental legislation it has. 393 
 To be sure, organized public interest groups may be more active 
with respect to environmental issues than they are in other regula-
tory fields, although that fact itself is somewhat inconvenient for the 
interest group theory. But that difference could be overstated, as 
public interest groups are active in old-fashioned regulatory areas 
too.394 Moreover, special interest groups are extremely active on envi-
ronmental issues as well. It just so happens that environmental is-
sues are among the more important modern regulatory issues, and as 
a result significant interest group activity surrounds them on both 
sides. And relative to interests representing manufacturers, oil pro-
ducers, and transportation industries, for example, environmental 
groups are very small players in the interest group arena.395 So the 
presence of environmental groups does not distinguish environ-
mental regulation from other types of regulation. There simply is 
nothing so distinctive about environmental regulation that takes it 
out of the interest group theory’s scope, neither as a matter of intel-
lectual history nor in theory. Thus, the EPA’s promulgation of the fi-
nal ozone and particulate matter rules over the objections of powerful 
interest groups and their congressional allies weighs heavily against 
the interest group account. For very similar reasons, the FDA’s pro-
motion of the interests of children, smokers, and future smokers over 
the organized and congressionally influential tobacco and advertising 
interests does too. 
                                                                                                                  
ronmental realm than in other fields of regulation”); see also JOHN CRONIN & ROBERT F. 
KENNEDY, THE RIVER KEEPERS 179 (1997) (arguing that environmental regulation is not 
immune from capture); EVAN J. RINGQUIST, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AT THE STATE 
LEVEL: POLITICS AND PROGRESS IN CONTROLLING POLLUTION 194-95 (1993) (finding that 
special interests, though influential, have not captured pollution control); Bradford C. 
Mank, Superfund Contractors and Agency Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 34 (1993). 
 393. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL, DIRTY AIR 
(1981). 
 394. Such areas with meaningful public interest group activity include energy, tele-
communications, transportation, and utility regulation, for example. 
 395. See, e.g., HARDIN, supra note 12, at 106-07. 
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 With respect to the OCC, banking regulation fits comfortably 
within the paradigm of old-fashioned “economic” regulation, so that 
case too counts against the theory. Had the OCC promoted the bank-
ing interests in some illicit way, or had the OCC instead supported 
banks’ competitors’ interests in some illicit way, either one following 
cues from Congress, the interest group theory would have appeared 
stronger. But the OCC did not act at all following congressional 
prompting, but rather over congressional objection. And rather than 
deliver regulatory rents to banks, it by numerous accounts advanced 
broad social interests, which largely happened to line up with bank-
ing interests. Furthermore, the OCC did so in an open, procedurally 
inclusive and evenhanded, and judicially sanctioned way. 
 None of this is to say that the interest group theory finds no sup-
port from the examined cases, however. First, a defender of the in-
terest group theory might point to the volume of activity on the part 
of powerful interest groups in their attempt to oppose the agencies on 
the regulatory, congressional, and judicial level. That is, the groups 
committing the most resources in pursuit of their regulatory goals 
were concentrated interests. The National Association of Manufac-
turers’ opposition to the EPA rules and the cigarette industry’s 
multi-thousand page comment during the FDA rulemaking are illus-
trative. Interest group activity concerning the proposed regulations 
in the EPA and FDA cases certainly was lopsided, lending support to 
the theory’s collective action claim. On the other hand, all three cases 
involve meaningful interest group activity on both sides of the issues, 
and thus very strong versions of that claim seem off the mark. 
 A defender of the interest group theory finds additional support 
from Congress’ attempts to prevent or discourage the agencies from 
adopting regulations contrary to the interests of important congres-
sional constituencies. On the whole, legislators did seem motivated to 
protect their interest group supporters. The importance of geography 
as the powerful predictor of how legislators resisted (or in a few in-
stances supported) the EPA and the FDA may be especially reveal-
ing. In those cases, members of Congress were motivated to protect 
their political turf, quite literally. In the OCC case, there appeared to 
be no strong congressional champions of the Comptroller, which may 
be a measure of the insurance industry’s influence on Congress. In 
short, the interest group theory’s legislator motivation claim finds 
substantial support from the evidence, subject, however, to an impor-
tant caveat mentioned below.396 
 But the theory’s legislative dominance claim proves fatally weak. 
In each case, Congress was unable to inspire agencies to deliver the 
regulatory decisions sought by powerful congressional constituencies, 
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notwithstanding congressional reliance on all of the standard tools 
Congress might use to discipline agencies. Instead, administrators, 
motivated to advance broad-based regulatory interests, used admin-
istrative procedure—with various degrees of help from public inter-
est groups, the President, and courts along the way—to exercise their 
delegated authority in pursuit of regulatory policies that had more 
congressional enemies than friends, as the next Part explains. 
B.   The Explanatory Relevance of the Administrative Process 
 The administrative process theory fares better, also for reasons 
already becoming clear. First of all, in each of the studied cases, key 
agency personnel were motivated to advance public interests, as al-
ready discussed. In that light, claims about the irrelevance of bu-
reaucratic motivations seem misguided. It is true, and significant, 
that some of the agencies’ industry opponents had come from the 
FDA, lending some support to the interest group theory’s reliance on 
the revolving-door phenomenon.397 On the other hand, neither 
Browner,398 Kessler,399 nor Ludwig acted in any way that can be in-
terpreted as attracting special interest groups as potential employ-
ers. Instead, they pursued their own visions of what public interests 
required, in the face of consistent interest group and congressional 
resistance. Browner endured difficult congressional hearings, and 
Kessler and Ludwig were also often the object of congressional criti-
cism. Yet congressional disapproval and repeated threats of various 
                                                                                                                  
 397. See Schwartz, supra note 288 (noting that one tobacco industry lawyer was a for-
mer FDA chief counsel); Schwartz & Torry, supra note 309 (noting that the same former 
FDA lawyer argued industry’s case). 
 398. See, e.g., Cushman, Top EPA Official , supra note 216 (observing that Browner’s 
adamant defense of EPA proposals, based on her belief that good science policy justified 
proposed rules notwithstanding the volume of industry criticism, constituted personal and 
political gamble); McQuaid, Breaux, Landrieu Against EPA Rules, supra note 229 (stating 
that Browner defended the EPA tenaciously before an “onslaught of lobbying attacks from 
business groups, and over the opposition of state and local government organizations”); 
Balz & Warrick, President May Endorse Tougher Clean Air Rules, supra note 171 (noting 
Browner’s forceful defense of her agency). 
 399. See, e.g., Blow to Cigarette Makers; Judge Rules FDA Can Regulate Tobacco, 
ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Apr. 25, 1997, at A3 (reporting that Kessler’s announced resigna-
tion sent tobacco stocks soaring); John Schwartz, Cigarettes Treated As Medical Devices: 
New Rules Give FDA Leeway in Regulation, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1995, at A15 [hereinaf-
ter Schwartz, Cigarettes as Medical Devices] (quoting Matthew Meyers, counsel to the Coa-
lition on Smoking or Health: “David Kessler . . . has given up a spectacular short-term gain 
for a far more substantial long-term progress [by focusing on children smoking]”); John 
Schwartz, Judge Rules that FDA Can Regulate Tobacco, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 1997, at A1 
(quoting Kessler: “A small group of very committed people at the agency took on the impo s-
sible. The President of the United States supported them, and a federal district judge in 
North Carolina in very large measure agreed . . . .”) Shankar Vedantam & Bob Geiger, 
Tough Kessler Quits FDA, DURHAM HERALD-SUN, Nov. 26, 1996, at A1 (explaining Kess-
ler’s legacy, reputation, and commitment, whose efforts to regulate tobacco put him “into 
the history books”). 
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legislative sanctions did not effectively discipline the regulators. As 
one legislative critic of the EPA’s rules observed, for example: “Agen-
cies used to live in fear of what Reps. Dingell and Waxman would 
say. Now, it’s as if committees live in fear of what Carol Browner will 
say if we issue a resolution of disapproval.”400  
 Part of the answer may be that congressional protest and threats 
are intended partly to appease important constituencies as much as 
intimidate agencies, as suggested earlier.401 Consider, for example, 
Representative Dingell’s posture before the National Association of 
Manufacturers, where he said in a speech to the Association, refer-
ring to the EPA’s proposed rules: “Let me be clear. I don’t want to 
have to fight the administration or the president, but if this decision 
is not handled wisely, I am fully prepared to go to war.”402 As ranking 
Commerce Committee member, Dingell was well positioned to punish 
the EPA, had he really determined to do so. Yet ultimately he did not 
act to stop the EPA’s rules. Some war. At least Representative 
Dingell’s bark may be bigger than his bite.403 How far one can gener-
alize from that is not clear. But surely agency personnel discount the 
rhetoric of legislators to some extent, knowing that some congres-
sional threats serve members’ own political purposes and therefore 
need not always be taken too seriously. Moreover, given the ease 
with which legislators can voice objections to agency action without 
taking additional steps to discipline agencies—talk is cheap—the 
strength of the interest group theory’s legislator motivation claim 
should rest on more than legislative statements. 
 In any event, it is worth some emphasis that when Congress 
threatened the agencies not to adopt the regulations they had pro-
posed, Congress clearly did so to protect contemporaneous congres-
sional constituencies, 404 not to preserve definite choices previously 
enacted into statute by some preexisting legislative coalition, as 
                                                                                                                  
 400. Skrzycki, supra note 233, at G8 (quoting Representative David McIntosh). Kessler 
and Ludwig also regularly endured congressional hostility. For one of many examples, 
Representative Solomon considered Ludwig a “‘rogue Clinton administration regulator.’” 
McConnell, supra note 378, at 2. See also Press Release, James A. Leach, Comments on 
Recent OCC Circulars About H.R. 10 (July 24, 1997) (on file with author) (criticizing the 
OCC for its “unseemly” and “misleading” campaign to mobilize banks against legislation). 
 401. See supra at 46-47. 
 402. Skrzycki, supra note 233, at G8. 
 403. Cf. Commerce OKs Bank Reform Bill Without Amendment, NAT’L J.’S CONGRESS 
DAILY, June 14, 1995, 1995 WL 1043455 (noting that Rep. Dingell offered, but then with-
drew, an amendment to financial services reform legislation that would have made clear 
that state insurance commissions would maintain authority over insurance sold in the 
states by banks). Interestingly House Banking Chair Jim Leach, a frequent critic of the 
OCC, characterized the OCC’s approval of Zion National Bank’s application to underwrite 
municipal bonds as “extremely credible,” after the fact pointing out that it was “fully con-
sistent” with a bill passed by the House Banking Committee, but not yet then by Congress. 
Mixed Hill Reaction, supra note 367. 
 404. See, e.g., Hohler, supra note 279. 
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McNollgast’s thesis would suggest.405 In the EPA case, Congress had 
in fact required the EPA to reevaluate its NAAQS standards periodi-
cally in light of scientific and economic changes. The Clean Air Act 
certainly did not codify any particular standard the EPA was sup-
posed to make with respect to ozone or particulate matter. Congres-
sional and other opponents of the EPA’s standards resisted not on 
the grounds that the EPA was undermining some past legislative de-
termination, but rather because the proposed rules were too costly,406 
notwithstanding that the relevant portions of the Clean Air Act made 
costs statutorily irrelevant.407 Geography, not legislative history, ac-
counted for the opposition to the EPA’s proposed rules. 408 
 So too in the FDA case was there no clear legislative determina-
tion with respect to the proposed rule. On the one hand, one could 
well argue that Congress never intended the FDA to regulate tobacco 
products. While that argument is not plainly wrong, it is also not 
clear that Congress ever focused on that specific question; it seems 
somewhat far-fetched to imagine that at the time it passed the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, in 1938,409 Congress had any will on the is-
sue one way or another. Moreover, the FDA’s plausible position was 
that the Act did not establish which products could and could not be 
regulated by the FDA, but rather established criteria according to 
which the agency could determine whether a product fell within the 
agency’s jurisdiction or not. According to the FDA, its tobacco rule 
was entirely faithful to those congressionally established criteria, a 
determination two federal courts agreed with. Moreover, during the 
FDA’s investigation into cigarette manufacturing and marketing 
practices preceding its notice of proposed rulemaking, it appeared 
possible that Congress would pass legislation explicitly giving the 
agency jurisdiction over tobacco. That possibility vanished with the 
1994 congressional elections, to be revived in a different form when 
Congress contemplated the national settlement. In the meantime, 
the agency sought to pursue what it deemed to be desirable regula-
tory policy within the constraints of what it considered its statutorily 
defined regulatory authority to be. 
                                                                                                                  
 405. See McNollgast, supra note 5, at 246-47. 
 406. See, e.g., supra notes 216-217, 219, 227-228. 
 407. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1994). 
 408. Yet state health agencies even from upwind states supported the EPA’s rules 
while their elected counterparts protested, see Cushman, Canada Says, supra note 217 
(noting that the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, representing health 
agencies of each state, not only did not oppose the agency’s rules but thought the rules 
should be more stringent than those which the EPA had proposed), a fact which provides 
some evidence that at the state level, too, agency personnel are more willing or better posi-
tioned to advance general interests, relative to elected politicians.  
 409. Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675, § 201, 52 Stat. 1041 (1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 
321).  
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 A similar point is to be made about the OCC. First, the Comptrol-
ler’s interpretations of the National Bank Act cannot in any mean-
ingful way be characterized as contrary to Congress’ will; the Act 
predates the end of the Civil War.410 Nor can the OCC’s liberaliza-
tions be characterized as contrary to Glass-Steagall, or other major 
federal banking statutes, as the agency explained at some length, 
with judicial backing. It is true that Congress itself for years did not 
enact the reforms the OCC accomplished, given the strength of in-
surance constituencies. What the OCC did went beyond Congress in 
that sense. But agencies are supposed to do what Congress itself 
cannot, so legislative inaction by itself should not be considered to 
express a regulatory policy beyond which agencies may not go. More 
importantly, what the OCC did ultimately provided Congress with an 
opportunity to enact liberalizing legislation, thereby helping to create 
a legislative coalition as much as it disturbed one. Incidentally, that 
dynamic—legislative inaction, followed by reform-oriented agency ac-
tion, followed by confirming legislation—is also inconsistent with the 
McNollgast thesis that administrative procedure keeps agencies 
faithful to established legislative coalitions, for if that were true, the 
OCC should have been prevented from regulating in a way that, 
given insurance companies’ persistent opposition, Congress did not. 
 In those specific instances where agency decisionmakers exercised 
considerable discretion rather than followed APA-prescribed proce-
dures, again agency personnel exhibited general-interest motiva-
tions. Neither the EPA, the FDA, nor the OCC promoted special in-
terests in the shadows of informal procedure. Although the OCC 
promoted the particular interests of banks by approving op-sub ap-
plications, the OCC did not liberate banks to the greater detriment of 
society at large: Again, because consumers of financial services un-
doubtedly benefit from greater competition as well as from economies 
of scale in the provision of financial services, the OCC’s policies did 
not simply deliver regulatory rents to banks. And while the OCC’s 
decisions harmed the narrow interests of insurance agents and other 
providers of financial services, the OCC did not do so in response to 
congressional pressures to advance banks’ interests at the expense of 
insurers, as the interest group theory might predict. As mentioned, 
insurance companies enjoyed at least as much influence over Con-
gress as banks did; Congress sent no cues to the OCC to help banks 
out. Moreover, the OCC’s discretionary decision to create a notice-
and-comment application process for op-sub activities shows agency 
evenhandedness towards interests adverse to banks: The OCC gave 
those opposed to applications to conduct new activities an opportu-
                                                                                                                  
 410. National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12, 19 & 31 U.S.C. ). 
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nity to explain why granting a particular application would be con-
trary to good public policy or federal banking laws. 
 Thus it seems safe to say that the agencies in question consis-
tently showed public-interest motivations. The EPA’s, FDA’s, and 
OCC’s efforts were not prompted by Congress seeking to deliver 
promised regulatory benefits to powerful constituencies, but rather 
by the agencies’ own visions of desirable regulatory policy. And when 
Congress objected to the agencies’ actions when they threatened im-
portant congressional constituencies, the agencies persisted never-
theless. For two reasons, then, the claim that agency-level regulators 
are motivated to advance public interests finds support in the stud-
ied cases. 
 And they had the legal-procedural wherewithal to do so. That is, 
the administrative process theory’s claim that regulatory decision-
making procedures go far to insulate agencies from Congress also 
seems supported by the cases in question. Particularly in the case of 
the EPA and the FDA rules, the agencies utilized APA section 553—
and on their own initiatives solicited participation far beyond the re-
quirements of section 553—to build thorough factual records justify-
ing what they proposed to do. Empowered politically and legally by 
the data and arguments relevant to their proposed rules, and made 
fully aware of data and arguments against their proposals, the EPA 
and FDA were very well positioned as a result of the rulemaking pro-
cess to defend their regulations both before Congress as well as in 
court. In a sense, initiating the rulemakings committed the agencies 
in advance to go wherever good science and good public policy coun-
seled, special-interest objections notwithstanding; the APA rulemak-
ing process thus facilitated the development of public-interested 
regulation. 
 Rulemaking certainly did not rein the agencies in. It is true, as 
McNollgast argue, that notice and comment provided an opportunity 
for congressional constituencies to mobilize against the EPA’s, 
FDA’s, and OCC’s rules. But, as the examples show, the procedure 
also provided public interest groups, health organizations, and aca-
demic researchers opportunities to register their data and arguments 
in the agencies’ rulemaking record. On balance, then, the informa-
tion generated by the rulemakings (and not only following the notice 
of proposed rulemakings) seems clearly to have empowered the agen-
cies vis-à-vis their interest group opponents. 
 Indeed, if greater participation in the rulemaking process were a 
source of congressional control over agencies, one would wonder why 
the agencies went out of their ways to solicit even more participation, 
including more opposition, than section 553 required them to do. If 
creating rulemaking procedures that mobilize potential opponents 
against agency action is how Congress controls the EPA, for example, 
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why did the EPA on its own initiative attend conferences, hold re-
gional meetings, and provide satellite telecasts to explore its revised 
ozone and particulate matter standards? And why did the EPA pro-
vide an “advance” notice of its proposed rulemaking, giving all con-
cerned additional time to mobilize against what the agency contem-
plated? The claim that openness and accessibility binds agencies to 
congressional preferences seems completely unsupported when con-
sidering the ozone and particulate matter rules especially: Interest 
group opposition and congressional disapproval of the agency’s action 
could not have been much stronger, and yet the EPA undertook to do 
what according to the McNollgast view should have decreased, not 
increased, the agency’s regulatory autonomy. By the same token, if 
notice and comment serves to keep otherwise errant agencies faithful 
to congressional will, one would wonder why the OCC established its 
own notice-and-comment procedure for considering op-sub applica-
tions. Again, if Congress uses the process to ensure that agencies fur-
ther the interests of important congressional constituencies rather 
than pursue their own respective agendas, why would the OCC vol-
untarily establish its own notice-and-comment process?  
 The Coalition on Smoking or Health’s and others’ use of section 
553’s provision allowing any party to request a rulemaking in 
prompting the tobacco rule illustrates how rulemaking can facilitate 
public interest groups’ efforts to put general-interest issues on agen-
cies’ agenda, even where Congress may oppose the agency’s response 
to the petition.411 If Congress meant to use rulemaking as a proce-
dural alarm bell that allowed interest groups to alert it when an 
agency threatened unfriendly regulation, a provision allowing groups 
to petition agencies to undertake regulation seems out of place. Of 
course, an agency may refuse, although the FDA did not, and a peti-
tioning party has little recourse (although the agency’s refusal would 
be subject to “arbitrary and capricious” review under the APA412). But 
the observation that an agency may refuse a request to initiate a 
rulemaking does not explain how the existence of the provision sup-
ports the legislative dominance claim. 
 Nor is the utility of the notice-and-comment process for those op-
posed to proposed agency action clarified by the regulatory cases in 
question. For example, consider the 300,000 letters from a single 
mail campaign, and the hundreds of form letters, that the FDA re-
ceived in opposition to its proposed tobacco rule. Mass-mailing cam-
                                                                                                                  
 411. See generally STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS , 95TH CONG., 
STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, VOL. III: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN REGULATORY AGENCY 
PROCEEDINGS 14-15 (Comm. Print 1977) (finding that petitions to initiate a rulemaking 
submitted by representatives of those outside a regulatory industry approximated or ex-
ceeded petitions submitted by regulated industries, for examined agencies including the 
FTC, NRC, and CPSC). 
 412. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994). 
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paigns such as this one are an odd institution in the context of the 
rulemaking process, awkwardly transplanted from the legislative 
arena, where their purposes seem clearer, to a forum where their ef-
ficacy is seriously questionable. For unlike legislators, the FDA was 
not counting votes or potential votes in favor of and against its to-
bacco rule. Nor do letter campaigns communicate to agencies some-
thing they do not already know. The FDA fully understood the politi-
cal implications of what it proposed, as evidenced by among other 
things Kessler’s prior requests for guidance from both the White 
House and Congress. And comments that duplicate other comments 
add nothing but paper to the agency’s rulemaking record. Perhaps 
those organizing the mass-mail campaigns thought they would send 
an intimidating signal to the FDA about the political pressures Con-
gress would be under to stop the agency, but if so the campaigns had 
no such measurable effect. The tobacco rulemaking illustrates not 
how an agency was cowed by important congressional constituencies 
who mobilized during the rulemaking process, but rather how an 
agency used that process to gather data and arguments, from a wide 
variety of sources, that the agency could use to defend its action 
against its political adversaries. 
 Finally, notice-and-comment rulemaking did not itself serve to 
alert Congress to pending agency action in any of the considered 
cases, as the McNollgast thesis suggests it does. For in each case, the 
agency began exploring and gathering data about its yet-to-be-
proposed rules far in advance of publishing its notice of a proposed 
rulemaking in the Federal Register. Affected interest groups, and 
Congress, were keenly aware of what the agencies might do before 
the commencement of section 553 rulemaking.413 The EPA’s, FDA’s, 
and OCC’s initiation of the section 553 process itself thus served to 
communicate no new information to Congress. In several ways, then, 
the agencies’ rulemakings seem most compatible with the claim that 
administrative procedure fosters agency independence more than 
congressional control. 
 The EPA and FDA cases also illustrate how the federal advisory 
committee process can promote agency autonomy. Both agencies em-
ployed FACA committees in the course of their background scientific 
research, both composed, as the FACA and its implementing regula-
tions require, of diverse interests. The EPA case is an especially good 
example of how the FACA process can promote agency autonomy. 
The EPA used its advisory committee first to prepare a study of sci-
                                                                                                                  
 413. Indeed, in some cases opposing interest groups prepared lawsuits challenging 
agency action before the agency issued its proposed rule. See, e.g., Cimons, supra note 279, 
at A24 (noting that the five largest cigarette companies and an advertising agency filed a 
challenging lawsuit “almost simultaneously” with the FDA’s announcement of its proposed 
rule). 
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entific and medical research relevant to its existing ozone and par-
ticulate matter standards and also to review and evaluate the 
agency’s own staff studies and literature reviews. The EPA’s final 
rules then refer to the advisory committee’s views and recommenda-
tions innumerable times. Subsequently, in her defense of the EPA’s 
proposed rules before Congress, Browner relied heavily on the 
CASAC’s findings. And when congressional opponents enlisted for-
mer CASAC members to testify against the agency’s proposed rules, 
Browner pointed out that the EPA relied on reports and recommen-
dations of its advisory committee as a whole, not the views, pro or 
con, of any particular committee member, whose independent views 
should not count for very much.414 Like section 553’s notice-and-
comment process, then, the FACA process worked to empower the 
agencies against their congressional and interest group critics. 
 Administrator motivations and administrative procedure to one 
side, the studied cases also illustrate how presidential oversight and 
judicial review further promote agency autonomy. While White 
House support for the EPA’s rules was slow to come, the White 
House’s ultimate support for the EPA reinforced the agency politi-
cally, making it possible for the agency to issue final rules that 
closely resembled their proposed versions. And although the White 
House was reportedly divided internally over the proposed rules—a 
division that congressional opponents of the rules emphasized—the 
Administrator of the White House’s Office of Information and Regu-
latory Affairs testified before Congress to defend the EPA, explaining 
that White House scrutiny of and questions about agency rules is 
common and should not be used as evidence that the EPA’s rules 
were misguided.415 White House oversight of the EPA rules worked 
as it should, with the White House ultimately supporting an other-
wise politically vulnerable agency. 
 The EPA case further illustrates how presidents and vice presi-
dents can sometimes better afford to support agency attempts to 
promote general interests than Congress can. According to many 
commentators, Clinton, and especially presidential candidate Gore, 
had much more to gain politically by courting midwestern states and 
cities, which opposed the EPA’s rules, than by further demonstrating 
                                                                                                                  
 414. See Review of EPA’s Proposed Ozone and Particulate Matter NAAQS Revisions, 
Part 2: Continuation of Hearings to Review EPA Proposed New National Ambient Air Qual-
ity Standards (NAAQS) for Ozone and Particulate Matter (PM) Under the Clean Air Act Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Health and Env’t. and Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of 
the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 378-83 (1997) (testimony of Carol Browner, 
Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency). 
 415. See Proposed NAAQS Hearings, supra note 212, at 177-78, 188-91 (testimony of 
Sally Katzen, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of 
Management & Budget). 
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their environmentalist credentials. 416 As one observer aptly put it, 
shortly before the White House made clear—with decisive vice-
presidential involvement417—that it was supporting the EPA: “Gore 
doesn’t need to get any greener.”418 Nevertheless, the White House 
supported the EPA. 
 The FDA case also illustrates how the White House can foster 
agency independence from Congress in ways that allow an agency 
better to pursue general interests. Although Clinton wanted electoral 
support from tobacco states in the 1996 elections, and although De-
mocratic governors and senators from those states urged him not to 
support the FDA’s tobacco initiative, the White House encouraged 
Kessler’s efforts. While the Administration perceived that limiting 
access to tobacco by children could become popular with the voters, 419 
the White House’s support of the FDA, given strong regional and in-
traparty opposition constituted, as commentators aptly described, “a 
high stakes confrontation with the tobacco industry,”420 a “mine-
field.”421 In fact, the Administration appeared to understand fully the 
potential adverse political consequences from the start, before voters 
were made much aware of the issue, yet it encouraged the FDA to go 
forward notwithstanding the political risks.422 
                                                                                                                  
 416. See Balz & Warrick, Tougher Clean Air Rules, supra note 171 (noting that Gore 
needed the support of Democratic mayors in his bid to win nomination, not the backing of 
environmental groups). 
 417. See, e.g., Cushman, Top EPA Official, supra note 216 (stating that the Vice Presi-
dent’s role was probably decisive in the White House decision to support the EPA rather 
than weaken proposed rules). 
 418. Balz & Warrick, Tougher Clean Air Rules, supra note 171. 
 419. See William Neikirk, Clinton Readies Tobacco Crackdown, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 
1996, at 1, 22 (observing that the White House believed the President’s position would hurt 
him in some states, but earn support in other states by “burnish[ing] his image as a coura-
geous president with strong values”). 
 420. Thomas, supra note 288. See also Jouzaitis, supra note 279, at 3 (quoting Repre-
sentative Richard Durbin: “‘It’s going to be a very tough fight’. . . . Clinton would be up 
‘against what I consider to be the most powerful lobby in Washington. If he’s willing to 
take (the tobacco industry) on, it speaks volumes about his own values and principles.’”); 
Clinton Launches War on Smoking, supra note 293 (observing that the President’s decision 
to support the FDA’s initiative “was fraught with political consequences because Clinton 
can ill afford to alienate Southerners heading into the 1996 elections” and quoting Clinton: 
“[Keeping cigarettes away from children] is more important than any political conse-
quences.”); Shankar Vedantam, FDA Rules to Heavily Filter Tobacco Sales, Marketing; In-
dustry Vows to Beat Back Regulations, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 24, 1996, at A1 (stating 
that the President’s and FDA’s action will influence the presidential politics in November). 
 421. Schwartz, Cigarettes as Medical Devices, supra note 399 (stating that the Clinton 
Administration and FDA were striding into a political “minefield”). 
 422. See, e.g., President’s Remarks, supra note 283. President Clinton stated that: 
 The first time [the Vice President and I] began to discuss this was about the 
time the FDA opened their inquiry. And he looked at me and I looked at him 
and I said, well, you know what this might lead to? And he said, I certainly 
hope so. (Laughter.) And I said, well, you know—I shouldn’t say this, this is our 
private conversation—I said, you know, it really isn’t an accident that nobody 
2000]  PUBLIC INTERESTED REGULATION  101 
 
 The White House backed the OCC’s liberalizing efforts too. The 
Administration went on record publicly in support of the OCC’s ini-
tiative, on the grounds that it believed financial services regulatory 
reform was overdue. And when the White House signaled to Con-
gress its strong support for financial services reform legislation, it in-
sisted, through the Treasury Department, that the OCC not be writ-
ten out of any such legislation.423 The OCC case does not illustrate a 
White House taking large political risks by supporting a public-
interest oriented agency effort, but it too shows how the White House 
can bolster an agency’s position relative to Congress and legislatively 
influential interest groups. 
 The judiciary also helped: The EPA’s rules were promulgated un-
der judicial order to revisit the NAAQS standards. In the FDA case, a 
court observed following the agency’s earlier decision not to regulate 
tobacco that the FDA might in the future proceed differently, and fol-
lowing the final tobacco rule a court vindicated the agency’s interpre-
tation of its authority under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, al-
though a higher court reversed that decision. And several federal 
courts, including the Supreme Court, repeatedly sanctioned OCC 
readings of the National Bank Act and other banking statutes. 
 And while an appeals court invalidated the EPA rules, it did so 
not on the grounds that the EPA had overstepped its statutory au-
thority, but rather on the grounds that that congressional authority 
was too vaguely interpreted.424 Moreover, the court in that case vin-
dicated the EPA against many of the criticisms its congressional and 
interest group opponents made against the rules. In any event, the 
Supreme Court ultimately vindicated the EPA’s rules. On the other 
hand, both an appeals court and subsequently the Supreme Court in 
the FDA lawsuit did determine specifically that the FDA overstepped 
its statutory authority, as did other courts with respect to certain of 
the OCC’s liberalizations. The agencies in question did not always 
survive judicial challenges to their regulatory actions, in other words, 
but the point remains that courts frequently sided with the agencies 
                                                                                                                  
else has ever tried to do this. (Laughter.) It’s not an accident. This is not going 
to be one of those freebies, you know. (Laughter.)  
Id.; Neikirk, supra note 419, at 22 (quoting Senator Jesse Helms: “The president is in ef-
fect declaring war on 76,000 North Carolinians who gain their livelihood in one form or an-
other from tobacco.”); Penny Bender, Tobacco Farmers Protest Gore, FDA Regulations, THE 
TENNESSEAN, Nov. 3, 1996, at 4B (reporting that several hundred tobacco farmers gath-
ered at Gore’s home town to protest tobacco initiative and to promise to vote against the 
Administration). 
 423. See, e.g., Banking on the Fed, WASH. TIMES, May 12, 1998, at A20; White House, 
OCC Working on Bank Reform “Principles”, NAT’L JOURNAL’S CONGRESS DAILY, June 18, 
1996. 
 424. See American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per 
curiam), modified, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d in relevant part sub nom. Whitman v. 
American Trucking Ass’ns, 121 S. Ct. 903, 911-14 (2001). 
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in important cases where agency decisions were unpopular with 
powerful congressional constituencies, but where the agencies’ posi-
tions were well supported by the contents of their rulemaking dock-
ets, even while courts at times concluded that the agencies had gone 
too far. 
 To summarize, the cases studied here lend support to the admin-
istrative process theory of regulation in that each shows how public-
interested administrators pursued general-interest regulatory goals, 
how administrative procedure—specifically, rulemaking, the advi-
sory-committee process, and informal agency decisionmaking—
promoted agency autonomy by insulating agencies from interest 
group criticism and congressional sanctions, and finally how presi-
dential oversight and judicial review further promoted agency auton-
omy. The examined cases do not provide much support for the inter-
est group theory, according to which Congress should have been able 
to discipline the agencies sufficiently well to ensure that they pro-
tected the important regulatory interests of powerful interest group 
constituencies. Organized and well-funded groups representing 
manufacturers, tobacco producers and advertisers, and insurance 
groups should have done much better than they in fact did. To be 
sure, firm conclusions cannot be drawn from three examples. But the 
cases certainly suggest that administrator motivations, the proce-
dural rules according to which agencies regulate, and agency rela-
tionships with the White House and the courts can be at least as de-
terminative of regulatory outcomes as is the constellation of congres-
sional constituencies affected by regulatory choices. 
C.   Toward A Synthesis 
 Yet in the end, one need not choose between exaggerated alterna-
tive theories. A single-minded focus on administrative process may 
be just as misguided as a narrow preoccupation with interest groups 
and legislative motivation. To say that regulators are sometimes mo-
tivated to pursue public-interested regulation, or that they may often 
have the procedural and institutional decisionmaking tools to do so 
even over interest group and legislative objection, is hardly to gain-
say the importance of interest groups or legislative preferences, 
which after all may carry the day. The cases examined here do not 
show, for example, that interest groups are irrelevant. To the con-
trary, opponents of the regulatory initiatives showed considerable 
strength in the administrative arena, nearly prevailed in the legisla-
tive arena, and sometimes prevailed in court. Nor do the cases show 
that congressional preferences concerning regulatory outcomes are 
irrelevant; Congress exhibited considerable influence over the agen-
cies, just not enough to prompt the agencies to abandon or substan-
tially redirect their respective courses. 
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 The thesis advanced so far here is simply that there is more—not 
less—to the story of regulation than interest group politics and con-
gressional control, notwithstanding the great explanatory weight 
these usually are thought to carry. The interesting question becomes, 
then, under what circumstances are regulatory decisionmaking proc-
esses more likely to yield public-interested outcomes, and under what 
different circumstances will regulatory outcomes more likely deliver 
narrow and socially wasteful benefits. While an exhaustive treat-
ment of this issue is beyond the present scope, it is now possible to 
begin to identify the conditions most likely associated with different 
types of regulation. 
 Take the pure cases first. On the one side, one might most expect 
to find public-interested regulation where:  
(1) administrators are ideologically motivated to advance general 
interests; 
(2) advancing such interests will not seriously jeopardize an 
agency’s own institutional interests, budgetary or otherwise;  
(3) agency decisionmaking processes promote political autonomy 
from interest groups and legislators hostile to the agency’s motiva-
tions; 
(4) there is no easily revolving door between the relevant agency 
and regulated interest groups;  
(5) the implicated regulatory interests are themselves divided over 
the merits of the agency’s regulatory program; 
(6) the White House is willing to make the agency’s agenda a prior-
ity worthy of political capital;  
(7) the agency is able to create high public visibility with respect to 
its regulatory program;  
(8) agency decisionmaking is supported judicially; and  
(9) the relevant scientific or expert community provides consensus 
support for the agency’s general-interest program.  
The coincidence of these conditions might be said to constitute the 
easiest case for public-interested regulation. These conditions begin 
to specify the circumstances under which administrators seek to ad-
vance general interests, possess the legal and political wherewithal 
to do so, and enjoy an institutional environment compatible with 
their regulatory aims. 
 By implication, one would least expect to find public-interested 
regulation where:  
(1) administrators exhibit no commitment to such regulation;  
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(2) any effort to advance general-interest regulatory policies would 
seriously jeopardize the relevant agency’s own institutional inter-
ests;  
(3) agency decisionmaking processes constrain rather than liberate 
the agency politically by facilitating legislative control; 
(4) interest groups have easy access to the agency; 
(5) interest groups are united with respect to their preferred regu-
latory outcome; 
(6) the White House is unwilling to support the agency politically;  
(7) the agency is unable to create high public visibility that would 
generate support for a public-interested regulatory program;  
(8) agency decisionmaking is discredited judicially; and  
(9) the agency is unable to enlist broad scientific or expert support 
for such a program.  
The coincidence of these conditions might constitute the easiest case 
for special-interest regulation; where they are met, public-interested 
regulation is most unlikely. 
 Of course, the real world is rarely divided so neatly. Yet, to be 
more specific than this, one would next have to gauge the relative 
importance of the above conditions, no easy task. On the other hand, 
it is quite clear that the conditions most conducive to public-
interested regulation are not all necessary conditions. For example, 
in each of the studied cases, the agencies’ institutional interests in 
budgetary stability was to some extent threatened, and yet the agen-
cies were not disciplined by threats to their budgets. For another ex-
ample, in the EPA case the White House’s support of the agency, al-
though crucial and ultimately forthcoming, came slow and late. Per-
haps worse, in the EPA and FDA cases the relevant regulated inter-
ests were not divided with respect to the EPA’s and FDA’s initiatives. 
And finally, none of the agencies was consistently supported by the 
courts when interests adverse to the agencies brought judicial chal-
lenges. 
 On the other hand, some of the conditions conducive to public-
interested regulation probably are necessary conditions. Agencies 
will advance public-interested regulation, for example, only where 
agency decisionmakers themselves are motivated to do so. Unless 
agencies advance general regulatory interests inadvertently, in other 
words, they do so only because agency decisionmakers aim to further 
their own conceptions of the public interest. Others among the speci-
fied conditions are probably contingently necessary. For example, if 
regulated interests and their legislative supporters are united in op-
position to an agency’s public-interested regulatory initiative, then 
agency decisionmaking processes that promote agency autonomy are 
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almost certainly crucial. If instead regulated interests are them-
selves divided, and that division carries over to Congress, an agency 
may be able to advance its own vision of public-interested regulation 
even if it lacked considerable political autonomy. 
 To say much more about the relative importance of the above con-
ditions would require undertaking many more than three regulatory 
case studies, gradually isolating the different variables and their 
possible combinations. For now, the important point is that interest 
group and legislative preferences are not irrelevant to explaining 
regulatory outcomes, just as they are not the only relevant considera-
tions. And, where agencies are motivated to advance general inter-
ests, where administrative decisionmaking processes promote agency 
autonomy, and where the White House and the judiciary further in-
sulate agencies from political pressures, the regulatory preferences of 
powerful interests groups and even Congress are unlikely to prove 
decisive. To greater and lesser degrees, the studied cases provide 
support for that much at least. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 An old cliché familiar to students of political science holds that 
there are essentially but two theories of government, the corruption 
theory and the incompetence theory. This Article has explored one 
fairly well-developed, and certainly influential, version of the former. 
While visions of incompetence are commonly associated with the 
regulatory state in popular culture, and while scholars and even poli-
ticians regularly document instances of patently undesirable or in-
consistent agency decisionmaking,425 there is no developed theoretical 
model of regulation explaining how the fundamental forces underly-
ing regulatory decisionmaking routinely work to generate incompe-
tent regulatory policy. There is, however, a distinguished theory ac-
cording to which those forces regularly produce policies that advance 
narrow interests at the rest of society’s greater expense. That theory 
has provided an academic ballast for various programs of political re-
form—the deregulation era of the early 1980s, the initiative of the 
Council on Competitiveness in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, the Con-
tract with America, calls to rely more heavily on private-law regula-
tion, and so on. More generally, the theory accounts for a certain 
jaundice that many (though by no means all) academicians and 
commentators of various political and philosophical persuasions ex-
hibit towards public-law regulation. 
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 Undoubtedly, the regulatory state is at times “corrupt” in the spe-
cific sense the interest group theory contemplates. But the interest 
group theory predicts undesirable regulatory policy as a matter of 
course, and it reaches that conclusion only because it oversimplifies 
regulatory decisionmaking, emphasizing the relationship between 
legislators and interest groups, and assuming that legislators can ef-
fectively discipline administrative agencies to ensure delivery of 
regulatory rents to favored interests. Once the complexities of the re-
lationship between legislators and agencies are taken into account, 
however—moving beyond tired observations such as the importance 
of Congress’ budget power—the picture changes. Legislative influ-
ence over agency-level regulatory decisions becomes more precarious. 
 This Article presented an alternative picture. According to that 
picture, regulatory outcomes are explicable only with due emphasis 
on the full legal-procedural context in which agencies operate. Given 
the structure of the administrative-process rules through which 
agencies make regulatory decisions, and given the nature of presi-
dential oversight and judicial review, there are reasons to believe 
agencies are fairly well situated—in a legal-procedural sense—to 
regulate in the public interest, to the extent they are motivated to do 
so. And indeed, recent regulatory activity in the environmental, con-
sumer protection, and financial services arenas suggests that admin-
istrators are at least sometimes—and on very important regulatory 
policy occasions at that—motivated by general-interest goals. Al-
though scholars such as Stigler have argued that administrators’ mo-
tivations are irrelevant to an understanding of regulation—because 
the forces operating on administrators lead them to provide regula-
tory rents however benign their intentions426—the examples consid-
ered here suggest to the contrary that administrative procedure and 
administrative law go far to liberate public-interested agencies from 
Congress and congressional constituencies. Focusing on administra-
tor motivations and the administrative processes through which 
agencies regulate thus begins to remedy the existing mismatch be-
tween academic theory and regulatory reality. 
 The alternative theory presented here is itself incomplete, to be 
sure. It emphasizes administrative decisionmaking procedures and 
the legal-institutional context in which agencies operate, with less to 
say about matters such as agency decisions not to regulate, for one 
example. A fuller treatment of the dynamics of regulation would in-
tegrate more. A fuller treatment would also specify more completely 
the circumstances under which administrators are most/least moti-
vated to advance public interests, the conditions under which agen-
                                                                                                                  
 426. See, e.g., STIGLER, The Consumer, supra note 8, at 181; Stigler, The Theory, supra 
note 3, at 17-18. 
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cies are most/least likely to respond to congressional cues about de-
sirable regulatory outcomes, the contexts in which presidential over-
sight is most/least likely to empower agencies against influential in-
terest groups, and so on. But whatever additional work remains to be 
done, any account of regulation divorced from administration leaves 
out a lot in the meantime. And any account of regulation that views 
the administrative process simply as a(nother) device to ensure con-
gressional control of agencies seems unconvincing. 
 Of course, none of this directly answers the incompetence theory. 
Administrative regulators might often aspire to vindicate public in-
terests, and may often enjoy sufficient legal-procedural autonomy to 
do so, but routinely blow it. Whether regulatory policies truly serve 
public interests by delivering broad-based policies that are on net so-
cially beneficial, as opposed to broad-based but socially wasteful, will 
be saved for another day, though it deserves mention that the cases 
examined here would not support the incompetence theory either. 427 
In the meantime, students of regulation seem justified in seeking de-
cisionmaking mechanisms most likely to yield socially desirable regu-
latory policy, rather than capitulating to a conventional wisdom that 
sees the administrative state as an inevitable failure. 
                                                                                                                  
 427. For example, in the EPA and FDA cases, the cost-benefit analyses, viewed in the 
light least favorable to the agencies, still suggest that the regulations were cost-justified.  
